Does Corruption Impact on Firms' Ability to Conduct Business in Mauritania? Evidence from Investment Climate Survey Data
This paper seeks to understand whether Mauritanian firms deem corruption as an obstacle to operate and grow, to identify the profile of firms that are more likely to make informal payments, and to quantify the size of these payments. The results of the analysis show that perceptions of corruption can be potentially misleading. Corruption is not considered to be one of the most taxing factors impeding the growth of firms in Mauritania. Yet, its cost to firms is significant and greater than in the comparator group countries. This means that corruption is internalized by firms and considered an accepted practice. Alternatively, firms may fear reporting corruption practices for fear of retaliation. Econometric evidence on the propensity and intensity of bribes suggests that medium-size firms suffer the most from corruption in Mauritania. Larger firms are more established and connected, do not fear exiting the market, and are less likely to be harassed. Smaller firms are less visible and may be able to escape the control of public officials by operating largely in the informal sector. Medium-size firms are the most likely to pay bribes and to pay the highest amounts as a percentage of their total annual sales, which places a heavy burden on their ability to grow.
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dig-okr-109867570 |
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koha |
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Banco Mundial |
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Estados Unidos |
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US |
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Bibliográfico |
| access |
En linea |
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dig-okr |
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biblioteca |
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America del Norte |
| libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCESS TO FINANCE ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES AUTHORITY BANK CREDIT BARRIERS TO GROWTH BORROWING BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRAT BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURES BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS OPERATIONS BUSINESS OWNERSHIP BUSINESS PEOPLE BUSINESSMEN CAPITAL STOCK CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPANY COMPETITORS COMPOSITE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPT CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION DATA CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION VARIABLES COUNTRIES % FIRMS COUNTRY REPORTS CPI CREDIT ACCESS CRIME DECISION-MAKING DEGREE OF CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION ECONOMIC AGENTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC REFORMS EMBEZZLEMENT EMPLOYEE EMPLOYMENT ENTREPRENEURS EXPANSION EXPLOITATION FAMILIES FAMILY BUSINESS FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL COST FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL MARKETS FIRM SIZE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GOVERNMENT SERVICES GRAFT GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES HUMAN RIGHTS INCOME INEQUALITY INFORMAL PAYMENT INFORMAL PAYMENTS INFORMAL SECTOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INSURANCE SERVICES INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT CLIMATE KEY CHALLENGE KICKBACKS LACK OF COMPETITION LATIN AMERICAN LEADERSHIP LISTED COMPANY LOAN MEASURING CORRUPTION MEASURING GOVERNANCE MEDIUM ENTERPRISES MICRO ENTERPRISES MONOPOLIES NATURAL RESOURCES NEW BUSINESS OBSTACLES TO GROWTH OFFICE HOLDERS OLIGARCHY PARTY PATRONAGE PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION PERSONAL GAIN PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL PRIVATE GAIN PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT POLICIES PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC CONTRACTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCES PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SPENDING REAL ESTATE RED TAPE REGULATORY BURDEN REGULATORY POLICIES REGULATORY QUALITY RULE OF LAW SKILLED WORKERS SMALL FIRMS SOURCE OF INFORMATION STATE CONTROL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TAX INSPECTIONS TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TERM CREDIT TRANSPARENCY UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY VIOLENCE WEALTH CREATION ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCESS TO FINANCE ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES AUTHORITY BANK CREDIT BARRIERS TO GROWTH BORROWING BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRAT BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURES BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS OPERATIONS BUSINESS OWNERSHIP BUSINESS PEOPLE BUSINESSMEN CAPITAL STOCK CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPANY COMPETITORS COMPOSITE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPT CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION DATA CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION VARIABLES COUNTRIES % FIRMS COUNTRY REPORTS CPI CREDIT ACCESS CRIME DECISION-MAKING DEGREE OF CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION ECONOMIC AGENTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC REFORMS EMBEZZLEMENT EMPLOYEE EMPLOYMENT ENTREPRENEURS EXPANSION EXPLOITATION FAMILIES FAMILY BUSINESS FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL COST FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL MARKETS FIRM SIZE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GOVERNMENT SERVICES GRAFT GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES HUMAN RIGHTS INCOME INEQUALITY INFORMAL PAYMENT INFORMAL PAYMENTS INFORMAL SECTOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INSURANCE SERVICES INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT CLIMATE KEY CHALLENGE KICKBACKS LACK OF COMPETITION LATIN AMERICAN LEADERSHIP LISTED COMPANY LOAN MEASURING CORRUPTION MEASURING GOVERNANCE MEDIUM ENTERPRISES MICRO ENTERPRISES MONOPOLIES NATURAL RESOURCES NEW BUSINESS OBSTACLES TO GROWTH OFFICE HOLDERS OLIGARCHY PARTY PATRONAGE PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION PERSONAL GAIN PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL PRIVATE GAIN PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT POLICIES PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC CONTRACTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCES PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SPENDING REAL ESTATE RED TAPE REGULATORY BURDEN REGULATORY POLICIES REGULATORY QUALITY RULE OF LAW SKILLED WORKERS SMALL FIRMS SOURCE OF INFORMATION STATE CONTROL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TAX INSPECTIONS TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TERM CREDIT TRANSPARENCY UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY VIOLENCE WEALTH CREATION |
| spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCESS TO FINANCE ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES AUTHORITY BANK CREDIT BARRIERS TO GROWTH BORROWING BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRAT BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURES BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS OPERATIONS BUSINESS OWNERSHIP BUSINESS PEOPLE BUSINESSMEN CAPITAL STOCK CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPANY COMPETITORS COMPOSITE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPT CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION DATA CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION VARIABLES COUNTRIES % FIRMS COUNTRY REPORTS CPI CREDIT ACCESS CRIME DECISION-MAKING DEGREE OF CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION ECONOMIC AGENTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC REFORMS EMBEZZLEMENT EMPLOYEE EMPLOYMENT ENTREPRENEURS EXPANSION EXPLOITATION FAMILIES FAMILY BUSINESS FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL COST FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL MARKETS FIRM SIZE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GOVERNMENT SERVICES GRAFT GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES HUMAN RIGHTS INCOME INEQUALITY INFORMAL PAYMENT INFORMAL PAYMENTS INFORMAL SECTOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INSURANCE SERVICES INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT CLIMATE KEY CHALLENGE KICKBACKS LACK OF COMPETITION LATIN AMERICAN LEADERSHIP LISTED COMPANY LOAN MEASURING CORRUPTION MEASURING GOVERNANCE MEDIUM ENTERPRISES MICRO ENTERPRISES MONOPOLIES NATURAL RESOURCES NEW BUSINESS OBSTACLES TO GROWTH OFFICE HOLDERS OLIGARCHY PARTY PATRONAGE PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION PERSONAL GAIN PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL PRIVATE GAIN PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT POLICIES PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC CONTRACTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCES PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SPENDING REAL ESTATE RED TAPE REGULATORY BURDEN REGULATORY POLICIES REGULATORY QUALITY RULE OF LAW SKILLED WORKERS SMALL FIRMS SOURCE OF INFORMATION STATE CONTROL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TAX INSPECTIONS TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TERM CREDIT TRANSPARENCY UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY VIOLENCE WEALTH CREATION ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCESS TO FINANCE ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES AUTHORITY BANK CREDIT BARRIERS TO GROWTH BORROWING BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRAT BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURES BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS OPERATIONS BUSINESS OWNERSHIP BUSINESS PEOPLE BUSINESSMEN CAPITAL STOCK CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPANY COMPETITORS COMPOSITE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPT CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION DATA CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION VARIABLES COUNTRIES % FIRMS COUNTRY REPORTS CPI CREDIT ACCESS CRIME DECISION-MAKING DEGREE OF CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION ECONOMIC AGENTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC REFORMS EMBEZZLEMENT EMPLOYEE EMPLOYMENT ENTREPRENEURS EXPANSION EXPLOITATION FAMILIES FAMILY BUSINESS FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL COST FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL MARKETS FIRM SIZE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GOVERNMENT SERVICES GRAFT GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES HUMAN RIGHTS INCOME INEQUALITY INFORMAL PAYMENT INFORMAL PAYMENTS INFORMAL SECTOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INSURANCE SERVICES INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT CLIMATE KEY CHALLENGE KICKBACKS LACK OF COMPETITION LATIN AMERICAN LEADERSHIP LISTED COMPANY LOAN MEASURING CORRUPTION MEASURING GOVERNANCE MEDIUM ENTERPRISES MICRO ENTERPRISES MONOPOLIES NATURAL RESOURCES NEW BUSINESS OBSTACLES TO GROWTH OFFICE HOLDERS OLIGARCHY PARTY PATRONAGE PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION PERSONAL GAIN PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL PRIVATE GAIN PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT POLICIES PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC CONTRACTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCES PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SPENDING REAL ESTATE RED TAPE REGULATORY BURDEN REGULATORY POLICIES REGULATORY QUALITY RULE OF LAW SKILLED WORKERS SMALL FIRMS SOURCE OF INFORMATION STATE CONTROL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TAX INSPECTIONS TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TERM CREDIT TRANSPARENCY UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY VIOLENCE WEALTH CREATION Francisco, Manuela Pontara, Nicola Does Corruption Impact on Firms' Ability to Conduct Business in Mauritania? Evidence from Investment Climate Survey Data |
| description |
This paper seeks to understand whether
Mauritanian firms deem corruption as an obstacle to operate
and grow, to identify the profile of firms that are more
likely to make informal payments, and to quantify the size
of these payments. The results of the analysis show that
perceptions of corruption can be potentially misleading.
Corruption is not considered to be one of the most taxing
factors impeding the growth of firms in Mauritania. Yet, its
cost to firms is significant and greater than in the
comparator group countries. This means that corruption is
internalized by firms and considered an accepted practice.
Alternatively, firms may fear reporting corruption practices
for fear of retaliation. Econometric evidence on the
propensity and intensity of bribes suggests that medium-size
firms suffer the most from corruption in Mauritania. Larger
firms are more established and connected, do not fear
exiting the market, and are less likely to be harassed.
Smaller firms are less visible and may be able to escape the
control of public officials by operating largely in the
informal sector. Medium-size firms are the most likely to
pay bribes and to pay the highest amounts as a percentage of
their total annual sales, which places a heavy burden on
their ability to grow. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| topic_facet |
ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCESS TO FINANCE ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES AUTHORITY BANK CREDIT BARRIERS TO GROWTH BORROWING BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRAT BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURES BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS OPERATIONS BUSINESS OWNERSHIP BUSINESS PEOPLE BUSINESSMEN CAPITAL STOCK CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPANY COMPETITORS COMPOSITE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPT CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION DATA CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION VARIABLES COUNTRIES % FIRMS COUNTRY REPORTS CPI CREDIT ACCESS CRIME DECISION-MAKING DEGREE OF CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION ECONOMIC AGENTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC REFORMS EMBEZZLEMENT EMPLOYEE EMPLOYMENT ENTREPRENEURS EXPANSION EXPLOITATION FAMILIES FAMILY BUSINESS FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL COST FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL MARKETS FIRM SIZE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GOVERNMENT SERVICES GRAFT GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES HUMAN RIGHTS INCOME INEQUALITY INFORMAL PAYMENT INFORMAL PAYMENTS INFORMAL SECTOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INSURANCE SERVICES INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT CLIMATE KEY CHALLENGE KICKBACKS LACK OF COMPETITION LATIN AMERICAN LEADERSHIP LISTED COMPANY LOAN MEASURING CORRUPTION MEASURING GOVERNANCE MEDIUM ENTERPRISES MICRO ENTERPRISES MONOPOLIES NATURAL RESOURCES NEW BUSINESS OBSTACLES TO GROWTH OFFICE HOLDERS OLIGARCHY PARTY PATRONAGE PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION PERSONAL GAIN PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL PRIVATE GAIN PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT POLICIES PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC CONTRACTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCES PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SPENDING REAL ESTATE RED TAPE REGULATORY BURDEN REGULATORY POLICIES REGULATORY QUALITY RULE OF LAW SKILLED WORKERS SMALL FIRMS SOURCE OF INFORMATION STATE CONTROL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TAX INSPECTIONS TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TERM CREDIT TRANSPARENCY UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY VIOLENCE WEALTH CREATION |
| author |
Francisco, Manuela Pontara, Nicola |
| author_facet |
Francisco, Manuela Pontara, Nicola |
| author_sort |
Francisco, Manuela |
| title |
Does Corruption Impact on Firms' Ability to Conduct Business in Mauritania? Evidence from Investment Climate Survey Data |
| title_short |
Does Corruption Impact on Firms' Ability to Conduct Business in Mauritania? Evidence from Investment Climate Survey Data |
| title_full |
Does Corruption Impact on Firms' Ability to Conduct Business in Mauritania? Evidence from Investment Climate Survey Data |
| title_fullStr |
Does Corruption Impact on Firms' Ability to Conduct Business in Mauritania? Evidence from Investment Climate Survey Data |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Does Corruption Impact on Firms' Ability to Conduct Business in Mauritania? Evidence from Investment Climate Survey Data |
| title_sort |
does corruption impact on firms' ability to conduct business in mauritania? evidence from investment climate survey data |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2007-12 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/12/8879695/corruption-impact-firms-ability-conduct-business-mauritania-evidence-investment-climate-survey-data http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7570 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT franciscomanuela doescorruptionimpactonfirmsabilitytoconductbusinessinmauritaniaevidencefrominvestmentclimatesurveydata AT pontaranicola doescorruptionimpactonfirmsabilitytoconductbusinessinmauritaniaevidencefrominvestmentclimatesurveydata |
| _version_ |
1756571906057699328 |
| spelling |
dig-okr-1098675702021-04-23T14:02:35Z Does Corruption Impact on Firms' Ability to Conduct Business in Mauritania? Evidence from Investment Climate Survey Data Francisco, Manuela Pontara, Nicola ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCESS TO FINANCE ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES AUTHORITY BANK CREDIT BARRIERS TO GROWTH BORROWING BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRAT BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURES BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS OPERATIONS BUSINESS OWNERSHIP BUSINESS PEOPLE BUSINESSMEN CAPITAL STOCK CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPANY COMPETITORS COMPOSITE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPT CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION DATA CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION VARIABLES COUNTRIES % FIRMS COUNTRY REPORTS CPI CREDIT ACCESS CRIME DECISION-MAKING DEGREE OF CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION ECONOMIC AGENTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC REFORMS EMBEZZLEMENT EMPLOYEE EMPLOYMENT ENTREPRENEURS EXPANSION EXPLOITATION FAMILIES FAMILY BUSINESS FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL COST FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL MARKETS FIRM SIZE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GOVERNMENT SERVICES GRAFT GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES HUMAN RIGHTS INCOME INEQUALITY INFORMAL PAYMENT INFORMAL PAYMENTS INFORMAL SECTOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INSURANCE SERVICES INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT CLIMATE KEY CHALLENGE KICKBACKS LACK OF COMPETITION LATIN AMERICAN LEADERSHIP LISTED COMPANY LOAN MEASURING CORRUPTION MEASURING GOVERNANCE MEDIUM ENTERPRISES MICRO ENTERPRISES MONOPOLIES NATURAL RESOURCES NEW BUSINESS OBSTACLES TO GROWTH OFFICE HOLDERS OLIGARCHY PARTY PATRONAGE PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION PERSONAL GAIN PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL PRIVATE GAIN PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT POLICIES PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC CONTRACTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCES PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SPENDING REAL ESTATE RED TAPE REGULATORY BURDEN REGULATORY POLICIES REGULATORY QUALITY RULE OF LAW SKILLED WORKERS SMALL FIRMS SOURCE OF INFORMATION STATE CONTROL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TAX INSPECTIONS TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TERM CREDIT TRANSPARENCY UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY VIOLENCE WEALTH CREATION This paper seeks to understand whether Mauritanian firms deem corruption as an obstacle to operate and grow, to identify the profile of firms that are more likely to make informal payments, and to quantify the size of these payments. The results of the analysis show that perceptions of corruption can be potentially misleading. Corruption is not considered to be one of the most taxing factors impeding the growth of firms in Mauritania. Yet, its cost to firms is significant and greater than in the comparator group countries. This means that corruption is internalized by firms and considered an accepted practice. Alternatively, firms may fear reporting corruption practices for fear of retaliation. Econometric evidence on the propensity and intensity of bribes suggests that medium-size firms suffer the most from corruption in Mauritania. Larger firms are more established and connected, do not fear exiting the market, and are less likely to be harassed. Smaller firms are less visible and may be able to escape the control of public officials by operating largely in the informal sector. Medium-size firms are the most likely to pay bribes and to pay the highest amounts as a percentage of their total annual sales, which places a heavy burden on their ability to grow. 2012-06-08T19:16:30Z 2012-06-08T19:16:30Z 2007-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/12/8879695/corruption-impact-firms-ability-conduct-business-mauritania-evidence-investment-climate-survey-data http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7570 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4439 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Africa Mauritania |