An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers between 1997 and 2001 is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission's resolution. The paper approximates the decision making process using two different discrete choice models. The results indicate that, contrary to the Commission's objective, the presence of efficiency gains increases the probability of a case being issued. The findings also show that factors different from the ones explicitly mentioned by the Commission have a significant effect on the Commission's final decision. In particular, the presence of a foreign company among the would-be merger firms significantly increases the likelihood of observing an allowed merger.
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dig-okr-1098664102024-08-08T16:46:35Z An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy Avalos, Marcos De Hoyos, Rafael E. ACCURATE INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW BARGAINING BARRIERS TO ENTRY CLAIM COMPETITION COMMISSION COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITORS DECISION MAKING DEPENDENT DOMINANT FIRM ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY EQUITY SHARE EQUITY SHARES EXPANSION EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN FIRM FOREIGN FIRMS FUTURE RESEARCH HORIZONTAL MERGER IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION JUDGE JUDGMENTS JUDICIAL REVIEW LAWYERS LEGAL PROCESS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MARKET ENTRY MERGER MERGER CONTROL MERGERS MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY SHARES OF FIRM SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers between 1997 and 2001 is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission's resolution. The paper approximates the decision making process using two different discrete choice models. The results indicate that, contrary to the Commission's objective, the presence of efficiency gains increases the probability of a case being issued. The findings also show that factors different from the ones explicitly mentioned by the Commission have a significant effect on the Commission's final decision. In particular, the presence of a foreign company among the would-be merger firms significantly increases the likelihood of observing an allowed merger. 2012-05-25T14:25:04Z 2012-05-25T14:25:04Z 2008-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9026843/empirical-analysis-mexican-merger-policy https://hdl.handle.net/10986/6410 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4527 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
| institution |
Banco Mundial |
| collection |
DSpace |
| country |
Estados Unidos |
| countrycode |
US |
| component |
Bibliográfico |
| access |
En linea |
| databasecode |
dig-okr |
| tag |
biblioteca |
| region |
America del Norte |
| libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCURATE INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW BARGAINING BARRIERS TO ENTRY CLAIM COMPETITION COMMISSION COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITORS DECISION MAKING DEPENDENT DOMINANT FIRM ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY EQUITY SHARE EQUITY SHARES EXPANSION EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN FIRM FOREIGN FIRMS FUTURE RESEARCH HORIZONTAL MERGER IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION JUDGE JUDGMENTS JUDICIAL REVIEW LAWYERS LEGAL PROCESS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MARKET ENTRY MERGER MERGER CONTROL MERGERS MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY SHARES OF FIRM SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ACCURATE INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW BARGAINING BARRIERS TO ENTRY CLAIM COMPETITION COMMISSION COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITORS DECISION MAKING DEPENDENT DOMINANT FIRM ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY EQUITY SHARE EQUITY SHARES EXPANSION EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN FIRM FOREIGN FIRMS FUTURE RESEARCH HORIZONTAL MERGER IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION JUDGE JUDGMENTS JUDICIAL REVIEW LAWYERS LEGAL PROCESS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MARKET ENTRY MERGER MERGER CONTROL MERGERS MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY SHARES OF FIRM SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS |
| spellingShingle |
ACCURATE INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW BARGAINING BARRIERS TO ENTRY CLAIM COMPETITION COMMISSION COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITORS DECISION MAKING DEPENDENT DOMINANT FIRM ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY EQUITY SHARE EQUITY SHARES EXPANSION EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN FIRM FOREIGN FIRMS FUTURE RESEARCH HORIZONTAL MERGER IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION JUDGE JUDGMENTS JUDICIAL REVIEW LAWYERS LEGAL PROCESS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MARKET ENTRY MERGER MERGER CONTROL MERGERS MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY SHARES OF FIRM SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ACCURATE INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW BARGAINING BARRIERS TO ENTRY CLAIM COMPETITION COMMISSION COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITORS DECISION MAKING DEPENDENT DOMINANT FIRM ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY EQUITY SHARE EQUITY SHARES EXPANSION EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN FIRM FOREIGN FIRMS FUTURE RESEARCH HORIZONTAL MERGER IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION JUDGE JUDGMENTS JUDICIAL REVIEW LAWYERS LEGAL PROCESS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MARKET ENTRY MERGER MERGER CONTROL MERGERS MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY SHARES OF FIRM SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS Avalos, Marcos De Hoyos, Rafael E. An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy |
| description |
A newly created dataset including 239
decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission
on horizontal mergers between 1997 and 2001 is used to
estimate the different factors affecting the
Commission's resolution. The paper approximates the
decision making process using two different discrete choice
models. The results indicate that, contrary to the
Commission's objective, the presence of efficiency
gains increases the probability of a case being issued. The
findings also show that factors different from the ones
explicitly mentioned by the Commission have a significant
effect on the Commission's final decision. In
particular, the presence of a foreign company among the
would-be merger firms significantly increases the likelihood
of observing an allowed merger. |
| topic_facet |
ACCURATE INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW BARGAINING BARRIERS TO ENTRY CLAIM COMPETITION COMMISSION COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITORS DECISION MAKING DEPENDENT DOMINANT FIRM ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY EQUITY SHARE EQUITY SHARES EXPANSION EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN FIRM FOREIGN FIRMS FUTURE RESEARCH HORIZONTAL MERGER IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION JUDGE JUDGMENTS JUDICIAL REVIEW LAWYERS LEGAL PROCESS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MARKET ENTRY MERGER MERGER CONTROL MERGERS MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY SHARES OF FIRM SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS |
| author |
Avalos, Marcos De Hoyos, Rafael E. |
| author_facet |
Avalos, Marcos De Hoyos, Rafael E. |
| author_sort |
Avalos, Marcos |
| title |
An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy |
| title_short |
An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy |
| title_full |
An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy |
| title_fullStr |
An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy |
| title_full_unstemmed |
An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy |
| title_sort |
empirical analysis of mexican merger policy |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2008-02 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9026843/empirical-analysis-mexican-merger-policy https://hdl.handle.net/10986/6410 |
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AT avalosmarcos anempiricalanalysisofmexicanmergerpolicy AT dehoyosrafaele anempiricalanalysisofmexicanmergerpolicy AT avalosmarcos empiricalanalysisofmexicanmergerpolicy AT dehoyosrafaele empiricalanalysisofmexicanmergerpolicy |
| _version_ |
1807157328196141056 |