Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes
This paper deals with the effect of constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in a panel of observations for more than 70 developing and developed countries in the 1955-2005 period. Testable hypotheses are drawn from recent developments in the comparative politics literature that see political institutions as key elements in shaping public policies. Using differences-in-differences regressions we find a positive effect of a transition into democracy on agricultural protection. However, this average effect masks substantial heterogeneities across different forms of democracy. Indeed, what matters are transitions to proportional democracies, as well as to permanent democracies. Moreover, while the author does not detect significant differences across alternative forms of government (presidential versus parliamentary systems), there is some evidence that the effect of proportional election is exacerbated under parliamentary regimes, and diminished under presidential ones.
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dig-okr-10986281582024-08-08T16:01:23Z Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes Olper, Alessandro Raimondi, Valentina ACCOUNTABILITY AUTOCRACY BARGAINING CANDIDATES CETERIS PARIBUS CIVIL LIBERTIES COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY COMPARATIVE POLITICS CONFIDENCE CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT EUROPEAN UNION FISCAL POLICY FRANCHISE FREE TRADE FREEDOM GDP IDEOLOGY INCOME INTEREST GROUP INTEREST GROUPS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INVESTIGATION LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET POLICIES LAWS LEADERSHIP LEFT-WING LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE DECISION LEGISLATIVE PROCESS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LOBBYING LOWER HOUSE PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARTY DISCIPLINE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL EFFECTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL REFORMS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VARIABLES POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTIONISM PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC POLICY RENTS SEPARATION OF POWERS TAX TAXATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY VETO VOTING VOTING RIGHTS This paper deals with the effect of constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in a panel of observations for more than 70 developing and developed countries in the 1955-2005 period. Testable hypotheses are drawn from recent developments in the comparative politics literature that see political institutions as key elements in shaping public policies. Using differences-in-differences regressions we find a positive effect of a transition into democracy on agricultural protection. However, this average effect masks substantial heterogeneities across different forms of democracy. Indeed, what matters are transitions to proportional democracies, as well as to permanent democracies. Moreover, while the author does not detect significant differences across alternative forms of government (presidential versus parliamentary systems), there is some evidence that the effect of proportional election is exacerbated under parliamentary regimes, and diminished under presidential ones. 2017-09-07T16:32:30Z 2017-09-07T16:32:30Z 2009-05 Working Paper Document de travail Documento de trabajo http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/148201468168839812/Constitutional-rules-and-agricultural-policy-outcomes https://hdl.handle.net/10986/28158 English en_US Agricultural Distortions Working Paper;83 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
| institution |
Banco Mundial |
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DSpace |
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Estados Unidos |
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US |
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Bibliográfico |
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En linea |
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dig-okr |
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biblioteca |
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America del Norte |
| libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY AUTOCRACY BARGAINING CANDIDATES CETERIS PARIBUS CIVIL LIBERTIES COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY COMPARATIVE POLITICS CONFIDENCE CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT EUROPEAN UNION FISCAL POLICY FRANCHISE FREE TRADE FREEDOM GDP IDEOLOGY INCOME INTEREST GROUP INTEREST GROUPS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INVESTIGATION LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET POLICIES LAWS LEADERSHIP LEFT-WING LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE DECISION LEGISLATIVE PROCESS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LOBBYING LOWER HOUSE PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARTY DISCIPLINE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL EFFECTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL REFORMS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VARIABLES POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTIONISM PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC POLICY RENTS SEPARATION OF POWERS TAX TAXATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY VETO VOTING VOTING RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY AUTOCRACY BARGAINING CANDIDATES CETERIS PARIBUS CIVIL LIBERTIES COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY COMPARATIVE POLITICS CONFIDENCE CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT EUROPEAN UNION FISCAL POLICY FRANCHISE FREE TRADE FREEDOM GDP IDEOLOGY INCOME INTEREST GROUP INTEREST GROUPS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INVESTIGATION LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET POLICIES LAWS LEADERSHIP LEFT-WING LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE DECISION LEGISLATIVE PROCESS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LOBBYING LOWER HOUSE PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARTY DISCIPLINE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL EFFECTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL REFORMS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VARIABLES POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTIONISM PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC POLICY RENTS SEPARATION OF POWERS TAX TAXATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY VETO VOTING VOTING RIGHTS |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY AUTOCRACY BARGAINING CANDIDATES CETERIS PARIBUS CIVIL LIBERTIES COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY COMPARATIVE POLITICS CONFIDENCE CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT EUROPEAN UNION FISCAL POLICY FRANCHISE FREE TRADE FREEDOM GDP IDEOLOGY INCOME INTEREST GROUP INTEREST GROUPS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INVESTIGATION LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET POLICIES LAWS LEADERSHIP LEFT-WING LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE DECISION LEGISLATIVE PROCESS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LOBBYING LOWER HOUSE PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARTY DISCIPLINE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL EFFECTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL REFORMS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VARIABLES POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTIONISM PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC POLICY RENTS SEPARATION OF POWERS TAX TAXATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY VETO VOTING VOTING RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY AUTOCRACY BARGAINING CANDIDATES CETERIS PARIBUS CIVIL LIBERTIES COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY COMPARATIVE POLITICS CONFIDENCE CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT EUROPEAN UNION FISCAL POLICY FRANCHISE FREE TRADE FREEDOM GDP IDEOLOGY INCOME INTEREST GROUP INTEREST GROUPS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INVESTIGATION LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET POLICIES LAWS LEADERSHIP LEFT-WING LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE DECISION LEGISLATIVE PROCESS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LOBBYING LOWER HOUSE PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARTY DISCIPLINE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL EFFECTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL REFORMS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VARIABLES POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTIONISM PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC POLICY RENTS SEPARATION OF POWERS TAX TAXATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY VETO VOTING VOTING RIGHTS Olper, Alessandro Raimondi, Valentina Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes |
| description |
This paper deals with the effect of
constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in a
panel of observations for more than 70 developing and
developed countries in the 1955-2005 period. Testable
hypotheses are drawn from recent developments in the
comparative politics literature that see political
institutions as key elements in shaping public policies.
Using differences-in-differences regressions we find a
positive effect of a transition into democracy on
agricultural protection. However, this average effect masks
substantial heterogeneities across different forms of
democracy. Indeed, what matters are transitions to
proportional democracies, as well as to permanent
democracies. Moreover, while the author does not detect
significant differences across alternative forms of
government (presidential versus parliamentary systems),
there is some evidence that the effect of proportional
election is exacerbated under parliamentary regimes, and
diminished under presidential ones. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| topic_facet |
ACCOUNTABILITY AUTOCRACY BARGAINING CANDIDATES CETERIS PARIBUS CIVIL LIBERTIES COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY COMPARATIVE POLITICS CONFIDENCE CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT EUROPEAN UNION FISCAL POLICY FRANCHISE FREE TRADE FREEDOM GDP IDEOLOGY INCOME INTEREST GROUP INTEREST GROUPS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INVESTIGATION LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET POLICIES LAWS LEADERSHIP LEFT-WING LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE DECISION LEGISLATIVE PROCESS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LOBBYING LOWER HOUSE PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARTY DISCIPLINE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL EFFECTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL REFORMS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VARIABLES POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTIONISM PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC POLICY RENTS SEPARATION OF POWERS TAX TAXATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY VETO VOTING VOTING RIGHTS |
| author |
Olper, Alessandro Raimondi, Valentina |
| author_facet |
Olper, Alessandro Raimondi, Valentina |
| author_sort |
Olper, Alessandro |
| title |
Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes |
| title_short |
Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes |
| title_full |
Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes |
| title_fullStr |
Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes |
| title_sort |
constitutional rules and agricultural policy outcomes |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2009-05 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/148201468168839812/Constitutional-rules-and-agricultural-policy-outcomes https://hdl.handle.net/10986/28158 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT olperalessandro constitutionalrulesandagriculturalpolicyoutcomes AT raimondivalentina constitutionalrulesandagriculturalpolicyoutcomes |
| _version_ |
1809105965768769536 |