Bank Competition, Financing Obstacles, and Access to Credit
Theory makes ambiguous predictions about the effects of bank concentration on access to external finance. Using a unique data base for 74 countries of financing obstacles and financing patterns for firms of small, medium, and large size, the authors assess the effects of banking market structure on financing obstacles and the access of firms to bank finance. The authors find that bank concentration increases financing obstacles and decreases the likelihood of receiving bank finance, with the impact decreasing in size. The relation of bank concentration and financing obstacles is dampened in countries with well developed institutions, higher levels of economic and financial development, and a larger share of foreign-owned banks. The effect is exacerbated by more restrictions on banks' activities, more government interference in the banking sector, and a larger share of government-owned banks. Finally, it is possible to alleviate the negative impact of bank concentration on access to finance by reducing activity restrictions.
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dig-okr-10986191612024-08-08T17:47:32Z Bank Competition, Financing Obstacles, and Access to Credit Maksimovic, Vojislav Beck, Thorsten Demirguc-Kunt, Asli ACCUMULATION RATE ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CASH FLOW CENTRAL BANKS COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE BANKS CORRELATION ANALYSIS CREDIT RATIONING DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSITS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN BANKS GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GROWTH RATE INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INFLATION RATE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE POLICIES INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INVESTOR PROTECTION LAWS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION MORAL HAZARD OLIGOPOLY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PERFECT COMPETITION PREDICTIONS REAL ESTATE REAL GDP REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY REGIMES RELATIONSHIP LENDING RESOURCE ALLOCATION SAVINGS SECURITIES SMALL BUSINESS STOCK MARKETS SUBSIDIARIES SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES ACCESS TO CREDIT Theory makes ambiguous predictions about the effects of bank concentration on access to external finance. Using a unique data base for 74 countries of financing obstacles and financing patterns for firms of small, medium, and large size, the authors assess the effects of banking market structure on financing obstacles and the access of firms to bank finance. The authors find that bank concentration increases financing obstacles and decreases the likelihood of receiving bank finance, with the impact decreasing in size. The relation of bank concentration and financing obstacles is dampened in countries with well developed institutions, higher levels of economic and financial development, and a larger share of foreign-owned banks. The effect is exacerbated by more restrictions on banks' activities, more government interference in the banking sector, and a larger share of government-owned banks. Finally, it is possible to alleviate the negative impact of bank concentration on access to finance by reducing activity restrictions. 2014-07-31T22:18:47Z 2014-07-31T22:18:47Z 2003-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/03/2183609/bank-competition-financing-obstacles-access-credit https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19161 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2996 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
| institution |
Banco Mundial |
| collection |
DSpace |
| country |
Estados Unidos |
| countrycode |
US |
| component |
Bibliográfico |
| access |
En linea |
| databasecode |
dig-okr |
| tag |
biblioteca |
| region |
America del Norte |
| libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCUMULATION RATE ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CASH FLOW CENTRAL BANKS COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE BANKS CORRELATION ANALYSIS CREDIT RATIONING DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSITS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN BANKS GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GROWTH RATE INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INFLATION RATE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE POLICIES INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INVESTOR PROTECTION LAWS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION MORAL HAZARD OLIGOPOLY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PERFECT COMPETITION PREDICTIONS REAL ESTATE REAL GDP REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY REGIMES RELATIONSHIP LENDING RESOURCE ALLOCATION SAVINGS SECURITIES SMALL BUSINESS STOCK MARKETS SUBSIDIARIES SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCUMULATION RATE ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CASH FLOW CENTRAL BANKS COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE BANKS CORRELATION ANALYSIS CREDIT RATIONING DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSITS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN BANKS GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GROWTH RATE INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INFLATION RATE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE POLICIES INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INVESTOR PROTECTION LAWS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION MORAL HAZARD OLIGOPOLY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PERFECT COMPETITION PREDICTIONS REAL ESTATE REAL GDP REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY REGIMES RELATIONSHIP LENDING RESOURCE ALLOCATION SAVINGS SECURITIES SMALL BUSINESS STOCK MARKETS SUBSIDIARIES SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES ACCESS TO CREDIT |
| spellingShingle |
ACCUMULATION RATE ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CASH FLOW CENTRAL BANKS COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE BANKS CORRELATION ANALYSIS CREDIT RATIONING DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSITS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN BANKS GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GROWTH RATE INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INFLATION RATE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE POLICIES INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INVESTOR PROTECTION LAWS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION MORAL HAZARD OLIGOPOLY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PERFECT COMPETITION PREDICTIONS REAL ESTATE REAL GDP REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY REGIMES RELATIONSHIP LENDING RESOURCE ALLOCATION SAVINGS SECURITIES SMALL BUSINESS STOCK MARKETS SUBSIDIARIES SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCUMULATION RATE ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CASH FLOW CENTRAL BANKS COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE BANKS CORRELATION ANALYSIS CREDIT RATIONING DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSITS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN BANKS GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GROWTH RATE INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INFLATION RATE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE POLICIES INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INVESTOR PROTECTION LAWS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION MORAL HAZARD OLIGOPOLY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PERFECT COMPETITION PREDICTIONS REAL ESTATE REAL GDP REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY REGIMES RELATIONSHIP LENDING RESOURCE ALLOCATION SAVINGS SECURITIES SMALL BUSINESS STOCK MARKETS SUBSIDIARIES SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES ACCESS TO CREDIT Maksimovic, Vojislav Beck, Thorsten Demirguc-Kunt, Asli Bank Competition, Financing Obstacles, and Access to Credit |
| description |
Theory makes ambiguous predictions about
the effects of bank concentration on access to external
finance. Using a unique data base for 74 countries of
financing obstacles and financing patterns for firms of
small, medium, and large size, the authors assess the
effects of banking market structure on financing obstacles
and the access of firms to bank finance. The authors find
that bank concentration increases financing obstacles and
decreases the likelihood of receiving bank finance, with the
impact decreasing in size. The relation of bank
concentration and financing obstacles is dampened in
countries with well developed institutions, higher levels of
economic and financial development, and a larger share of
foreign-owned banks. The effect is exacerbated by more
restrictions on banks' activities, more government
interference in the banking sector, and a larger share of
government-owned banks. Finally, it is possible to alleviate
the negative impact of bank concentration on access to
finance by reducing activity restrictions. |
| topic_facet |
ACCUMULATION RATE ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CASH FLOW CENTRAL BANKS COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE BANKS CORRELATION ANALYSIS CREDIT RATIONING DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSITS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN BANKS GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GROWTH RATE INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INFLATION RATE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE POLICIES INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INVESTOR PROTECTION LAWS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION MORAL HAZARD OLIGOPOLY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PERFECT COMPETITION PREDICTIONS REAL ESTATE REAL GDP REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY REGIMES RELATIONSHIP LENDING RESOURCE ALLOCATION SAVINGS SECURITIES SMALL BUSINESS STOCK MARKETS SUBSIDIARIES SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES ACCESS TO CREDIT |
| author |
Maksimovic, Vojislav Beck, Thorsten Demirguc-Kunt, Asli |
| author_facet |
Maksimovic, Vojislav Beck, Thorsten Demirguc-Kunt, Asli |
| author_sort |
Maksimovic, Vojislav |
| title |
Bank Competition, Financing Obstacles, and Access to Credit |
| title_short |
Bank Competition, Financing Obstacles, and Access to Credit |
| title_full |
Bank Competition, Financing Obstacles, and Access to Credit |
| title_fullStr |
Bank Competition, Financing Obstacles, and Access to Credit |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Bank Competition, Financing Obstacles, and Access to Credit |
| title_sort |
bank competition, financing obstacles, and access to credit |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2003-03 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/03/2183609/bank-competition-financing-obstacles-access-credit https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19161 |
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1807157899239096320 |