Financing Peace
After more than a decade of experience and research on financing arrangements in post conflict countries and fragile states, a consensus has emerged on at least one matter. The core objective is to build effective and legitimate governance structures that secure public confidence through provision of personal security, equal justice and the rule of law, economic well-being, and essential social services including education and health. These governance structures are necessary to ensure that countries do not turn, or turn back, to violence as a means of negotiating state-societal relations. This paper discusses a number of the weaknesses in current financing arrangements for post conflict countries and fragile states, with a focus on Official Development Assistance (ODA). We argue that tensions persist between business-as-usual development policies on the one hand and policies responsive to the demands of peace building on the other. The preferential allocation of aid to 'good performers,' in the name of maximizing its payoff in terms of economic growth, militates against aid to fragile and conflict-affected states. If the aim of aid is redefined to include durable peace, the conventional performance criteria for aid allocation lose much of their force. Compelling arguments can be made for assistance to 'poor performers' if this can help to prevent conflict. Yet the difficulties that initially prompted donors to become more selective in aid allocation remain all too real. Experience has shown that aid can exacerbate problems rather than solving them.
Summary: | After more than a decade of experience
and research on financing arrangements in post conflict
countries and fragile states, a consensus has emerged on at
least one matter. The core objective is to build effective
and legitimate governance structures that secure public
confidence through provision of personal security, equal
justice and the rule of law, economic well-being, and
essential social services including education and health.
These governance structures are necessary to ensure that
countries do not turn, or turn back, to violence as a means
of negotiating state-societal relations. This paper
discusses a number of the weaknesses in current financing
arrangements for post conflict countries and fragile states,
with a focus on Official Development Assistance (ODA). We
argue that tensions persist between business-as-usual
development policies on the one hand and policies responsive
to the demands of peace building on the other. The
preferential allocation of aid to 'good
performers,' in the name of maximizing its payoff in
terms of economic growth, militates against aid to fragile
and conflict-affected states. If the aim of aid is redefined
to include durable peace, the conventional performance
criteria for aid allocation lose much of their force.
Compelling arguments can be made for assistance to
'poor performers' if this can help to prevent
conflict. Yet the difficulties that initially prompted
donors to become more selective in aid allocation remain all
too real. Experience has shown that aid can exacerbate
problems rather than solving them. |
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