Upping the Ante
This paper tests for financial constraints as a market failure in education in a low-income country. In an experimental setup, unconditional cash grants are allocated to one private school or all private schools in a village. Enrollment increases in both treatments, accompanied by infrastructure investments. However, test scores and fees only increase in the setting of all private schools along with higher teacher wages. This differential impact follows from a canonical oligopoly model with capacity constraints and endogenous quality: greater financial saturation crowds-in quality investments. The findings of higher social surplus in the setting of all private schools, but greater private returns in the setting of one private school underscore the importance of leveraging market structure in designing educational subsidies.
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Format: | Working Paper biblioteca |
Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2018-08
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Subjects: | PRIVATE EDUCATION, FINANCIAL INNOVATION, STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT, EDUCATION MARKETS, RETURN TO CAPITAL, SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES, SMEs, UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS, |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/489361534875600698/Upping-the-ante-the-equilibrium-effects-of-unconditional-grants-to-private-schools https://hdl.handle.net/10986/30290 |
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dig-okr-10986302902024-08-09T07:37:53Z Upping the Ante The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools Andrabi, Tahir Das, Jishnu Khwaja, Asim I. Ozyurt, Selcuk Singh, Niharika PRIVATE EDUCATION FINANCIAL INNOVATION STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT EDUCATION MARKETS RETURN TO CAPITAL SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES SMEs UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS This paper tests for financial constraints as a market failure in education in a low-income country. In an experimental setup, unconditional cash grants are allocated to one private school or all private schools in a village. Enrollment increases in both treatments, accompanied by infrastructure investments. However, test scores and fees only increase in the setting of all private schools along with higher teacher wages. This differential impact follows from a canonical oligopoly model with capacity constraints and endogenous quality: greater financial saturation crowds-in quality investments. The findings of higher social surplus in the setting of all private schools, but greater private returns in the setting of one private school underscore the importance of leveraging market structure in designing educational subsidies. 2018-08-23T17:19:28Z 2018-08-23T17:19:28Z 2018-08 Working Paper Document de travail Documento de trabajo http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/489361534875600698/Upping-the-ante-the-equilibrium-effects-of-unconditional-grants-to-private-schools https://hdl.handle.net/10986/30290 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8563 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
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America del Norte |
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Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
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English |
topic |
PRIVATE EDUCATION FINANCIAL INNOVATION STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT EDUCATION MARKETS RETURN TO CAPITAL SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES SMEs UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS PRIVATE EDUCATION FINANCIAL INNOVATION STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT EDUCATION MARKETS RETURN TO CAPITAL SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES SMEs UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS |
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PRIVATE EDUCATION FINANCIAL INNOVATION STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT EDUCATION MARKETS RETURN TO CAPITAL SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES SMEs UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS PRIVATE EDUCATION FINANCIAL INNOVATION STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT EDUCATION MARKETS RETURN TO CAPITAL SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES SMEs UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS Andrabi, Tahir Das, Jishnu Khwaja, Asim I. Ozyurt, Selcuk Singh, Niharika Upping the Ante |
description |
This paper tests for financial
constraints as a market failure in education in a low-income
country. In an experimental setup, unconditional cash grants
are allocated to one private school or all private schools
in a village. Enrollment increases in both treatments,
accompanied by infrastructure investments. However, test
scores and fees only increase in the setting of all private
schools along with higher teacher wages. This differential
impact follows from a canonical oligopoly model with
capacity constraints and endogenous quality: greater
financial saturation crowds-in quality investments. The
findings of higher social surplus in the setting of all
private schools, but greater private returns in the setting
of one private school underscore the importance of
leveraging market structure in designing educational subsidies. |
format |
Working Paper |
topic_facet |
PRIVATE EDUCATION FINANCIAL INNOVATION STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT EDUCATION MARKETS RETURN TO CAPITAL SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES SMEs UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS |
author |
Andrabi, Tahir Das, Jishnu Khwaja, Asim I. Ozyurt, Selcuk Singh, Niharika |
author_facet |
Andrabi, Tahir Das, Jishnu Khwaja, Asim I. Ozyurt, Selcuk Singh, Niharika |
author_sort |
Andrabi, Tahir |
title |
Upping the Ante |
title_short |
Upping the Ante |
title_full |
Upping the Ante |
title_fullStr |
Upping the Ante |
title_full_unstemmed |
Upping the Ante |
title_sort |
upping the ante |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2018-08 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/489361534875600698/Upping-the-ante-the-equilibrium-effects-of-unconditional-grants-to-private-schools https://hdl.handle.net/10986/30290 |
work_keys_str_mv |
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1807158525341728768 |