Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns

In this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. The authors then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. The authors find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection across countries and within countries over time. The results are consistent with the predictions of a model that assumes that labor is specialized and sector-specific in nature. Some aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with predictions of a lobbying model in that agricultural protection is negatively related to agricultural employment and positively related to agricultural productivity. Public finance aspects of protection also seem to be empirically important.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Dutt, Pushan, Mitra, Devashish
Format: Working Paper biblioteca
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2009-05
Subjects:ABSOLUTE VALUE, AGRICULTURAL TRADE, AGRICULTURE, ASSET DISTRIBUTION, ASSET INEQUALITY, AUCTIONS, BARRIER, BARRIERS ON IMPORTS, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, CAPITAL GAINS, CAPITAL-ABUNDANT COUNTRIES, CHECKS AND BALANCES, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY, CONSTANT RETURNS, CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE, CONSUMER SURPLUS, CONSUMERS, COUNTRY SIZE, COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EFFECTS, CROSS-COUNTRY DATA, DATA SET, DECREASING FUNCTION, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRACY, DEPENDENT VARIABLE, DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRY, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DICTATORSHIP, DOMESTIC PRICE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, ECONOMIC FACTORS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC MODELS, ECONOMIC REVIEW, ECONOMICS, ECONOMY LITERATURE, ELASTICITY, EMPIRICAL APPLICATION, EMPIRICAL APPROACHES, EMPIRICAL LITERATURE, EMPIRICAL RESULTS, EMPIRICAL SUPPORT, EMPIRICAL WORK, EQUILIBRIUM, EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF, EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, EXPORT SUBSIDY, EXPORT SUPPLY, EXPORTS, FREE TRADE, FUTURE RESEARCH, GDP, GDP PER CAPITA, GINI COEFFICIENT, GLOBALIZATION, IDEOLOGY, IMPORT COMPETITION, IMPORT PROTECTION, INCOME, INCOME INEQUALITY, INCOME LEVELS, INCOME TAXES, INCREASING FUNCTION, INCUMBENT, INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, INEQUALITY, INEQUALITY MEASURE, INEQUALITY WILL INCREASE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, LABOR FORCE, LAND INEQUALITY, LEGAL SYSTEM, LOBBYING, LONG-RUN POLICY, MARKET ACCESS, MARKET CONDITIONS, MEASURING INCOME INEQUALITY, MEDIAN VOTER, NEGATIVE SIGN, NOMINAL RATE, NON-TARIFF BARRIERS, OLD ISSUES, OPEN ECONOMIES, OUTPUT, PER CAPITA INCOME, PER CAPITA INCOMES, POLICY CHANGES, POLITICAL ACTIVITY, POLITICAL CONFLICT, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL ECONOMY MODELS, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL REGIME, POLITICAL SCIENCE, POOR COUNTRIES, PRODUCTIVITY, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, PROTECTIONISM, PROTECTIONIST, PUBLIC FINANCE, REAL WAGES, REGULATION OF TRADE, SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT, TARIFF BARRIERS, TARIFF FORMATION, TARIFF RATES, TARIFF STRUCTURE, TAX, TAX REVENUE, TAX REVENUES, TAXATION, TERMS OF TRADE, TRADE BARRIERS, TRADE ISSUES, TRADE LEGISLATION, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, TRADE MODELS, TRADE POLICIES, TRADE POLICY, TRADE POLICY FORMULATION, TRADE PROTECTION, TRADE REFORMS, TRADE RESTRICTIONS, TRANSPARENCY, UNEMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, UNSKILLED LABOR, WAGES, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, WORLD TRADE,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/704051468336324311/Explaining-agricultural-distortion-patterns-the-roles-of-ideology-inequality-lobbying-and-public-finance
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/28159
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libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language English
en_US
topic ABSOLUTE VALUE
AGRICULTURAL TRADE
AGRICULTURE
ASSET DISTRIBUTION
ASSET INEQUALITY
AUCTIONS
BARRIER
BARRIERS ON IMPORTS
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
CAPITAL GAINS
CAPITAL-ABUNDANT COUNTRIES
CHECKS AND BALANCES
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
CONSTANT RETURNS
CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONSUMERS
COUNTRY SIZE
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EFFECTS
CROSS-COUNTRY DATA
DATA SET
DECREASING FUNCTION
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRY
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DICTATORSHIP
DOMESTIC PRICE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ECONOMIC FACTORS
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC MODELS
ECONOMIC REVIEW
ECONOMICS
ECONOMY LITERATURE
ELASTICITY
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
EMPIRICAL WORK
EQUILIBRIUM
EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
EXPORT SUBSIDY
EXPORT SUPPLY
EXPORTS
FREE TRADE
FUTURE RESEARCH
GDP
GDP PER CAPITA
GINI COEFFICIENT
GLOBALIZATION
IDEOLOGY
IMPORT COMPETITION
IMPORT PROTECTION
INCOME
INCOME INEQUALITY
INCOME LEVELS
INCOME TAXES
INCREASING FUNCTION
INCUMBENT
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY MEASURE
INEQUALITY WILL INCREASE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LABOR FORCE
LAND INEQUALITY
LEGAL SYSTEM
LOBBYING
LONG-RUN POLICY
MARKET ACCESS
MARKET CONDITIONS
MEASURING INCOME INEQUALITY
MEDIAN VOTER
NEGATIVE SIGN
NOMINAL RATE
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
OLD ISSUES
OPEN ECONOMIES
OUTPUT
PER CAPITA INCOME
PER CAPITA INCOMES
POLICY CHANGES
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
POLITICAL CONFLICT
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL ECONOMY MODELS
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL REGIME
POLITICAL SCIENCE
POOR COUNTRIES
PRODUCTIVITY
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
PROTECTIONISM
PROTECTIONIST
PUBLIC FINANCE
REAL WAGES
REGULATION OF TRADE
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT
TARIFF BARRIERS
TARIFF FORMATION
TARIFF RATES
TARIFF STRUCTURE
TAX
TAX REVENUE
TAX REVENUES
TAXATION
TERMS OF TRADE
TRADE BARRIERS
TRADE ISSUES
TRADE LEGISLATION
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE MODELS
TRADE POLICIES
TRADE POLICY
TRADE POLICY FORMULATION
TRADE PROTECTION
TRADE REFORMS
TRADE RESTRICTIONS
TRANSPARENCY
UNEMPLOYMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
UNSKILLED LABOR
WAGES
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
WORLD TRADE
ABSOLUTE VALUE
AGRICULTURAL TRADE
AGRICULTURE
ASSET DISTRIBUTION
ASSET INEQUALITY
AUCTIONS
BARRIER
BARRIERS ON IMPORTS
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
CAPITAL GAINS
CAPITAL-ABUNDANT COUNTRIES
CHECKS AND BALANCES
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
CONSTANT RETURNS
CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONSUMERS
COUNTRY SIZE
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EFFECTS
CROSS-COUNTRY DATA
DATA SET
DECREASING FUNCTION
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRY
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DICTATORSHIP
DOMESTIC PRICE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ECONOMIC FACTORS
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC MODELS
ECONOMIC REVIEW
ECONOMICS
ECONOMY LITERATURE
ELASTICITY
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
EMPIRICAL WORK
EQUILIBRIUM
EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
EXPORT SUBSIDY
EXPORT SUPPLY
EXPORTS
FREE TRADE
FUTURE RESEARCH
GDP
GDP PER CAPITA
GINI COEFFICIENT
GLOBALIZATION
IDEOLOGY
IMPORT COMPETITION
IMPORT PROTECTION
INCOME
INCOME INEQUALITY
INCOME LEVELS
INCOME TAXES
INCREASING FUNCTION
INCUMBENT
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY MEASURE
INEQUALITY WILL INCREASE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LABOR FORCE
LAND INEQUALITY
LEGAL SYSTEM
LOBBYING
LONG-RUN POLICY
MARKET ACCESS
MARKET CONDITIONS
MEASURING INCOME INEQUALITY
MEDIAN VOTER
NEGATIVE SIGN
NOMINAL RATE
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
OLD ISSUES
OPEN ECONOMIES
OUTPUT
PER CAPITA INCOME
PER CAPITA INCOMES
POLICY CHANGES
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
POLITICAL CONFLICT
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL ECONOMY MODELS
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL REGIME
POLITICAL SCIENCE
POOR COUNTRIES
PRODUCTIVITY
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
PROTECTIONISM
PROTECTIONIST
PUBLIC FINANCE
REAL WAGES
REGULATION OF TRADE
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT
TARIFF BARRIERS
TARIFF FORMATION
TARIFF RATES
TARIFF STRUCTURE
TAX
TAX REVENUE
TAX REVENUES
TAXATION
TERMS OF TRADE
TRADE BARRIERS
TRADE ISSUES
TRADE LEGISLATION
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE MODELS
TRADE POLICIES
TRADE POLICY
TRADE POLICY FORMULATION
TRADE PROTECTION
TRADE REFORMS
TRADE RESTRICTIONS
TRANSPARENCY
UNEMPLOYMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
UNSKILLED LABOR
WAGES
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
WORLD TRADE
spellingShingle ABSOLUTE VALUE
AGRICULTURAL TRADE
AGRICULTURE
ASSET DISTRIBUTION
ASSET INEQUALITY
AUCTIONS
BARRIER
BARRIERS ON IMPORTS
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
CAPITAL GAINS
CAPITAL-ABUNDANT COUNTRIES
CHECKS AND BALANCES
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
CONSTANT RETURNS
CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONSUMERS
COUNTRY SIZE
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EFFECTS
CROSS-COUNTRY DATA
DATA SET
DECREASING FUNCTION
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRY
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DICTATORSHIP
DOMESTIC PRICE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ECONOMIC FACTORS
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC MODELS
ECONOMIC REVIEW
ECONOMICS
ECONOMY LITERATURE
ELASTICITY
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
EMPIRICAL WORK
EQUILIBRIUM
EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
EXPORT SUBSIDY
EXPORT SUPPLY
EXPORTS
FREE TRADE
FUTURE RESEARCH
GDP
GDP PER CAPITA
GINI COEFFICIENT
GLOBALIZATION
IDEOLOGY
IMPORT COMPETITION
IMPORT PROTECTION
INCOME
INCOME INEQUALITY
INCOME LEVELS
INCOME TAXES
INCREASING FUNCTION
INCUMBENT
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY MEASURE
INEQUALITY WILL INCREASE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LABOR FORCE
LAND INEQUALITY
LEGAL SYSTEM
LOBBYING
LONG-RUN POLICY
MARKET ACCESS
MARKET CONDITIONS
MEASURING INCOME INEQUALITY
MEDIAN VOTER
NEGATIVE SIGN
NOMINAL RATE
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
OLD ISSUES
OPEN ECONOMIES
OUTPUT
PER CAPITA INCOME
PER CAPITA INCOMES
POLICY CHANGES
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
POLITICAL CONFLICT
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL ECONOMY MODELS
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL REGIME
POLITICAL SCIENCE
POOR COUNTRIES
PRODUCTIVITY
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
PROTECTIONISM
PROTECTIONIST
PUBLIC FINANCE
REAL WAGES
REGULATION OF TRADE
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT
TARIFF BARRIERS
TARIFF FORMATION
TARIFF RATES
TARIFF STRUCTURE
TAX
TAX REVENUE
TAX REVENUES
TAXATION
TERMS OF TRADE
TRADE BARRIERS
TRADE ISSUES
TRADE LEGISLATION
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE MODELS
TRADE POLICIES
TRADE POLICY
TRADE POLICY FORMULATION
TRADE PROTECTION
TRADE REFORMS
TRADE RESTRICTIONS
TRANSPARENCY
UNEMPLOYMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
UNSKILLED LABOR
WAGES
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
WORLD TRADE
ABSOLUTE VALUE
AGRICULTURAL TRADE
AGRICULTURE
ASSET DISTRIBUTION
ASSET INEQUALITY
AUCTIONS
BARRIER
BARRIERS ON IMPORTS
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
CAPITAL GAINS
CAPITAL-ABUNDANT COUNTRIES
CHECKS AND BALANCES
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
CONSTANT RETURNS
CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONSUMERS
COUNTRY SIZE
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EFFECTS
CROSS-COUNTRY DATA
DATA SET
DECREASING FUNCTION
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRY
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DICTATORSHIP
DOMESTIC PRICE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ECONOMIC FACTORS
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC MODELS
ECONOMIC REVIEW
ECONOMICS
ECONOMY LITERATURE
ELASTICITY
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
EMPIRICAL WORK
EQUILIBRIUM
EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
EXPORT SUBSIDY
EXPORT SUPPLY
EXPORTS
FREE TRADE
FUTURE RESEARCH
GDP
GDP PER CAPITA
GINI COEFFICIENT
GLOBALIZATION
IDEOLOGY
IMPORT COMPETITION
IMPORT PROTECTION
INCOME
INCOME INEQUALITY
INCOME LEVELS
INCOME TAXES
INCREASING FUNCTION
INCUMBENT
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY MEASURE
INEQUALITY WILL INCREASE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LABOR FORCE
LAND INEQUALITY
LEGAL SYSTEM
LOBBYING
LONG-RUN POLICY
MARKET ACCESS
MARKET CONDITIONS
MEASURING INCOME INEQUALITY
MEDIAN VOTER
NEGATIVE SIGN
NOMINAL RATE
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
OLD ISSUES
OPEN ECONOMIES
OUTPUT
PER CAPITA INCOME
PER CAPITA INCOMES
POLICY CHANGES
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
POLITICAL CONFLICT
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL ECONOMY MODELS
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL REGIME
POLITICAL SCIENCE
POOR COUNTRIES
PRODUCTIVITY
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
PROTECTIONISM
PROTECTIONIST
PUBLIC FINANCE
REAL WAGES
REGULATION OF TRADE
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT
TARIFF BARRIERS
TARIFF FORMATION
TARIFF RATES
TARIFF STRUCTURE
TAX
TAX REVENUE
TAX REVENUES
TAXATION
TERMS OF TRADE
TRADE BARRIERS
TRADE ISSUES
TRADE LEGISLATION
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE MODELS
TRADE POLICIES
TRADE POLICY
TRADE POLICY FORMULATION
TRADE PROTECTION
TRADE REFORMS
TRADE RESTRICTIONS
TRANSPARENCY
UNEMPLOYMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
UNSKILLED LABOR
WAGES
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
WORLD TRADE
Dutt, Pushan
Mitra, Devashish
Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns
description In this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. The authors then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. The authors find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection across countries and within countries over time. The results are consistent with the predictions of a model that assumes that labor is specialized and sector-specific in nature. Some aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with predictions of a lobbying model in that agricultural protection is negatively related to agricultural employment and positively related to agricultural productivity. Public finance aspects of protection also seem to be empirically important.
format Working Paper
topic_facet ABSOLUTE VALUE
AGRICULTURAL TRADE
AGRICULTURE
ASSET DISTRIBUTION
ASSET INEQUALITY
AUCTIONS
BARRIER
BARRIERS ON IMPORTS
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
CAPITAL GAINS
CAPITAL-ABUNDANT COUNTRIES
CHECKS AND BALANCES
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
CONSTANT RETURNS
CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONSUMERS
COUNTRY SIZE
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EFFECTS
CROSS-COUNTRY DATA
DATA SET
DECREASING FUNCTION
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRY
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DICTATORSHIP
DOMESTIC PRICE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ECONOMIC FACTORS
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC MODELS
ECONOMIC REVIEW
ECONOMICS
ECONOMY LITERATURE
ELASTICITY
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
EMPIRICAL WORK
EQUILIBRIUM
EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
EXPORT SUBSIDY
EXPORT SUPPLY
EXPORTS
FREE TRADE
FUTURE RESEARCH
GDP
GDP PER CAPITA
GINI COEFFICIENT
GLOBALIZATION
IDEOLOGY
IMPORT COMPETITION
IMPORT PROTECTION
INCOME
INCOME INEQUALITY
INCOME LEVELS
INCOME TAXES
INCREASING FUNCTION
INCUMBENT
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY MEASURE
INEQUALITY WILL INCREASE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LABOR FORCE
LAND INEQUALITY
LEGAL SYSTEM
LOBBYING
LONG-RUN POLICY
MARKET ACCESS
MARKET CONDITIONS
MEASURING INCOME INEQUALITY
MEDIAN VOTER
NEGATIVE SIGN
NOMINAL RATE
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
OLD ISSUES
OPEN ECONOMIES
OUTPUT
PER CAPITA INCOME
PER CAPITA INCOMES
POLICY CHANGES
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
POLITICAL CONFLICT
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL ECONOMY MODELS
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL REGIME
POLITICAL SCIENCE
POOR COUNTRIES
PRODUCTIVITY
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
PROTECTIONISM
PROTECTIONIST
PUBLIC FINANCE
REAL WAGES
REGULATION OF TRADE
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT
TARIFF BARRIERS
TARIFF FORMATION
TARIFF RATES
TARIFF STRUCTURE
TAX
TAX REVENUE
TAX REVENUES
TAXATION
TERMS OF TRADE
TRADE BARRIERS
TRADE ISSUES
TRADE LEGISLATION
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE MODELS
TRADE POLICIES
TRADE POLICY
TRADE POLICY FORMULATION
TRADE PROTECTION
TRADE REFORMS
TRADE RESTRICTIONS
TRANSPARENCY
UNEMPLOYMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
UNSKILLED LABOR
WAGES
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
WORLD TRADE
author Dutt, Pushan
Mitra, Devashish
author_facet Dutt, Pushan
Mitra, Devashish
author_sort Dutt, Pushan
title Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns
title_short Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns
title_full Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns
title_fullStr Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns
title_full_unstemmed Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns
title_sort explaining agricultural distortion patterns
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2009-05
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/704051468336324311/Explaining-agricultural-distortion-patterns-the-roles-of-ideology-inequality-lobbying-and-public-finance
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/28159
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AT mitradevashish explainingagriculturaldistortionpatterns
AT duttpushan therolesofideologyinequalitylobbyingandpublicfinance
AT mitradevashish therolesofideologyinequalitylobbyingandpublicfinance
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spelling dig-okr-10986281592024-08-08T16:01:21Z Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance Dutt, Pushan Mitra, Devashish ABSOLUTE VALUE AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURE ASSET DISTRIBUTION ASSET INEQUALITY AUCTIONS BARRIER BARRIERS ON IMPORTS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL GAINS CAPITAL-ABUNDANT COUNTRIES CHECKS AND BALANCES COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY CONSTANT RETURNS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COUNTRY SIZE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EFFECTS CROSS-COUNTRY DATA DATA SET DECREASING FUNCTION DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DICTATORSHIP DOMESTIC PRICE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC FACTORS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC REVIEW ECONOMICS ECONOMY LITERATURE ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL APPLICATION EMPIRICAL APPROACHES EMPIRICAL LITERATURE EMPIRICAL RESULTS EMPIRICAL SUPPORT EMPIRICAL WORK EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES EXPORT SUBSIDY EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTS FREE TRADE FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GDP PER CAPITA GINI COEFFICIENT GLOBALIZATION IDEOLOGY IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PROTECTION INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVELS INCOME TAXES INCREASING FUNCTION INCUMBENT INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INEQUALITY INEQUALITY MEASURE INEQUALITY WILL INCREASE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL TRADE LABOR FORCE LAND INEQUALITY LEGAL SYSTEM LOBBYING LONG-RUN POLICY MARKET ACCESS MARKET CONDITIONS MEASURING INCOME INEQUALITY MEDIAN VOTER NEGATIVE SIGN NOMINAL RATE NON-TARIFF BARRIERS OLD ISSUES OPEN ECONOMIES OUTPUT PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY CHANGES POLITICAL ACTIVITY POLITICAL CONFLICT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY MODELS POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL REGIME POLITICAL SCIENCE POOR COUNTRIES PRODUCTIVITY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PUBLIC FINANCE REAL WAGES REGULATION OF TRADE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF RATES TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE ISSUES TRADE LEGISLATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE MODELS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY FORMULATION TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REFORMS TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRANSPARENCY UNEMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE UNSKILLED LABOR WAGES WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE In this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. The authors then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. The authors find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection across countries and within countries over time. The results are consistent with the predictions of a model that assumes that labor is specialized and sector-specific in nature. Some aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with predictions of a lobbying model in that agricultural protection is negatively related to agricultural employment and positively related to agricultural productivity. Public finance aspects of protection also seem to be empirically important. 2017-09-07T16:34:28Z 2017-09-07T16:34:28Z 2009-05 Working Paper Document de travail Documento de trabajo http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/704051468336324311/Explaining-agricultural-distortion-patterns-the-roles-of-ideology-inequality-lobbying-and-public-finance https://hdl.handle.net/10986/28159 English en_US Agricultural Distortions Working Paper;84 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC