Do Autocratic States Trade Less?

Does the political regime of a country influence its involvement in international trade? A theoretical model that predicts that autocracies trade less than democracies is developed, and the predictions of the model are tested empirically using a panel of more than 130 countries for 1962–2000. In contrast to the existing literature, data on the regime type of individual countries are used rather than information about the congruence of the regime type of pairs of trading countries. In line with the model, autocracies are found to import substantially less than democracies, even after controlling for official trade policies. This finding is very stable and does not depend on a particular setup or estimation technique.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Aidt, Toke S., Gassebner, Martin
Format: Journal Article biblioteca
Published: World Bank 2010-02-15
Subjects:barriers, democracies, democracy, developing countries, economic development, economic structure, free trade, good governance, internal control, international trade, liberalization, political economy, political regime, political regimes, political systems, red tape, share, shares, trade, trade taxes,
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4514
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spelling dig-okr-1098645142021-04-23T14:02:18Z Do Autocratic States Trade Less? Aidt, Toke S. Gassebner, Martin barriers democracies democracy developing countries economic development economic structure free trade good governance internal control international trade liberalization political economy political regime political regimes political systems red tape share shares trade trade taxes Does the political regime of a country influence its involvement in international trade? A theoretical model that predicts that autocracies trade less than democracies is developed, and the predictions of the model are tested empirically using a panel of more than 130 countries for 1962–2000. In contrast to the existing literature, data on the regime type of individual countries are used rather than information about the congruence of the regime type of pairs of trading countries. In line with the model, autocracies are found to import substantially less than democracies, even after controlling for official trade policies. This finding is very stable and does not depend on a particular setup or estimation technique. 2012-03-30T07:12:38Z 2012-03-30T07:12:38Z 2010-02-15 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4514 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank Journal Article Slovak Republic Nigeria Myanmar Liberia Ukraine
institution Banco Mundial
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
topic barriers
democracies
democracy
developing countries
economic development
economic structure
free trade
good governance
internal control
international trade
liberalization
political economy
political regime
political regimes
political systems
red tape
share
shares
trade
trade taxes
barriers
democracies
democracy
developing countries
economic development
economic structure
free trade
good governance
internal control
international trade
liberalization
political economy
political regime
political regimes
political systems
red tape
share
shares
trade
trade taxes
spellingShingle barriers
democracies
democracy
developing countries
economic development
economic structure
free trade
good governance
internal control
international trade
liberalization
political economy
political regime
political regimes
political systems
red tape
share
shares
trade
trade taxes
barriers
democracies
democracy
developing countries
economic development
economic structure
free trade
good governance
internal control
international trade
liberalization
political economy
political regime
political regimes
political systems
red tape
share
shares
trade
trade taxes
Aidt, Toke S.
Gassebner, Martin
Do Autocratic States Trade Less?
description Does the political regime of a country influence its involvement in international trade? A theoretical model that predicts that autocracies trade less than democracies is developed, and the predictions of the model are tested empirically using a panel of more than 130 countries for 1962–2000. In contrast to the existing literature, data on the regime type of individual countries are used rather than information about the congruence of the regime type of pairs of trading countries. In line with the model, autocracies are found to import substantially less than democracies, even after controlling for official trade policies. This finding is very stable and does not depend on a particular setup or estimation technique.
format Journal Article
topic_facet barriers
democracies
democracy
developing countries
economic development
economic structure
free trade
good governance
internal control
international trade
liberalization
political economy
political regime
political regimes
political systems
red tape
share
shares
trade
trade taxes
author Aidt, Toke S.
Gassebner, Martin
author_facet Aidt, Toke S.
Gassebner, Martin
author_sort Aidt, Toke S.
title Do Autocratic States Trade Less?
title_short Do Autocratic States Trade Less?
title_full Do Autocratic States Trade Less?
title_fullStr Do Autocratic States Trade Less?
title_full_unstemmed Do Autocratic States Trade Less?
title_sort do autocratic states trade less?
publisher World Bank
publishDate 2010-02-15
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4514
work_keys_str_mv AT aidttokes doautocraticstatestradeless
AT gassebnermartin doautocraticstatestradeless
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