Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis
Standard political economy theories suggest that democratization has a moderating effect on income inequality. But the empirical literature has failed to uncover any such robust relationship. The authors take another look at the issue. The authors argue that prevailing ideology may be an important determinant of inequality and that the democratization effect "works through" ideology. In societies that value equality highly there is less distributional conflict among income groups, so democratization may have only a negligible effect on inequality. But in societies that value equality less, democratization reduces inequality through redistribution as the poor outvote the rich. The authors' cross-country empirical analysis, covering 126 countries in 1960-98, confirms the hypothesis: ideology, as proxied by a country's dominant religion, seems to be related to inequality. In addition, while in Judeo-Christian societies increased democratization appears to lead to lower inequality, in Muslim and Confucian societies it has an insignificant effect. The authors hypothesize that Muslim and Confucian societies rely on informal transfers to reach the desired level of inequality, while Judeo-Christian societies, where family ties are weaker, use political action.
Saved in:
| id |
dig-okr-1098619685 |
|---|---|
| record_format |
koha |
| spelling |
dig-okr-10986196852024-08-08T18:04:27Z Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis Gradstein, Mark Milanovic, Branko Ying, Yvonne COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COUNTRY DUMMIES COUNTRY EFFECTS CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION DATA SET DECREASING FUNCTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DICTATORSHIP DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION EMPIRICAL LITERATURE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL TEST GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GROWTH RATE HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES IDEOLOGIES INCOME INCOME DIFFERENCES INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS INCOME GROUPS INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVEL INCOME LEVELS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INCREASED INEQUALITY INCREASING FUNCTION INEQUALITY INEQUALITY DATA INEQUALITY MEASURE INEQUALITY MEASURES LABOR SUPPLY LACK OF TRANSPARENCY LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE MEDIAN INCOME MEDIAN VOTER MINISTERS NATIONS NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP OLIGARCHY PARLIAMENT PER CAPITA GROWTH PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENTISTS POLITICAL SYSTEM PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIME MINISTERS PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY REFERENDUM REGRESSION ANALYSIS REPUBLICS RESOURCE ALLOCATION REVERSE CAUSALITY REVERSE CAUSATION SAM TAX RATE TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VETO VETO POWER VOTING WAGES Standard political economy theories suggest that democratization has a moderating effect on income inequality. But the empirical literature has failed to uncover any such robust relationship. The authors take another look at the issue. The authors argue that prevailing ideology may be an important determinant of inequality and that the democratization effect "works through" ideology. In societies that value equality highly there is less distributional conflict among income groups, so democratization may have only a negligible effect on inequality. But in societies that value equality less, democratization reduces inequality through redistribution as the poor outvote the rich. The authors' cross-country empirical analysis, covering 126 countries in 1960-98, confirms the hypothesis: ideology, as proxied by a country's dominant religion, seems to be related to inequality. In addition, while in Judeo-Christian societies increased democratization appears to lead to lower inequality, in Muslim and Confucian societies it has an insignificant effect. The authors hypothesize that Muslim and Confucian societies rely on informal transfers to reach the desired level of inequality, while Judeo-Christian societies, where family ties are weaker, use political action. 2014-08-26T15:57:06Z 2014-08-26T15:57:06Z 2001-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/1047466/democracy-income-inequality-empirical-analysis https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19685 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2561 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
| institution |
Banco Mundial |
| collection |
DSpace |
| country |
Estados Unidos |
| countrycode |
US |
| component |
Bibliográfico |
| access |
En linea |
| databasecode |
dig-okr |
| tag |
biblioteca |
| region |
America del Norte |
| libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COUNTRY DUMMIES COUNTRY EFFECTS CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION DATA SET DECREASING FUNCTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DICTATORSHIP DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION EMPIRICAL LITERATURE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL TEST GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GROWTH RATE HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES IDEOLOGIES INCOME INCOME DIFFERENCES INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS INCOME GROUPS INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVEL INCOME LEVELS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INCREASED INEQUALITY INCREASING FUNCTION INEQUALITY INEQUALITY DATA INEQUALITY MEASURE INEQUALITY MEASURES LABOR SUPPLY LACK OF TRANSPARENCY LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE MEDIAN INCOME MEDIAN VOTER MINISTERS NATIONS NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP OLIGARCHY PARLIAMENT PER CAPITA GROWTH PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENTISTS POLITICAL SYSTEM PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIME MINISTERS PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY REFERENDUM REGRESSION ANALYSIS REPUBLICS RESOURCE ALLOCATION REVERSE CAUSALITY REVERSE CAUSATION SAM TAX RATE TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VETO VETO POWER VOTING WAGES COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COUNTRY DUMMIES COUNTRY EFFECTS CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION DATA SET DECREASING FUNCTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DICTATORSHIP DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION EMPIRICAL LITERATURE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL TEST GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GROWTH RATE HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES IDEOLOGIES INCOME INCOME DIFFERENCES INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS INCOME GROUPS INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVEL INCOME LEVELS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INCREASED INEQUALITY INCREASING FUNCTION INEQUALITY INEQUALITY DATA INEQUALITY MEASURE INEQUALITY MEASURES LABOR SUPPLY LACK OF TRANSPARENCY LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE MEDIAN INCOME MEDIAN VOTER MINISTERS NATIONS NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP OLIGARCHY PARLIAMENT PER CAPITA GROWTH PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENTISTS POLITICAL SYSTEM PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIME MINISTERS PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY REFERENDUM REGRESSION ANALYSIS REPUBLICS RESOURCE ALLOCATION REVERSE CAUSALITY REVERSE CAUSATION SAM TAX RATE TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VETO VETO POWER VOTING WAGES |
| spellingShingle |
COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COUNTRY DUMMIES COUNTRY EFFECTS CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION DATA SET DECREASING FUNCTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DICTATORSHIP DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION EMPIRICAL LITERATURE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL TEST GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GROWTH RATE HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES IDEOLOGIES INCOME INCOME DIFFERENCES INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS INCOME GROUPS INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVEL INCOME LEVELS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INCREASED INEQUALITY INCREASING FUNCTION INEQUALITY INEQUALITY DATA INEQUALITY MEASURE INEQUALITY MEASURES LABOR SUPPLY LACK OF TRANSPARENCY LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE MEDIAN INCOME MEDIAN VOTER MINISTERS NATIONS NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP OLIGARCHY PARLIAMENT PER CAPITA GROWTH PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENTISTS POLITICAL SYSTEM PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIME MINISTERS PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY REFERENDUM REGRESSION ANALYSIS REPUBLICS RESOURCE ALLOCATION REVERSE CAUSALITY REVERSE CAUSATION SAM TAX RATE TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VETO VETO POWER VOTING WAGES COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COUNTRY DUMMIES COUNTRY EFFECTS CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION DATA SET DECREASING FUNCTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DICTATORSHIP DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION EMPIRICAL LITERATURE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL TEST GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GROWTH RATE HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES IDEOLOGIES INCOME INCOME DIFFERENCES INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS INCOME GROUPS INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVEL INCOME LEVELS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INCREASED INEQUALITY INCREASING FUNCTION INEQUALITY INEQUALITY DATA INEQUALITY MEASURE INEQUALITY MEASURES LABOR SUPPLY LACK OF TRANSPARENCY LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE MEDIAN INCOME MEDIAN VOTER MINISTERS NATIONS NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP OLIGARCHY PARLIAMENT PER CAPITA GROWTH PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENTISTS POLITICAL SYSTEM PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIME MINISTERS PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY REFERENDUM REGRESSION ANALYSIS REPUBLICS RESOURCE ALLOCATION REVERSE CAUSALITY REVERSE CAUSATION SAM TAX RATE TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VETO VETO POWER VOTING WAGES Gradstein, Mark Milanovic, Branko Ying, Yvonne Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis |
| description |
Standard political economy theories
suggest that democratization has a moderating effect on
income inequality. But the empirical literature has failed
to uncover any such robust relationship. The authors take
another look at the issue. The authors argue that prevailing
ideology may be an important determinant of inequality and
that the democratization effect "works through"
ideology. In societies that value equality highly there is
less distributional conflict among income groups, so
democratization may have only a negligible effect on
inequality. But in societies that value equality less,
democratization reduces inequality through redistribution as
the poor outvote the rich. The authors' cross-country
empirical analysis, covering 126 countries in 1960-98,
confirms the hypothesis: ideology, as proxied by a
country's dominant religion, seems to be related to
inequality. In addition, while in Judeo-Christian societies
increased democratization appears to lead to lower
inequality, in Muslim and Confucian societies it has an
insignificant effect. The authors hypothesize that Muslim
and Confucian societies rely on informal transfers to reach
the desired level of inequality, while Judeo-Christian
societies, where family ties are weaker, use political action. |
| topic_facet |
COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COUNTRY DUMMIES COUNTRY EFFECTS CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION DATA SET DECREASING FUNCTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DICTATORSHIP DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION EMPIRICAL LITERATURE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL TEST GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GROWTH RATE HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES IDEOLOGIES INCOME INCOME DIFFERENCES INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS INCOME GROUPS INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVEL INCOME LEVELS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INCREASED INEQUALITY INCREASING FUNCTION INEQUALITY INEQUALITY DATA INEQUALITY MEASURE INEQUALITY MEASURES LABOR SUPPLY LACK OF TRANSPARENCY LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE MEDIAN INCOME MEDIAN VOTER MINISTERS NATIONS NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP OLIGARCHY PARLIAMENT PER CAPITA GROWTH PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENTISTS POLITICAL SYSTEM PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIME MINISTERS PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY REFERENDUM REGRESSION ANALYSIS REPUBLICS RESOURCE ALLOCATION REVERSE CAUSALITY REVERSE CAUSATION SAM TAX RATE TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VETO VETO POWER VOTING WAGES |
| author |
Gradstein, Mark Milanovic, Branko Ying, Yvonne |
| author_facet |
Gradstein, Mark Milanovic, Branko Ying, Yvonne |
| author_sort |
Gradstein, Mark |
| title |
Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis |
| title_short |
Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis |
| title_full |
Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis |
| title_fullStr |
Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis |
| title_sort |
democracy and income inequality : an empirical analysis |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2001-03 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/1047466/democracy-income-inequality-empirical-analysis https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19685 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT gradsteinmark democracyandincomeinequalityanempiricalanalysis AT milanovicbranko democracyandincomeinequalityanempiricalanalysis AT yingyvonne democracyandincomeinequalityanempiricalanalysis |
| _version_ |
1807159319238541312 |