Special Interests versus the Public Interest in Policy Determination

This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agricultural markets. Four groups of forces are isolated: political governance structures emphasizing the role of democratic mechanisms; the design of polycentric structures for assigned governmental authority for setting policy instruments; market structure and other socioeconomic characteristics; and the role of sector mobility and asset diversification. Each of these forces are distilled and data sources are reviewed that will allow econometric specifications that have both explanatory and policy reform implications.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Rausser, Gordon C., Roland, Gérard
Format:	Working Paper biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2009-05
Subjects:	ACCOUNTING, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, ADVERSE SELECTION, AGRICULTURE, ALTERNATIVE POLICY INSTRUMENTS, ASSET DIVERSIFICATION, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, BANK POLICY, BID, BRIBERY, BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY, CANDIDATES, CHECKS, COALITION GOVERNMENT, COALITION GOVERNMENTS, COLLUSION, COMPETITIVENESS, CONDITIONALITY, CONFIDENCE, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, CONSTITUENCIES, CONSTITUENCY, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, CORPORATE TAXES, CORRUPT, CORRUPT OFFICIALS, CORRUPTION, COUNTRY RISK, CREDIBILITY, CRIME, DECISION MAKING, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, DEMOCRATIC REGIMES, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES, DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPMENT BANK, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, ECONOMETRICS, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC EFFECTS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC HISTORY, ECONOMIC RESEARCH, ECONOMIC TRENDS, ECONOMICS, ECONOMISTS, ELASTICITIES, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES, ELECTIONS, ELECTORAL PROCESS, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, ELECTORATE, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, EMPIRICAL STUDIES, ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES, ENFORCEABILITY, ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS, ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE, ENVIRONMENTAL, EQUILIBRIUM, EXCHANGE RATE, EXECUTIVE BRANCH, EXPENDITURE, EXPENDITURES, EXPLOITATION, EXPORTS, EXTERNALITIES, GDP, GINI COEFFICIENT, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, GOVERNMENT SPENDING, GROWTH RATE, HIDDEN ACTIONS, HIDDEN INFORMATION, HUMAN CAPITAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, INCOME INEQUALITY, INCOME LEVEL, INEFFICIENCY, INSTRUMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INTERMEDIATE INPUTS, INVESTIGATION, INVESTIGATIONS, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, JUDICIAL PROCESS, JUDICIARY, LABOR MARKET, LAWS, LEADERSHIP, LEGAL FRAMEWORK, LEGAL SYSTEM, LEGISLATION, LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS, LOBBYING, LOCAL MARKET, MARKET DISTORTIONS, MARKET FAILURES, MARKET PRICE, MARKET STRUCTURE, MEDIA, MONOPOLY, MORAL HAZARD, OPTIMIZATION, PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS, PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS, PATRONAGE, PENALTY, POLICY INSTRUMENTS, POLICY MAKING, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL POWER, POLITICAL RIGHTS, POLITICAL RISK, POLITICAL SYSTEM, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, POLITICIAN, POLITICIANS, PREFERENCE ANALYSIS, PRICE CONTROLS, PRIVATE GAIN, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, PUBLIC FINANCE, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SERVICES, PUBLIC SPENDING, QUOTAS, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, REPRESENTATIVES, RULE OF LAW, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, TAX, TAX COLLECTION, TAX REVENUE, TAX REVENUES, TAX SYSTEM, TAXATION, TERRORISM, TRADE POLICY, TRANSACTION, TRANSACTION COSTS, TRANSPARENCY, TRUST FUNDS, TURNOVER, UNFAIR COMPETITION, VIOLENCE, VOTER PREFERENCES, VOTERS, WEALTH,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/899931468346438707/Special-interests-versus-the-public-interest-in-policy-determination https://hdl.handle.net/10986/28251
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