Telecommunications Sector Reforms in Senegal

This paper analyzes Senegal's experience with telecommunications liberalization and privatization. Senegal privatized its incumbent operator in 1997, and granted the newly privatized firm seven years of fixed-line exclusivity while introducing "managed competition" in the cellular market and free competition in value-added services (VAS). By May 2001, two cellular operators, a number of VAS providers, and thousands of retailers operating telecenters had entered the market. Reform has thus significantly changed the landscape of Senegal's telecommunications sector and has brought with it tremendous improvement in sector performance. Between 1997 and 2001, fixed-line telephone penetration grew from 1.32 to 2.45 per hundred people, while mobile penetration skyrocketed from 0.08 to 4.04. But it is still too early to assess the validity of granting fixed-line exclusivity to the incumbent operator. While penetration increased, the operator did not meet objectives regarding rural telephony. Moreover, fixed-line penetration increased in areas where the operator faced competition from a mobile provider.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Azam, Jean-Paul, Dia, Magueye, N'Guessan, Tchetche
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2002-09
Subjects:ACCOUNTABILITY, ACCOUNTING, ALLOCATION OF LINES, ASSETS, BIDDING, BUDGET DEFICIT, CALLS, CASH-FLOW, CHARGING, COMPETITION POLICY, CONSTITUENCY, CONSUMERS, CORRUPTION, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, DATA TRANSMISSION, DEMOCRATIZATION, DEVALUATION, DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS, ELASTICITY, ENTERPRISE REFORM, EXCESS DEMAND, FINANCIAL BENEFITS, FINANCIAL DISASTER, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE, GDP, GOVERNMENT'S POLICY, HUMAN RESOURCES, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, INFORMAL SECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL CALLS, LOBBYING, LOCAL CALLS, MARGINAL COST, MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, MONOPOLY, MOTIVATIONS, NATIONAL ACCOUNTS, NATIONAL ELECTIONS, OPPOSITION PARTIES, PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION, PAYPHONES, PHONES, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL POWER, POLITICIANS, PRESIDENCY, PRESIDENTS, PRIVATE SECTOR, PRIVATISATION, PRODUCTIVE ASSETS, PROGRAMS, PUBLIC DEBT, PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES, PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC UTILITIES, REPRESENTATIVES, RURAL TELEPHONY, SAVINGS, SERVICE QUALITY, SOCIAL CONTROL, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, SUPPLY CURVE, TAX, TECHNOCRATS, TELECENTERS, TELECOM SECTOR, TELECOM SERVICES, TELECOMMUNICATION, TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR, TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR, TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR REFORMS, TELECOMS, TELEPHONE LINES, TELEPHONES, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, TRANSPARENCY, TREASURY, URBANIZATION, VALUE ADDED, VOTERS, WAGE THEORY, WAGES TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY, MARKET LIBERALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, CELLULAR MOBILE PHONES, MARKET COMPETITION, CELLULAR TELEPHONE, MARKET PENETRATION, SERVICE DELIVERY, NETWORKS, FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/09/2028950/telecommunications-sector-reforms-senegal
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19334
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Summary:This paper analyzes Senegal's experience with telecommunications liberalization and privatization. Senegal privatized its incumbent operator in 1997, and granted the newly privatized firm seven years of fixed-line exclusivity while introducing "managed competition" in the cellular market and free competition in value-added services (VAS). By May 2001, two cellular operators, a number of VAS providers, and thousands of retailers operating telecenters had entered the market. Reform has thus significantly changed the landscape of Senegal's telecommunications sector and has brought with it tremendous improvement in sector performance. Between 1997 and 2001, fixed-line telephone penetration grew from 1.32 to 2.45 per hundred people, while mobile penetration skyrocketed from 0.08 to 4.04. But it is still too early to assess the validity of granting fixed-line exclusivity to the incumbent operator. While penetration increased, the operator did not meet objectives regarding rural telephony. Moreover, fixed-line penetration increased in areas where the operator faced competition from a mobile provider.