The Determinants of Government Environmental Performance : An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Townships

This paper explores the determinants of government environmental performance at the local level. Chinese township governments, the lowest level in the hierarchical government structure, were selected for this exercise. The performance indicators used in the analyses include the efforts of enforcing government environmental regulations and of providing environmental services to polluting enterprises. The performance determinants identified include environmental performance of upper-level governments, local development status, industrial employment, income of workers in polluting enterprises, local environmental quality, and public pressure for environmental quality improvement. A survey of 85 townships and interviews of 151 township government leaders were conducted in three provinces of China. The statistical results show that: a) The environmental performance of upper-level governments in China strongly and positively influences the environmental efforts of the township governments. b) Public pressure has created incentives for the township governments to improve their efforts in both enforcing environmental regulations and providing environmental services, while the environmental quality did not show significant impacts. c) Higher employment in industries tends to have a negative influence on the regulatory enforcement, but a positive influence on environmental service provision. d) A higher enforcement effort and a lower service provision are associated with higher wages the workers received from industries. This implies that the industries offering higher wages to the workers are subject to more stringent environmental enforcement but receive less environmental services. 5) Richer townships tend to have less regulatory enforcement but better environmental services.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Wang, Hua, Di, Wenhua
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2002-12
Subjects:	ABATEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET, AIR POLLUTION, AIR QUALITY, BUDGET DEFICITS, BUREAUCRACY, CAPITALS, CASH BUDGETS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CLEANER ENVIRONMENT, CORRUPTION, DECENTRALIZATION, DECISION MAKING, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC POLICIES, EMISSIONS, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, EMPLOYMENT, ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS, ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS, ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION, ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS, ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE, ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EFFORTS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS, ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES, ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS, EQUILIBRIUM, FEDERALISM, FILE COMPLAINTS, FINANCIAL SUPPORT, FISCAL, FISCAL INCENTIVES, FISCAL REFORM, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, GOVERNMENT, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, INCOME, INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION, INDUSTRIAL WATER, INFORMATION, INFORMATION DISCLOSURE, INFORMATION SERVICES, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, LABOR MARKET, LOBBYING, LOCAL ADMINISTRATION, LOCAL ENTERPRISES, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL TAX, MARKET INSTRUMENTS, MOTIVATIONS, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS, MUNICIPALITIES, MUNICIPALITY, NATIONAL POLICY, PENALTIES, POINT OF VIEW, POLICY MAKERS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLLUTERS, POLLUTION, POLLUTION ABATEMENT, POLLUTION CHARGES, POLLUTION CONTROL, POLLUTION DISCHARGE, POLLUTION REGULATION, PRIVATIZATION, PROFITABILITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC FINANCE, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, PUBLIC SERVICES, REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION, REGULATORY AGENCY, REGULATORY APPROACHES, REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS, REGULATORY SYSTEM, SOCIAL STABILITY, SOCIAL WELFARE, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, SULFUR DIOXIDE, TOWNSHIPS, TRADE ASSOCIATION, WAGES,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/12/2109778/determinants-government-environmental-performance-empirical-analysis-chinese-townships https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19197
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