Democracy and Reforms
The authors use a sample of 147 countries to investigate the link between democracy and reforms. Democracy may be conducive to reforms, because politicians have the incentive to embrace growth-enhancing reforms to win elections. By contrast, authoritarian regimes do not have to worry as much about public opinion and may undertake reforms that are painful in the short run but bring future prosperity. This paper tests these hypotheses, using data on micro-economic reforms from the World Bank's Doing Business database. These data do not suffer the endogeneity issues associated with other datasets on changes in economic institutions. The results provide robust support for the claim that democracy is good for growth-enhancing reforms.
id |
dig-okr-109864031 |
---|---|
record_format |
koha |
spelling |
dig-okr-1098640312024-08-08T16:29:44Z Democracy and Reforms Amin, Mohammad Djankov, Simeon AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY BANKRUPTCY BARRIER BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS REGULATIONS CIVIL LAW COMMON LAW CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CRIME DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ENVIRONMENT DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY ECONOMIC CRISES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ECONOMIC REFORMS ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS GOVERNANCE INDICATORS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION LABOR MARKETS LEGAL REFORMS LEGAL RIGHTS LEGAL SYSTEM LIVING STANDARDS MACRO LEVEL MILITARY REGIMES MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MORTALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICIANS PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC OPINION RAPID GROWTH RENTS RULE OF LAW SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS THIRD WORLD WAGES WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS The authors use a sample of 147 countries to investigate the link between democracy and reforms. Democracy may be conducive to reforms, because politicians have the incentive to embrace growth-enhancing reforms to win elections. By contrast, authoritarian regimes do not have to worry as much about public opinion and may undertake reforms that are painful in the short run but bring future prosperity. This paper tests these hypotheses, using data on micro-economic reforms from the World Bank's Doing Business database. These data do not suffer the endogeneity issues associated with other datasets on changes in economic institutions. The results provide robust support for the claim that democracy is good for growth-enhancing reforms. 2012-03-19T19:08:42Z 2012-03-19T19:08:42Z 2009-02-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090210105038 https://hdl.handle.net/10986/4031 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4835 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain |
institution |
Banco Mundial |
collection |
DSpace |
country |
Estados Unidos |
countrycode |
US |
component |
Bibliográfico |
access |
En linea |
databasecode |
dig-okr |
tag |
biblioteca |
region |
America del Norte |
libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
language |
English |
topic |
AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY BANKRUPTCY BARRIER BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS REGULATIONS CIVIL LAW COMMON LAW CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CRIME DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ENVIRONMENT DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY ECONOMIC CRISES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ECONOMIC REFORMS ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS GOVERNANCE INDICATORS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION LABOR MARKETS LEGAL REFORMS LEGAL RIGHTS LEGAL SYSTEM LIVING STANDARDS MACRO LEVEL MILITARY REGIMES MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MORTALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICIANS PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC OPINION RAPID GROWTH RENTS RULE OF LAW SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS THIRD WORLD WAGES WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY BANKRUPTCY BARRIER BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS REGULATIONS CIVIL LAW COMMON LAW CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CRIME DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ENVIRONMENT DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY ECONOMIC CRISES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ECONOMIC REFORMS ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS GOVERNANCE INDICATORS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION LABOR MARKETS LEGAL REFORMS LEGAL RIGHTS LEGAL SYSTEM LIVING STANDARDS MACRO LEVEL MILITARY REGIMES MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MORTALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICIANS PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC OPINION RAPID GROWTH RENTS RULE OF LAW SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS THIRD WORLD WAGES WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS |
spellingShingle |
AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY BANKRUPTCY BARRIER BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS REGULATIONS CIVIL LAW COMMON LAW CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CRIME DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ENVIRONMENT DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY ECONOMIC CRISES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ECONOMIC REFORMS ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS GOVERNANCE INDICATORS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION LABOR MARKETS LEGAL REFORMS LEGAL RIGHTS LEGAL SYSTEM LIVING STANDARDS MACRO LEVEL MILITARY REGIMES MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MORTALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICIANS PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC OPINION RAPID GROWTH RENTS RULE OF LAW SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS THIRD WORLD WAGES WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY BANKRUPTCY BARRIER BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS REGULATIONS CIVIL LAW COMMON LAW CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CRIME DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ENVIRONMENT DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY ECONOMIC CRISES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ECONOMIC REFORMS ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS GOVERNANCE INDICATORS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION LABOR MARKETS LEGAL REFORMS LEGAL RIGHTS LEGAL SYSTEM LIVING STANDARDS MACRO LEVEL MILITARY REGIMES MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MORTALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICIANS PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC OPINION RAPID GROWTH RENTS RULE OF LAW SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS THIRD WORLD WAGES WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS Amin, Mohammad Djankov, Simeon Democracy and Reforms |
description |
The authors use a sample of 147
countries to investigate the link between democracy and
reforms. Democracy may be conducive to reforms, because
politicians have the incentive to embrace growth-enhancing
reforms to win elections. By contrast, authoritarian regimes
do not have to worry as much about public opinion and may
undertake reforms that are painful in the short run but
bring future prosperity. This paper tests these hypotheses,
using data on micro-economic reforms from the World
Bank's Doing Business database. These data do not
suffer the endogeneity issues associated with other datasets
on changes in economic institutions. The results provide
robust support for the claim that democracy is good for
growth-enhancing reforms. |
topic_facet |
AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY BANKRUPTCY BARRIER BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS REGULATIONS CIVIL LAW COMMON LAW CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CRIME DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ENVIRONMENT DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY ECONOMIC CRISES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ECONOMIC REFORMS ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS GOVERNANCE INDICATORS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION LABOR MARKETS LEGAL REFORMS LEGAL RIGHTS LEGAL SYSTEM LIVING STANDARDS MACRO LEVEL MILITARY REGIMES MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MORTALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICIANS PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC OPINION RAPID GROWTH RENTS RULE OF LAW SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS THIRD WORLD WAGES WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS |
author |
Amin, Mohammad Djankov, Simeon |
author_facet |
Amin, Mohammad Djankov, Simeon |
author_sort |
Amin, Mohammad |
title |
Democracy and Reforms |
title_short |
Democracy and Reforms |
title_full |
Democracy and Reforms |
title_fullStr |
Democracy and Reforms |
title_full_unstemmed |
Democracy and Reforms |
title_sort |
democracy and reforms |
publishDate |
2009-02-01 |
url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090210105038 https://hdl.handle.net/10986/4031 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT aminmohammad democracyandreforms AT djankovsimeon democracyandreforms |
_version_ |
1807154620239183872 |