The Impact of Tax Blacklisting
This paper estimates the policy and economic impacts of a European Union–led effort to review and “blacklist” jurisdictions based on their compliance with international standards designed to curb corporate profit shifting and private tax evasion. Using a combination of regression discontinuity and difference-and-difference methods, there is evidence of only limited improvements in tax governance four years after the inception of the list. There is also no clear evidence that the listing exercise had any impact on offshore wealth or shifted profits, largely because the bulk of jurisdictions that host both of these were not targeted by the European Union. The results suggest that “coercive” efforts to reduce global tax evasion and avoidance will struggle without better targeting and enforcement.
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| Format: | Working Paper biblioteca |
| Language: | English English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2023-05-11
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| Subjects: | INTERNATIONAL TAX, EU BLACKLISTING, TAX HAVENS, PROFIT SHIFTING, TAX EVASION, TAX GOVERNANCE, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099918205042371705/IDU0fd264bfb0c6f704cda09bd20025a1aa3a08c https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/39803 |
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| Summary: | This paper estimates the policy and
economic impacts of a European Union–led effort to review
and “blacklist” jurisdictions based on their compliance with
international standards designed to curb corporate profit
shifting and private tax evasion. Using a combination of
regression discontinuity and difference-and-difference
methods, there is evidence of only limited improvements in
tax governance four years after the inception of the list.
There is also no clear evidence that the listing exercise
had any impact on offshore wealth or shifted profits,
largely because the bulk of jurisdictions that host both of
these were not targeted by the European Union. The results
suggest that “coercive” efforts to reduce global tax evasion
and avoidance will struggle without better targeting and enforcement. |
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