Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes

This paper deals with the effect of constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in a panel of observations for more than 70 developing and developed countries in the 1955-2005 period. Testable hypotheses are drawn from recent developments in the comparative politics literature that see political institutions as key elements in shaping public policies. Using differences-in-differences regressions we find a positive effect of a transition into democracy on agricultural protection. However, this average effect masks substantial heterogeneities across different forms of democracy. Indeed, what matters are transitions to proportional democracies, as well as to permanent democracies. Moreover, while the author does not detect significant differences across alternative forms of government (presidential versus parliamentary systems), there is some evidence that the effect of proportional election is exacerbated under parliamentary regimes, and diminished under presidential ones.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Olper, Alessandro, Raimondi, Valentina
Format:	Working Paper biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2009-05
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY, AUTOCRACY, BARGAINING, CANDIDATES, CETERIS PARIBUS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, COALITION GOVERNMENTS, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY, COMPARATIVE POLITICS, CONFIDENCE, CONSTITUENCIES, CONSTITUENCY, CONSTITUENTS, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC REGIMES, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, ECONOMIC POLICIES, ECONOMIC THEORY, ECONOMICS, ELECTION, ELECTIONS, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, EMPLOYMENT, EUROPEAN UNION, FISCAL POLICY, FRANCHISE, FREE TRADE, FREEDOM, GDP, IDEOLOGY, INCOME, INTEREST GROUP, INTEREST GROUPS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, INVESTIGATION, LABOR MARKET, LABOR MARKET POLICIES, LAWS, LEADERSHIP, LEFT-WING, LEGISLATION, LEGISLATIVE DECISION, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, LEGISLATOR, LEGISLATORS, LOBBYING, LOWER HOUSE, PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS, PARTY DISCIPLINE, POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE, POLITICAL ECONOMICS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL EFFECTS, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL PROCESS, POLITICAL REFORMS, POLITICAL RIGHTS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, POLITICAL VARIABLES, POLITICIAN, POLITICIANS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PROTECTIONISM, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC POLICY, RENTS, SEPARATION OF POWERS, TAX, TAXATION, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, TRADE POLICY, VETO, VOTING, VOTING RIGHTS,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/148201468168839812/Constitutional-rules-and-agricultural-policy-outcomes https://hdl.handle.net/10986/28158
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