Systemic Financial Distress and Auction-Based Bankruptcy Reorganization

Most bankruptcy procedures try to reorganize a financially-distressed firm's debts to a serviceable level through negotiations overseen by courts. Markets are an alternative to such negotiations. This paper develops a market-based approach that is appropriate if claimants are severely cash-constrained and there is merit in having existing owners-managers remain in control. This approach was developed in response to the 1997 Asian Crisis, where the sheer numbers of over-indebted firms, creditors with poor incentives, and inexperienced courts stymied negotiated resolution. The scheme, however, can be applied to other crisis settings that exhibit particular characteristics. One such setting could be the resolution of external sovereign debts, a situation where creditors obviously cannot take possession of a country. The scheme arranges creditors in a queue to be serviced in sequence from the firm's operating cash flows. Creditors bid for their position in this queue, and those accepting a greater proportionate reduction in the face value of their claims are placed ahead of the others. Any existing hierarchy of claims is honored by having claimants bid for their positions within the relevant segment of the queue. No one in the queue (including owners who are last) is paid anything until the (reduced) debts of the first in line are fully discharged using the firm's operating cash surpluses. The queue then moves up and the next claimant in line is serviced. The paper shows that, in equilibrium, the aggregate debts of the firm are reduced enough to provide a positive expected residual return to the owner-managers, which improves their incentives to efficiently operate the firm and can result in an outcome that is Pareto superior to other bankruptcy procedures. We discuss the efficiency properties of this scheme and its appropriateness to situations of systemic financial distress.

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Main Authors: Hausch, Donald B., Ramachandran, S.
Format: Journal Article biblioteca
Language:EN
Published: 2009
Subjects:Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure G320, Bankruptcy, Liquidation G330, Corporation and Securities Law K220, Economic Development: Financial Markets, Saving and Capital Investment, Corporate Finance and Governance O160, Formal and Informal Sectors, Shadow Economy, Institutional Arrangements O170,
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5825
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spelling dig-okr-1098658252021-04-23T14:02:23Z Systemic Financial Distress and Auction-Based Bankruptcy Reorganization Hausch, Donald B. Ramachandran, S. Financing Policy Financial Risk and Risk Management Capital and Ownership Structure G320 Bankruptcy Liquidation G330 Corporation and Securities Law K220 Economic Development: Financial Markets Saving and Capital Investment Corporate Finance and Governance O160 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Most bankruptcy procedures try to reorganize a financially-distressed firm's debts to a serviceable level through negotiations overseen by courts. Markets are an alternative to such negotiations. This paper develops a market-based approach that is appropriate if claimants are severely cash-constrained and there is merit in having existing owners-managers remain in control. This approach was developed in response to the 1997 Asian Crisis, where the sheer numbers of over-indebted firms, creditors with poor incentives, and inexperienced courts stymied negotiated resolution. The scheme, however, can be applied to other crisis settings that exhibit particular characteristics. One such setting could be the resolution of external sovereign debts, a situation where creditors obviously cannot take possession of a country. The scheme arranges creditors in a queue to be serviced in sequence from the firm's operating cash flows. Creditors bid for their position in this queue, and those accepting a greater proportionate reduction in the face value of their claims are placed ahead of the others. Any existing hierarchy of claims is honored by having claimants bid for their positions within the relevant segment of the queue. No one in the queue (including owners who are last) is paid anything until the (reduced) debts of the first in line are fully discharged using the firm's operating cash surpluses. The queue then moves up and the next claimant in line is serviced. The paper shows that, in equilibrium, the aggregate debts of the firm are reduced enough to provide a positive expected residual return to the owner-managers, which improves their incentives to efficiently operate the firm and can result in an outcome that is Pareto superior to other bankruptcy procedures. We discuss the efficiency properties of this scheme and its appropriateness to situations of systemic financial distress. 2012-03-30T07:34:44Z 2012-03-30T07:34:44Z 2009 Journal Article International Review of Economics and Finance 10590560 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5825 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article
institution Banco Mundial
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language EN
topic Financing Policy
Financial Risk and Risk Management
Capital and Ownership Structure G320
Bankruptcy
Liquidation G330
Corporation and Securities Law K220
Economic Development: Financial Markets
Saving and Capital Investment
Corporate Finance and Governance O160
Formal and Informal Sectors
Shadow Economy
Institutional Arrangements O170
Financing Policy
Financial Risk and Risk Management
Capital and Ownership Structure G320
Bankruptcy
Liquidation G330
Corporation and Securities Law K220
Economic Development: Financial Markets
Saving and Capital Investment
Corporate Finance and Governance O160
Formal and Informal Sectors
Shadow Economy
Institutional Arrangements O170
spellingShingle Financing Policy
Financial Risk and Risk Management
Capital and Ownership Structure G320
Bankruptcy
Liquidation G330
Corporation and Securities Law K220
Economic Development: Financial Markets
Saving and Capital Investment
Corporate Finance and Governance O160
Formal and Informal Sectors
Shadow Economy
Institutional Arrangements O170
Financing Policy
Financial Risk and Risk Management
Capital and Ownership Structure G320
Bankruptcy
Liquidation G330
Corporation and Securities Law K220
Economic Development: Financial Markets
Saving and Capital Investment
Corporate Finance and Governance O160
Formal and Informal Sectors
Shadow Economy
Institutional Arrangements O170
Hausch, Donald B.
Ramachandran, S.
Systemic Financial Distress and Auction-Based Bankruptcy Reorganization
description Most bankruptcy procedures try to reorganize a financially-distressed firm's debts to a serviceable level through negotiations overseen by courts. Markets are an alternative to such negotiations. This paper develops a market-based approach that is appropriate if claimants are severely cash-constrained and there is merit in having existing owners-managers remain in control. This approach was developed in response to the 1997 Asian Crisis, where the sheer numbers of over-indebted firms, creditors with poor incentives, and inexperienced courts stymied negotiated resolution. The scheme, however, can be applied to other crisis settings that exhibit particular characteristics. One such setting could be the resolution of external sovereign debts, a situation where creditors obviously cannot take possession of a country. The scheme arranges creditors in a queue to be serviced in sequence from the firm's operating cash flows. Creditors bid for their position in this queue, and those accepting a greater proportionate reduction in the face value of their claims are placed ahead of the others. Any existing hierarchy of claims is honored by having claimants bid for their positions within the relevant segment of the queue. No one in the queue (including owners who are last) is paid anything until the (reduced) debts of the first in line are fully discharged using the firm's operating cash surpluses. The queue then moves up and the next claimant in line is serviced. The paper shows that, in equilibrium, the aggregate debts of the firm are reduced enough to provide a positive expected residual return to the owner-managers, which improves their incentives to efficiently operate the firm and can result in an outcome that is Pareto superior to other bankruptcy procedures. We discuss the efficiency properties of this scheme and its appropriateness to situations of systemic financial distress.
format Journal Article
topic_facet Financing Policy
Financial Risk and Risk Management
Capital and Ownership Structure G320
Bankruptcy
Liquidation G330
Corporation and Securities Law K220
Economic Development: Financial Markets
Saving and Capital Investment
Corporate Finance and Governance O160
Formal and Informal Sectors
Shadow Economy
Institutional Arrangements O170
author Hausch, Donald B.
Ramachandran, S.
author_facet Hausch, Donald B.
Ramachandran, S.
author_sort Hausch, Donald B.
title Systemic Financial Distress and Auction-Based Bankruptcy Reorganization
title_short Systemic Financial Distress and Auction-Based Bankruptcy Reorganization
title_full Systemic Financial Distress and Auction-Based Bankruptcy Reorganization
title_fullStr Systemic Financial Distress and Auction-Based Bankruptcy Reorganization
title_full_unstemmed Systemic Financial Distress and Auction-Based Bankruptcy Reorganization
title_sort systemic financial distress and auction-based bankruptcy reorganization
publishDate 2009
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5825
work_keys_str_mv AT hauschdonaldb systemicfinancialdistressandauctionbasedbankruptcyreorganization
AT ramachandrans systemicfinancialdistressandauctionbasedbankruptcyreorganization
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