Developing Countries, Dispute Settlement, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law
Critical appraisals of the current and potential benefits from developing country engagement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) focus mainly on the Doha Round of negotiations. This paper examines developing country participation in the WTO dispute settlement system to enforce foreign market access rights already negotiated in earlier multilateral rounds. The dispute data from 1995 through 2008 reveal three notable trends: developing countries sustained rate of self-enforcement actions despite declining use of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) by developed countries, developing countries increased use of the DSU to self-enforce their access to the markets of developing as well as developed country markets, and the prevalence of disputes targeting highly observable causes of lost foreign market access, such as antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards. The paper also examines potential impacts of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) into the WTO system in 2001. A close look at the data reveals evidence on at least three channels through which the ACWL may be enhancing developing countries' ability to self-enforce foreign market access: increased initiation of sole-complainant cases, more extensive pursuit of the DSU legal process for any given case, and initiation of disputes over smaller values of lost trade.
Summary: | Critical appraisals of the current and
potential benefits from developing country engagement in the
World Trade Organization (WTO) focus mainly on the Doha
Round of negotiations. This paper examines developing
country participation in the WTO dispute settlement system
to enforce foreign market access rights already negotiated
in earlier multilateral rounds. The dispute data from 1995
through 2008 reveal three notable trends: developing
countries sustained rate of self-enforcement actions
despite declining use of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) by developed countries, developing
countries increased use of the DSU to self-enforce their
access to the markets of developing as well as developed
country markets, and the prevalence of disputes targeting
highly observable causes of lost foreign market access, such
as antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards. The
paper also examines potential impacts of the Advisory Centre
on WTO Law (ACWL) into the WTO system in 2001. A close look
at the data reveals evidence on at least three channels
through which the ACWL may be enhancing developing
countries' ability to self-enforce foreign market
access: increased initiation of sole-complainant cases, more
extensive pursuit of the DSU legal process for any given
case, and initiation of disputes over smaller values of lost trade. |
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