Oil and Civil Conflict : Can Public Spending Have a Mitigation Effect?

This paper explores the conditions under which public spending could minimize violent conflict related to oil wealth. Previous work suggests that oil can lead to violent conflict because it increases the value of the state as a prize or because it undermines the state's bureaucratic penetration. Yet, little has been said on how oil wealth could be used to prevent the onset of violent conflict through public spending by buying off citizens and elites, increasing state legitimacy by providing basic services, or strengthening the military and security apparatus. The empirical analysis (148 countries over 1960-2009) shows that higher levels of military spending are associated with lower risk of small- and large-scale conflict onset in countries rich in oil and gas. By contrast, in economies with little natural resources, increases in military spending are associated with a higher risk of conflict. Welfare expenditure is associated with lower risk of small-scale conflict, irrespective of the level of oil revenue. However, general government spending does not appear to have any robust mitigating effects.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Singh, Raju Jan, Bodea, Cristina, Higashijima, Masaaki
Format: Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank Group, Washington, DC 2014-11
Subjects:ADEQUATE EDUCATION, ADULT LITERACY, ARMED CONFLICT, ARMED FORCE, ARMED FORCES, ARMS, BASIC HUMAN NEEDS, BATTLE, CITIZEN, CITIZENS, CIVIL CONFLICT, CIVIL CONFLICTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, CIVIL PEACE, CIVIL SERVICE, CIVIL UNREST, CIVIL WAR, CIVIL WARS, COERCION, COLD WAR, CONFLICT, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, CONFLICT PREVENTION, CONFLICT RESEARCH, CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CONFLICT RISK, CONFLICT RISKS, CONFLICTS, COST OF REBELLION, DEATHS, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRACY SCORE, DEPENDENCE, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPMENT POLICY, DISPUTES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DURATION OF CONFLICT, DURATION OF PEACE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, ENERGY CONSUMPTION, ETHNIC DIVISIONS, ETHNIC GROUP, ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY, ETHNIC POLITICS, FERTILITY, FIGHTING, FOUNDATIONS, GENOCIDE, GOVERNMENT POWER, HEALTH SECTOR, HIGH RISK, HUMAN CAPITAL, HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION, IMF, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, INCOME PER CAPITA, INCREASE IN RISK, INFANT, INFANT MORTALITY, INTERNAL CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL WAR, INTERPERSONAL SKILLS, INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION, JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, LACK OF DEMOCRACY, LEVEL OF POVERTY, LIMITED RESOURCES, LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION, LITERACY RATES, LIVING STANDARDS, MATERIAL RESOURCES, MILITARIZATION, MILITARY BUDGETS, MILITARY EXPENDITURE, MILITARY EXPENDITURES, MILITARY FORCES, MILITARY OPPOSITION, MILITARY PERSONNEL, MILITARY REGIMES, MILITARY SPENDING, NATIONAL DEFENSE, NATIONALISM, NATIONS, NATURAL GAS, NATURAL RESOURCE, NATURAL RESOURCES, OBSERVER, OPPORTUNITY COST, PEACE, PEACE RESEARCH, PENSIONS, PERSONAL ENRICHMENT, POLICE, POLICY DISCUSSIONS, POLICY RESEARCH, POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER, POLITICAL CHANGE, POLITICAL INSTABILITY, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, POLITICAL OPPOSITION, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, POLITICAL PROCESS, POLITICAL RIGHTS, POLITICAL STABILITY, POLITICAL SUPPORT, POLITICAL VIOLENCE, POPULATION SIZE, POPULOUS COUNTRIES, POST-CONFLICT, PROGRESS, PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC SERVICES, QUALITY OF LIFE, REBEL, REBEL GROUP, REBEL GROUPS, REBEL RECRUITMENT, REBELLION, REBELS, RECONSTRUCTION, RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION, RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, REVOLUTIONS, RISK OF CONFLICT, RISKS OF CONFLICT, RURAL AREAS, SAFETY NETS, SANITATION, SECONDARY EDUCATION, SECURITY FORCES, SERVICE DELIVERY, SOCIAL COHESION, SOCIAL EXPENDITURES, SOCIAL MOBILITY, SOCIAL POLICIES, SOCIAL SECTORS, SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL WELFARE, STATE UNIVERSITY, TERRORISM, TOLERANCE, UNEMPLOYMENT, VICTIMS, VIOLENT CONFLICT, VIOLENT CONFLICTS, VIOLENT MEANS, WAR DURATION, WAR ECONOMY, WAR PROJECT, WARFARE, WORLD DEVELOPMENT, YOUNG MALE, YOUNG PEOPLE, YOUNG SOLDIERS,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/11/20366887/oil-civil-conflict-can-public-spending-mitigation-effect-oil-civil-conflict-can-public-spending-mitigation-effect
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20607
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:This paper explores the conditions under which public spending could minimize violent conflict related to oil wealth. Previous work suggests that oil can lead to violent conflict because it increases the value of the state as a prize or because it undermines the state's bureaucratic penetration. Yet, little has been said on how oil wealth could be used to prevent the onset of violent conflict through public spending by buying off citizens and elites, increasing state legitimacy by providing basic services, or strengthening the military and security apparatus. The empirical analysis (148 countries over 1960-2009) shows that higher levels of military spending are associated with lower risk of small- and large-scale conflict onset in countries rich in oil and gas. By contrast, in economies with little natural resources, increases in military spending are associated with a higher risk of conflict. Welfare expenditure is associated with lower risk of small-scale conflict, irrespective of the level of oil revenue. However, general government spending does not appear to have any robust mitigating effects.