Proposals for WTO Reform : A Synthesis and Assessment

Proposals for WTO Reform : A Synthesis and Assessment

This paper summarizes the major arguments and proposals to reform the modus operandi of the World Trade Organization --including decision-making procedures, negotiating modalities, and dispute settlement. Much has already been done to improve the internal and external transparency of World Trade Organization processes. Some proposals for structural reform ignore incentive constraints and the fact that the World Trade Organization is an incomplete contract that must be self-enforcing. Others -- such as calls for a "critical mass" approach to negotiations --can already be pursued (and have been). The agenda for international cooperation increasingly revolves around "behind-the-border" regulatory externalities that do not necessarily lend themselves to binding commitments in a trade agreement. This suggests a focus on strengthening notification/surveillance and developing more effective mechanisms for dialogue on regulatory policies that may create negative spillovers.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hoekman, Bernard
Language:English
Published: 2011-01-01
Subjects:ACCESSION, ACCESSION PROCESS, ADJUDICATING BODIES, ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES, AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, AGRICULTURE, APPELLATE BODY, AVERAGE TARIFFS, BALANCE OF CONCESSIONS, BALANCE OF RIGHTS, BENCHMARK, BILATERAL TRADE, CIVIL SOCIETY, COMMITTEE ON TRADE, COMPETITIVENESS, CONSUMER PROTECTION, CONSUMERS, CONTRACTING PARTIES, COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS, COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES, CUSTOMS, DAMAGES, DECISION MAKING, DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES, DEVELOPMENT POLICY, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT, DIRECT COMPENSATION, DIRECT INVESTMENT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, DOMESTIC REGULATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC LAW, ECONOMIC ORDER, ECONOMIC RESEARCH, ECONOMIC THEORIES, ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS, ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP, EXCHANGE RATES, EXPORT RESTRAINTS, EXPORTERS, EXPORTS, EXTERNALITIES, FINANCIAL CRISIS, FINANCIAL SECTOR, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, FREE TRADE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, FREER TRADE, FULL EMPLOYMENT, GDP, GLOBAL TRADE, GLOBAL TRADING, GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, GLOBAL WELFARE, IMPORT BARRIERS, IMPORT PROTECTION, INCENTIVE EFFECTS, INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS, INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS, INEFFICIENCY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT, ITC, JOINT VENTURE, LDCS, LEGAL SYSTEMS, LIABILITY, LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE, MACROECONOMIC POLICY, MARKET ACCESS, MARKET SEGMENTATION, MEMBER COUNTRIES, MFN, MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES, MINISTERIAL DECISION, MINISTERIAL MEETING, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS, MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL TRADE, MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM, NATIONAL TRADE POLICIES, NATIONAL WELFARE, NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES, NEGATIVE SPILLOVERS, NONTARIFF BARRIERS, OPENNESS, OPPORTUNITY COST, OPPORTUNITY COSTS, PANEL STAGE, PER CAPITA INCOMES, PERMANENT PANEL BODY, POLICY CHANGES, POLICY MAKERS, POLICY REFORM, POLICY REFORMS, POLICY RESEARCH, POLICY RULES, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POOR COUNTRIES, POVERTY REDUCTION, PREFERENTIAL TRADE, PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, PRIVATE INVESTMENT, PRODUCT STANDARDS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, PROTECTIONIST POLICIES, PUBLIC GOOD, QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS, RADICAL REFORM, REGIONALISM, REGULATORY BARRIERS, REGULATORY POLICIES, REGULATORY POLICY, REGULATORY REFORM, REGULATORY REGIMES, REMEDIES, ROUND AGREEMENTS, SERVICES TRADE, SUPRANATIONAL ENFORCEMENT, SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, TARIFF CONCESSIONS, TARIFF EQUIVALENT, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, TECHNICAL COOPERATION, TERMS OF TRADE, TRADE AGREEMENT, TRADE AGREEMENTS, TRADE AREA, TRADE COSTS, TRADE DISPUTES, TRADE FACILITATION, TRADE FLOWS, TRADE INTEGRATION, TRADE ISSUES, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, TRADE POLICIES, TRADE POLICY, TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM, TRADE REGIME, TRADE REGIMES, TRADE RESTRICTIONS, TRADE THEORIES, TRADE THEORY, TRADING NATIONS, TRADING PARTNERS, TRADING SYSTEM, TRANSITION ECONOMIES, TRANSPARENCY, TREATIES, UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION, URUGUAY ROUND, VALUE JUDGMENTS, VALUE OF TRADE, VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS, WEAK ENFORCEMENT, WORLD ECONOMY, WORLD TRADE, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, WTO, WTO ACCESSION, WTO AGREEMENTS, WTO MEMBERS, WTO MEMBERSHIP, WTO RULES, WTO SECRETARIAT,
Online Access:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110110095113
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/3298
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Summary:This paper summarizes the major arguments and proposals to reform the modus operandi of the World Trade Organization --including decision-making procedures, negotiating modalities, and dispute settlement. Much has already been done to improve the internal and external transparency of World Trade Organization processes. Some proposals for structural reform ignore incentive constraints and the fact that the World Trade Organization is an incomplete contract that must be self-enforcing. Others -- such as calls for a "critical mass" approach to negotiations --can already be pursued (and have been). The agenda for international cooperation increasingly revolves around "behind-the-border" regulatory externalities that do not necessarily lend themselves to binding commitments in a trade agreement. This suggests a focus on strengthening notification/surveillance and developing more effective mechanisms for dialogue on regulatory policies that may create negative spillovers.

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