The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms

This paper measures the extent to which firms in developing countries are the target of bribes. Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin American countries, we first show that perceptions adjust slowly to firms' experience with corrupt officials and hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft. We then construct an experience-based index that reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business transactions. On average, African firms are three times as likely to be asked for bribes as are firms in Latin America, although there is substantial variation within each region. Last, we show that graft appears to be more prevalent in countries with excessive regulation and where democracy is weak. In particular, our results suggest that the incidence of graft in Africa would fall by approximately 85 percent if countries in the region had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in Latin America.

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Main Authors: González, Alvaro, Ernesto López-Córdova, J., E. Valladares, Elio
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2007-11
Subjects:ACCOUNTABILITY, ANTI-CORRUPTION, ARSON, BRIBE, BRIBERY, BRIBES, BRIBING, BUSINESS CLIMATE, BUSINESS ENTRY, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT, BUSINESS REGULATIONS, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, BUSINESSES, CENTRAL AMERICA, CIVIL SERVANTS, COMPETITIVENESS, CONFIDENCE, CORRUPT, CORRUPT ACTS, CORRUPT OFFICIALS, CORRUPT PRACTICES, CORRUPTION, CORRUPTION PERCEPTION, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX, CRIME, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRACY, ELECTRICITY, ENTERPRISE SURVEY, ENTERPRISE SURVEYS, ENTREPRENEURS, EXTORTION, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, GRAFT, HOUSEHOLDS, INSPECTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL REFORM, INTEGRITY, INTERNATIONAL BANK, LATIN AMERICAN, LEGAL SYSTEM, LICENSE, LICENSES, MEDIA, MOBILE TELEPHONES, MULTINATIONAL, NEPOTISM, PAYOFF, PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION, PETTY CORRUPTION, POLITICAL CORRUPTION, PRIVATE SECTOR, PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, PROCUREMENT, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PUBLIC POLICY, REMEDY, RESULT, RESULTS, ROBBERY, SOLICITATIONS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TELEPHONE, TELEPHONE CONNECTION, TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS, TELEPHONE SERVICE, TELEPHONE SERVICES, TELEPHONY, THEFT, TRANSACTION, USERS, VICTIMS, WEB, Microdata Set,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/11/8682858/incidence-graft-developing-country-firms
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/7529
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spelling dig-okr-1098675292024-08-08T16:51:41Z The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms González, Alvaro Ernesto López-Córdova, J. E. Valladares, Elio ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI-CORRUPTION ARSON BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BRIBING BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENTRY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS REGULATIONS BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS BUSINESSES CENTRAL AMERICA CIVIL SERVANTS COMPETITIVENESS CONFIDENCE CORRUPT CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CRIME DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY ELECTRICITY ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENTERPRISE SURVEYS ENTREPRENEURS EXTORTION GOVERNMENT CONTRACT GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAFT HOUSEHOLDS INSPECTIONS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL BANK LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM LICENSE LICENSES MEDIA MOBILE TELEPHONES MULTINATIONAL NEPOTISM PAYOFF PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY REMEDY RESULT RESULTS ROBBERY SOLICITATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELEPHONE TELEPHONE CONNECTION TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS TELEPHONE SERVICE TELEPHONE SERVICES TELEPHONY THEFT TRANSACTION USERS VICTIMS WEB Microdata Set This paper measures the extent to which firms in developing countries are the target of bribes. Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin American countries, we first show that perceptions adjust slowly to firms' experience with corrupt officials and hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft. We then construct an experience-based index that reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business transactions. On average, African firms are three times as likely to be asked for bribes as are firms in Latin America, although there is substantial variation within each region. Last, we show that graft appears to be more prevalent in countries with excessive regulation and where democracy is weak. In particular, our results suggest that the incidence of graft in Africa would fall by approximately 85 percent if countries in the region had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in Latin America. 2012-06-08T15:39:03Z 2012-06-08T15:39:03Z 2007-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/11/8682858/incidence-graft-developing-country-firms https://hdl.handle.net/10986/7529 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4394 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC
institution Banco Mundial
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language English
topic ACCOUNTABILITY
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ARSON
BRIBE
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BRIBING
BUSINESS CLIMATE
BUSINESS ENTRY
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
BUSINESS REGULATIONS
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
BUSINESSES
CENTRAL AMERICA
CIVIL SERVANTS
COMPETITIVENESS
CONFIDENCE
CORRUPT
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
CRIME
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
ELECTRICITY
ENTERPRISE SURVEY
ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
ENTREPRENEURS
EXTORTION
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GRAFT
HOUSEHOLDS
INSPECTIONS
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
INTEGRITY
INTERNATIONAL BANK
LATIN AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM
LICENSE
LICENSES
MEDIA
MOBILE TELEPHONES
MULTINATIONAL
NEPOTISM
PAYOFF
PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
PRIVATE SECTOR
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC POLICY
REMEDY
RESULT
RESULTS
ROBBERY
SOLICITATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELEPHONE
TELEPHONE CONNECTION
TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS
TELEPHONE SERVICE
TELEPHONE SERVICES
TELEPHONY
THEFT
TRANSACTION
USERS
VICTIMS
WEB
Microdata Set
ACCOUNTABILITY
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ARSON
BRIBE
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BRIBING
BUSINESS CLIMATE
BUSINESS ENTRY
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
BUSINESS REGULATIONS
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
BUSINESSES
CENTRAL AMERICA
CIVIL SERVANTS
COMPETITIVENESS
CONFIDENCE
CORRUPT
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
CRIME
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
ELECTRICITY
ENTERPRISE SURVEY
ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
ENTREPRENEURS
EXTORTION
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GRAFT
HOUSEHOLDS
INSPECTIONS
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
INTEGRITY
INTERNATIONAL BANK
LATIN AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM
LICENSE
LICENSES
MEDIA
MOBILE TELEPHONES
MULTINATIONAL
NEPOTISM
PAYOFF
PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
PRIVATE SECTOR
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC POLICY
REMEDY
RESULT
RESULTS
ROBBERY
SOLICITATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELEPHONE
TELEPHONE CONNECTION
TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS
TELEPHONE SERVICE
TELEPHONE SERVICES
TELEPHONY
THEFT
TRANSACTION
USERS
VICTIMS
WEB
Microdata Set
spellingShingle ACCOUNTABILITY
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ARSON
BRIBE
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BRIBING
BUSINESS CLIMATE
BUSINESS ENTRY
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
BUSINESS REGULATIONS
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
BUSINESSES
CENTRAL AMERICA
CIVIL SERVANTS
COMPETITIVENESS
CONFIDENCE
CORRUPT
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
CRIME
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
ELECTRICITY
ENTERPRISE SURVEY
ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
ENTREPRENEURS
EXTORTION
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GRAFT
HOUSEHOLDS
INSPECTIONS
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
INTEGRITY
INTERNATIONAL BANK
LATIN AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM
LICENSE
LICENSES
MEDIA
MOBILE TELEPHONES
MULTINATIONAL
NEPOTISM
PAYOFF
PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
PRIVATE SECTOR
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC POLICY
REMEDY
RESULT
RESULTS
ROBBERY
SOLICITATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELEPHONE
TELEPHONE CONNECTION
TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS
TELEPHONE SERVICE
TELEPHONE SERVICES
TELEPHONY
THEFT
TRANSACTION
USERS
VICTIMS
WEB
Microdata Set
ACCOUNTABILITY
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ARSON
BRIBE
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BRIBING
BUSINESS CLIMATE
BUSINESS ENTRY
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
BUSINESS REGULATIONS
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
BUSINESSES
CENTRAL AMERICA
CIVIL SERVANTS
COMPETITIVENESS
CONFIDENCE
CORRUPT
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
CRIME
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
ELECTRICITY
ENTERPRISE SURVEY
ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
ENTREPRENEURS
EXTORTION
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GRAFT
HOUSEHOLDS
INSPECTIONS
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
INTEGRITY
INTERNATIONAL BANK
LATIN AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM
LICENSE
LICENSES
MEDIA
MOBILE TELEPHONES
MULTINATIONAL
NEPOTISM
PAYOFF
PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
PRIVATE SECTOR
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC POLICY
REMEDY
RESULT
RESULTS
ROBBERY
SOLICITATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELEPHONE
TELEPHONE CONNECTION
TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS
TELEPHONE SERVICE
TELEPHONE SERVICES
TELEPHONY
THEFT
TRANSACTION
USERS
VICTIMS
WEB
Microdata Set
González, Alvaro
Ernesto López-Córdova, J.
E. Valladares, Elio
The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms
description This paper measures the extent to which firms in developing countries are the target of bribes. Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin American countries, we first show that perceptions adjust slowly to firms' experience with corrupt officials and hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft. We then construct an experience-based index that reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business transactions. On average, African firms are three times as likely to be asked for bribes as are firms in Latin America, although there is substantial variation within each region. Last, we show that graft appears to be more prevalent in countries with excessive regulation and where democracy is weak. In particular, our results suggest that the incidence of graft in Africa would fall by approximately 85 percent if countries in the region had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in Latin America.
topic_facet ACCOUNTABILITY
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ARSON
BRIBE
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BRIBING
BUSINESS CLIMATE
BUSINESS ENTRY
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
BUSINESS REGULATIONS
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
BUSINESSES
CENTRAL AMERICA
CIVIL SERVANTS
COMPETITIVENESS
CONFIDENCE
CORRUPT
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
CRIME
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
ELECTRICITY
ENTERPRISE SURVEY
ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
ENTREPRENEURS
EXTORTION
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GRAFT
HOUSEHOLDS
INSPECTIONS
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
INTEGRITY
INTERNATIONAL BANK
LATIN AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM
LICENSE
LICENSES
MEDIA
MOBILE TELEPHONES
MULTINATIONAL
NEPOTISM
PAYOFF
PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
PRIVATE SECTOR
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC POLICY
REMEDY
RESULT
RESULTS
ROBBERY
SOLICITATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELEPHONE
TELEPHONE CONNECTION
TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS
TELEPHONE SERVICE
TELEPHONE SERVICES
TELEPHONY
THEFT
TRANSACTION
USERS
VICTIMS
WEB
Microdata Set
author González, Alvaro
Ernesto López-Córdova, J.
E. Valladares, Elio
author_facet González, Alvaro
Ernesto López-Córdova, J.
E. Valladares, Elio
author_sort González, Alvaro
title The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms
title_short The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms
title_full The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms
title_fullStr The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms
title_full_unstemmed The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms
title_sort incidence of graft on developing-country firms
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2007-11
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/11/8682858/incidence-graft-developing-country-firms
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/7529
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