Simple Model Frameworks for Explaining Inefficiency of the Clean Development Mechanism
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is an offset mechanism designed to reduce the overall cost of implementing a given global target for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in industrialized "Annex B" countries of the Kyoto Protocol. This paper discusses various ways in which CDM projects do not imply full offset of emissions, thus leading to an overall increase in global GHG emissions when considering the Annex-B emissions increase allowed by the offsets. The authors focus on two ways in which this may occur: baseline manipulation; and leakage. Baseline manipulation may result when agents that carry out CDM projects have incentives to increase their initial (or baseline) emissions in order to optimize the value of CDM credits. Leakage occurs because reductions in emissions under a CDM project may affect market equilibrium in local and/or global energy and product markets, and thereby increase emissions elsewhere. Remedies against these problems are discussed. Such remedies are more obvious for the baseline problem (where one is simply to choose an exogenous baseline independent of the project) than for the leakage problem (which is difficult to prevent, and where a prediction of the effect must rely on information about overall market equilibrium effects).
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dig-okr-1098641252024-08-08T16:24:56Z Simple Model Frameworks for Explaining Inefficiency of the Clean Development Mechanism Rosendahl, Knut Einar Strand, Jon AGGREGATE DEMAND APPROACH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AVAILABILITY BASELINE EMISSIONS CARBON CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON OFFSET CARBON TAXES CARBON UNITS CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE POLICY COAL COAL PRICE COAL PRICES COAL SUPPLY COAL USE CONSUMPTION OF COAL CONSUMPTION OF FOSSIL DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY ECONOMICS ELASTICITIES ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION ELECTRICITY SECTOR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY EMISSION EMISSION CHANGES EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS LEVELS EMISSIONS OF METHANE EMISSIONS REDUCTION EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES END-USERS ENERGY CONSUMPTION ENERGY DEMAND ENERGY ECONOMICS ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS ENERGY INPUT ENERGY INTENSIVE ENERGY MARKETS ENERGY OUTPUT ENERGY POLICY ENERGY PRICE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES ENERGY TECHNOLOGY ENERGY USE ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL TAX EQUILIBRIUM EXCISE TAX EXPLOITATION EXTERNALITIES FIXED COSTS FORESTRY FOSSIL FOSSIL FUEL FOSSIL FUELS FUEL FUEL DEMAND FUEL MARKET FUEL PRICE FUEL SUPPLY FUEL TAXES GLOBAL EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GASES HEALTH PROBLEMS HYDRO PLANT HYDROPOWER HYDROPOWER PLANT INCOME JOINT IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL OF EMISSIONS MACROECONOMICS NATURAL GAS NEW PLANT OIL OPEC PERMIT TRADING POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLLUTION POWER PRODUCERS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE VARIATIONS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY QUOTAS REDUCTION IN EMISSIONS RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY RENEWABLE ENERGIES RENEWABLE POWER TAX REVENUE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPORT TRANSPORT COSTS TRUE The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is an offset mechanism designed to reduce the overall cost of implementing a given global target for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in industrialized "Annex B" countries of the Kyoto Protocol. This paper discusses various ways in which CDM projects do not imply full offset of emissions, thus leading to an overall increase in global GHG emissions when considering the Annex-B emissions increase allowed by the offsets. The authors focus on two ways in which this may occur: baseline manipulation; and leakage. Baseline manipulation may result when agents that carry out CDM projects have incentives to increase their initial (or baseline) emissions in order to optimize the value of CDM credits. Leakage occurs because reductions in emissions under a CDM project may affect market equilibrium in local and/or global energy and product markets, and thereby increase emissions elsewhere. Remedies against these problems are discussed. Such remedies are more obvious for the baseline problem (where one is simply to choose an exogenous baseline independent of the project) than for the leakage problem (which is difficult to prevent, and where a prediction of the effect must rely on information about overall market equilibrium effects). 2012-03-19T19:10:24Z 2012-03-19T19:10:24Z 2009-05-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090513161017 https://hdl.handle.net/10986/4125 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4931 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain |
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Banco Mundial |
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Estados Unidos |
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US |
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Bibliográfico |
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America del Norte |
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Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
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English |
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AGGREGATE DEMAND APPROACH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AVAILABILITY BASELINE EMISSIONS CARBON CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON OFFSET CARBON TAXES CARBON UNITS CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE POLICY COAL COAL PRICE COAL PRICES COAL SUPPLY COAL USE CONSUMPTION OF COAL CONSUMPTION OF FOSSIL DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY ECONOMICS ELASTICITIES ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION ELECTRICITY SECTOR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY EMISSION EMISSION CHANGES EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS LEVELS EMISSIONS OF METHANE EMISSIONS REDUCTION EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES END-USERS ENERGY CONSUMPTION ENERGY DEMAND ENERGY ECONOMICS ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS ENERGY INPUT ENERGY INTENSIVE ENERGY MARKETS ENERGY OUTPUT ENERGY POLICY ENERGY PRICE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES ENERGY TECHNOLOGY ENERGY USE ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL TAX EQUILIBRIUM EXCISE TAX EXPLOITATION EXTERNALITIES FIXED COSTS FORESTRY FOSSIL FOSSIL FUEL FOSSIL FUELS FUEL FUEL DEMAND FUEL MARKET FUEL PRICE FUEL SUPPLY FUEL TAXES GLOBAL EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GASES HEALTH PROBLEMS HYDRO PLANT HYDROPOWER HYDROPOWER PLANT INCOME JOINT IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL OF EMISSIONS MACROECONOMICS NATURAL GAS NEW PLANT OIL OPEC PERMIT TRADING POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLLUTION POWER PRODUCERS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE VARIATIONS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY QUOTAS REDUCTION IN EMISSIONS RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY RENEWABLE ENERGIES RENEWABLE POWER TAX REVENUE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPORT TRANSPORT COSTS TRUE AGGREGATE DEMAND APPROACH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AVAILABILITY BASELINE EMISSIONS CARBON CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON OFFSET CARBON TAXES CARBON UNITS CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE POLICY COAL COAL PRICE COAL PRICES COAL SUPPLY COAL USE CONSUMPTION OF COAL CONSUMPTION OF FOSSIL DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY ECONOMICS ELASTICITIES ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION ELECTRICITY SECTOR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY EMISSION EMISSION CHANGES EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS LEVELS EMISSIONS OF METHANE EMISSIONS REDUCTION EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES END-USERS ENERGY CONSUMPTION ENERGY DEMAND ENERGY ECONOMICS ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS ENERGY INPUT ENERGY INTENSIVE ENERGY MARKETS ENERGY OUTPUT ENERGY POLICY ENERGY PRICE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES ENERGY TECHNOLOGY ENERGY USE ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL TAX EQUILIBRIUM EXCISE TAX EXPLOITATION EXTERNALITIES FIXED COSTS FORESTRY FOSSIL FOSSIL FUEL FOSSIL FUELS FUEL FUEL DEMAND FUEL MARKET FUEL PRICE FUEL SUPPLY FUEL TAXES GLOBAL EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GASES HEALTH PROBLEMS HYDRO PLANT HYDROPOWER HYDROPOWER PLANT INCOME JOINT IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL OF EMISSIONS MACROECONOMICS NATURAL GAS NEW PLANT OIL OPEC PERMIT TRADING POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLLUTION POWER PRODUCERS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE VARIATIONS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY QUOTAS REDUCTION IN EMISSIONS RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY RENEWABLE ENERGIES RENEWABLE POWER TAX REVENUE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPORT TRANSPORT COSTS TRUE |
spellingShingle |
AGGREGATE DEMAND APPROACH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AVAILABILITY BASELINE EMISSIONS CARBON CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON OFFSET CARBON TAXES CARBON UNITS CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE POLICY COAL COAL PRICE COAL PRICES COAL SUPPLY COAL USE CONSUMPTION OF COAL CONSUMPTION OF FOSSIL DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY ECONOMICS ELASTICITIES ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION ELECTRICITY SECTOR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY EMISSION EMISSION CHANGES EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS LEVELS EMISSIONS OF METHANE EMISSIONS REDUCTION EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES END-USERS ENERGY CONSUMPTION ENERGY DEMAND ENERGY ECONOMICS ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS ENERGY INPUT ENERGY INTENSIVE ENERGY MARKETS ENERGY OUTPUT ENERGY POLICY ENERGY PRICE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES ENERGY TECHNOLOGY ENERGY USE ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL TAX EQUILIBRIUM EXCISE TAX EXPLOITATION EXTERNALITIES FIXED COSTS FORESTRY FOSSIL FOSSIL FUEL FOSSIL FUELS FUEL FUEL DEMAND FUEL MARKET FUEL PRICE FUEL SUPPLY FUEL TAXES GLOBAL EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GASES HEALTH PROBLEMS HYDRO PLANT HYDROPOWER HYDROPOWER PLANT INCOME JOINT IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL OF EMISSIONS MACROECONOMICS NATURAL GAS NEW PLANT OIL OPEC PERMIT TRADING POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLLUTION POWER PRODUCERS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE VARIATIONS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY QUOTAS REDUCTION IN EMISSIONS RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY RENEWABLE ENERGIES RENEWABLE POWER TAX REVENUE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPORT TRANSPORT COSTS TRUE AGGREGATE DEMAND APPROACH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AVAILABILITY BASELINE EMISSIONS CARBON CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON OFFSET CARBON TAXES CARBON UNITS CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE POLICY COAL COAL PRICE COAL PRICES COAL SUPPLY COAL USE CONSUMPTION OF COAL CONSUMPTION OF FOSSIL DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY ECONOMICS ELASTICITIES ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION ELECTRICITY SECTOR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY EMISSION EMISSION CHANGES EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS LEVELS EMISSIONS OF METHANE EMISSIONS REDUCTION EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES END-USERS ENERGY CONSUMPTION ENERGY DEMAND ENERGY ECONOMICS ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS ENERGY INPUT ENERGY INTENSIVE ENERGY MARKETS ENERGY OUTPUT ENERGY POLICY ENERGY PRICE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES ENERGY TECHNOLOGY ENERGY USE ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL TAX EQUILIBRIUM EXCISE TAX EXPLOITATION EXTERNALITIES FIXED COSTS FORESTRY FOSSIL FOSSIL FUEL FOSSIL FUELS FUEL FUEL DEMAND FUEL MARKET FUEL PRICE FUEL SUPPLY FUEL TAXES GLOBAL EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GASES HEALTH PROBLEMS HYDRO PLANT HYDROPOWER HYDROPOWER PLANT INCOME JOINT IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL OF EMISSIONS MACROECONOMICS NATURAL GAS NEW PLANT OIL OPEC PERMIT TRADING POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLLUTION POWER PRODUCERS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE VARIATIONS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY QUOTAS REDUCTION IN EMISSIONS RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY RENEWABLE ENERGIES RENEWABLE POWER TAX REVENUE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPORT TRANSPORT COSTS TRUE Rosendahl, Knut Einar Strand, Jon Simple Model Frameworks for Explaining Inefficiency of the Clean Development Mechanism |
description |
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is
an offset mechanism designed to reduce the overall cost of
implementing a given global target for greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions in industrialized "Annex B" countries of
the Kyoto Protocol. This paper discusses various ways in
which CDM projects do not imply full offset of emissions,
thus leading to an overall increase in global GHG emissions
when considering the Annex-B emissions increase allowed by
the offsets. The authors focus on two ways in which this may
occur: baseline manipulation; and leakage. Baseline
manipulation may result when agents that carry out CDM
projects have incentives to increase their initial (or
baseline) emissions in order to optimize the value of CDM
credits. Leakage occurs because reductions in emissions
under a CDM project may affect market equilibrium in local
and/or global energy and product markets, and thereby
increase emissions elsewhere. Remedies against these
problems are discussed. Such remedies are more obvious for
the baseline problem (where one is simply to choose an
exogenous baseline independent of the project) than for the
leakage problem (which is difficult to prevent, and where a
prediction of the effect must rely on information about
overall market equilibrium effects). |
topic_facet |
AGGREGATE DEMAND APPROACH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AVAILABILITY BASELINE EMISSIONS CARBON CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON OFFSET CARBON TAXES CARBON UNITS CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE POLICY COAL COAL PRICE COAL PRICES COAL SUPPLY COAL USE CONSUMPTION OF COAL CONSUMPTION OF FOSSIL DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY ECONOMICS ELASTICITIES ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION ELECTRICITY SECTOR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY EMISSION EMISSION CHANGES EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS LEVELS EMISSIONS OF METHANE EMISSIONS REDUCTION EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES END-USERS ENERGY CONSUMPTION ENERGY DEMAND ENERGY ECONOMICS ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS ENERGY INPUT ENERGY INTENSIVE ENERGY MARKETS ENERGY OUTPUT ENERGY POLICY ENERGY PRICE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES ENERGY TECHNOLOGY ENERGY USE ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL TAX EQUILIBRIUM EXCISE TAX EXPLOITATION EXTERNALITIES FIXED COSTS FORESTRY FOSSIL FOSSIL FUEL FOSSIL FUELS FUEL FUEL DEMAND FUEL MARKET FUEL PRICE FUEL SUPPLY FUEL TAXES GLOBAL EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GASES HEALTH PROBLEMS HYDRO PLANT HYDROPOWER HYDROPOWER PLANT INCOME JOINT IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL OF EMISSIONS MACROECONOMICS NATURAL GAS NEW PLANT OIL OPEC PERMIT TRADING POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLLUTION POWER PRODUCERS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE VARIATIONS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY QUOTAS REDUCTION IN EMISSIONS RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY RENEWABLE ENERGIES RENEWABLE POWER TAX REVENUE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPORT TRANSPORT COSTS TRUE |
author |
Rosendahl, Knut Einar Strand, Jon |
author_facet |
Rosendahl, Knut Einar Strand, Jon |
author_sort |
Rosendahl, Knut Einar |
title |
Simple Model Frameworks for Explaining Inefficiency of the Clean Development Mechanism |
title_short |
Simple Model Frameworks for Explaining Inefficiency of the Clean Development Mechanism |
title_full |
Simple Model Frameworks for Explaining Inefficiency of the Clean Development Mechanism |
title_fullStr |
Simple Model Frameworks for Explaining Inefficiency of the Clean Development Mechanism |
title_full_unstemmed |
Simple Model Frameworks for Explaining Inefficiency of the Clean Development Mechanism |
title_sort |
simple model frameworks for explaining inefficiency of the clean development mechanism |
publishDate |
2009-05-01 |
url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090513161017 https://hdl.handle.net/10986/4125 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT rosendahlknuteinar simplemodelframeworksforexplaininginefficiencyofthecleandevelopmentmechanism AT strandjon simplemodelframeworksforexplaininginefficiencyofthecleandevelopmentmechanism |
_version_ |
1807157682882215936 |