Reducing Agricultural Tariffs versus Domestic Support : What's More Important for Developing Countries?
High levels of protection and domestic support for farmers in industrial countries significantly affect many developing countries, both directly and through the price-depressing effect of agricultural support policies. High tariffs--in both rich and poor countries--and domestic support may also lower the world price of agricultural products, benefiting net importers. The authors assess the impact of reducing tariffs and domestic support in a sample of 119 countries. Least developed countries (LDCs) are disproportionately affected by agricultural support policies. More than 18 percent of LDC exports are subject to domestic support in at least one World Trade Organization (WTO) member, as compared to only 9 percent of their imports. For other developing countries the figures are around 4 percent for both their exports and imports. So, the prevailing pattern of trade suggests the world price-reducing effect of agricultural domestic support policies may induce a welfare loss in LDCs. The authors develop a simple partial equilibrium model of global trade in commodities that benefit from domestic support in at least one WTO member. The simulation results suggest there will be large differences between LDCs and other developing economies in terms of the impact of a 50 percent cut in tariffs as compared to a 50 percent cut in domestic support. Developing countries as a group would suffer a welfare loss from a cut in support, while LDCs would experience a small gain. For both groups of countries, tariff reductions by WTO members--including own liberalization--will have a positive effect on welfare. The results show both the importance of focusing on tariffs as well as subsities, and the need for complementary actions to allow a domestic supply response to occur in developing countries if world prices rise
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Banco Mundial |
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Estados Unidos |
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Bibliográfico |
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America del Norte |
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Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
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English en_US |
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PROTECTIVE TARIFFS AGRICULTURAL TAXATION AGRICULTURAL PRICES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT TARIFFS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES ELASTICITY (ECONOMIC) SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SIMULATIONS MOST FAVOURED NATION CLAUSE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AGRICULTURAL GOODS AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES AGRICULTURE ARBITRAGE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFFS BENCHMARK BORDER PROTECTION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEMAND FUNCTIONS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DOMESTIC DEMAND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DOMESTIC SUPPORT ECONOMIC POLICY ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATE EXPORT PRICES EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTERS EXPORTS FIXED COSTS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GLOBAL TRADE HIGH TARIFFS IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PRICES IMPORTS INCOME INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES LDCS MARKET ACCESS MARKET SEGMENTING MARKET SEGMENTING EFFECT NET EXPORTERS NON-TARIFF BARRIERS OIL OVERVALUATION PATTERN OF TRADE PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY CHANGES POLICY MEASURES POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR COUNTRIES PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE SUPPORT PRICE VOLATILITY PRODUCERS PRODUCT MARKETS PROTECTION DATA PROTECTIONIST POLICIES QUOTAS REDUCTION IN TARIFFS RESTRICTIVE RULES OF ORIGIN ROUND AGREEMENT RULES OF ORIGIN SPECIALIZATION SUPPLY ELASTICITY SUPPLY FUNCTIONS TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF PREFERENCES TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATE QUOTAS TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF REVENUE TERMS OF TRADE TIME SERIES TRADE FLOWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY REFORM TRADING PARTNERS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPORT COSTS URUGUAY ROUND VOLATILITY WELFARE GAINS WELFARE LOSS WELFARE LOSSES WORLD MARKETS WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WTO WTO AGREEMENT WTO MEMBERS PROTECTIVE TARIFFS AGRICULTURAL TAXATION AGRICULTURAL PRICES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT TARIFFS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES ELASTICITY (ECONOMIC) SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SIMULATIONS MOST FAVOURED NATION CLAUSE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AGRICULTURAL GOODS AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES AGRICULTURE ARBITRAGE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFFS BENCHMARK BORDER PROTECTION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEMAND FUNCTIONS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DOMESTIC DEMAND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DOMESTIC SUPPORT ECONOMIC POLICY ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATE EXPORT PRICES EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTERS EXPORTS FIXED COSTS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GLOBAL TRADE HIGH TARIFFS IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PRICES IMPORTS INCOME INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES LDCS MARKET ACCESS MARKET SEGMENTING MARKET SEGMENTING EFFECT NET EXPORTERS NON-TARIFF BARRIERS OIL OVERVALUATION PATTERN OF TRADE PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY CHANGES POLICY MEASURES POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR COUNTRIES PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE SUPPORT PRICE VOLATILITY PRODUCERS PRODUCT MARKETS PROTECTION DATA PROTECTIONIST POLICIES QUOTAS REDUCTION IN TARIFFS RESTRICTIVE RULES OF ORIGIN ROUND AGREEMENT RULES OF ORIGIN SPECIALIZATION SUPPLY ELASTICITY SUPPLY FUNCTIONS TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF PREFERENCES TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATE QUOTAS TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF REVENUE TERMS OF TRADE TIME SERIES TRADE FLOWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY REFORM TRADING PARTNERS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPORT COSTS URUGUAY ROUND VOLATILITY WELFARE GAINS WELFARE LOSS WELFARE LOSSES WORLD MARKETS WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WTO WTO AGREEMENT WTO MEMBERS |
spellingShingle |
PROTECTIVE TARIFFS AGRICULTURAL TAXATION AGRICULTURAL PRICES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT TARIFFS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES ELASTICITY (ECONOMIC) SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SIMULATIONS MOST FAVOURED NATION CLAUSE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AGRICULTURAL GOODS AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES AGRICULTURE ARBITRAGE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFFS BENCHMARK BORDER PROTECTION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEMAND FUNCTIONS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DOMESTIC DEMAND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DOMESTIC SUPPORT ECONOMIC POLICY ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATE EXPORT PRICES EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTERS EXPORTS FIXED COSTS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GLOBAL TRADE HIGH TARIFFS IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PRICES IMPORTS INCOME INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES LDCS MARKET ACCESS MARKET SEGMENTING MARKET SEGMENTING EFFECT NET EXPORTERS NON-TARIFF BARRIERS OIL OVERVALUATION PATTERN OF TRADE PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY CHANGES POLICY MEASURES POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR COUNTRIES PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE SUPPORT PRICE VOLATILITY PRODUCERS PRODUCT MARKETS PROTECTION DATA PROTECTIONIST POLICIES QUOTAS REDUCTION IN TARIFFS RESTRICTIVE RULES OF ORIGIN ROUND AGREEMENT RULES OF ORIGIN SPECIALIZATION SUPPLY ELASTICITY SUPPLY FUNCTIONS TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF PREFERENCES TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATE QUOTAS TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF REVENUE TERMS OF TRADE TIME SERIES TRADE FLOWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY REFORM TRADING PARTNERS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPORT COSTS URUGUAY ROUND VOLATILITY WELFARE GAINS WELFARE LOSS WELFARE LOSSES WORLD MARKETS WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WTO WTO AGREEMENT WTO MEMBERS PROTECTIVE TARIFFS AGRICULTURAL TAXATION AGRICULTURAL PRICES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT TARIFFS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES ELASTICITY (ECONOMIC) SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SIMULATIONS MOST FAVOURED NATION CLAUSE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AGRICULTURAL GOODS AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES AGRICULTURE ARBITRAGE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFFS BENCHMARK BORDER PROTECTION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEMAND FUNCTIONS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DOMESTIC DEMAND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DOMESTIC SUPPORT ECONOMIC POLICY ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATE EXPORT PRICES EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTERS EXPORTS FIXED COSTS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GLOBAL TRADE HIGH TARIFFS IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PRICES IMPORTS INCOME INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES LDCS MARKET ACCESS MARKET SEGMENTING MARKET SEGMENTING EFFECT NET EXPORTERS NON-TARIFF BARRIERS OIL OVERVALUATION PATTERN OF TRADE PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY CHANGES POLICY MEASURES POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR COUNTRIES PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE SUPPORT PRICE VOLATILITY PRODUCERS PRODUCT MARKETS PROTECTION DATA PROTECTIONIST POLICIES QUOTAS REDUCTION IN TARIFFS RESTRICTIVE RULES OF ORIGIN ROUND AGREEMENT RULES OF ORIGIN SPECIALIZATION SUPPLY ELASTICITY SUPPLY FUNCTIONS TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF PREFERENCES TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATE QUOTAS TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF REVENUE TERMS OF TRADE TIME SERIES TRADE FLOWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY REFORM TRADING PARTNERS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPORT COSTS URUGUAY ROUND VOLATILITY WELFARE GAINS WELFARE LOSS WELFARE LOSSES WORLD MARKETS WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WTO WTO AGREEMENT WTO MEMBERS Ng, Francis Hoekman, Bernard M. Olarreaga, Marcelo Reducing Agricultural Tariffs versus Domestic Support : What's More Important for Developing Countries? |
description |
High levels of protection and domestic
support for farmers in industrial countries significantly
affect many developing countries, both directly and through
the price-depressing effect of agricultural support
policies. High tariffs--in both rich and poor countries--and
domestic support may also lower the world price of
agricultural products, benefiting net importers. The authors
assess the impact of reducing tariffs and domestic support
in a sample of 119 countries. Least developed countries
(LDCs) are disproportionately affected by agricultural
support policies. More than 18 percent of LDC exports are
subject to domestic support in at least one World Trade
Organization (WTO) member, as compared to only 9 percent of
their imports. For other developing countries the figures
are around 4 percent for both their exports and imports. So,
the prevailing pattern of trade suggests the world
price-reducing effect of agricultural domestic support
policies may induce a welfare loss in LDCs. The authors
develop a simple partial equilibrium model of global trade
in commodities that benefit from domestic support in at
least one WTO member. The simulation results suggest there
will be large differences between LDCs and other developing
economies in terms of the impact of a 50 percent cut in
tariffs as compared to a 50 percent cut in domestic support.
Developing countries as a group would suffer a welfare loss
from a cut in support, while LDCs would experience a small
gain. For both groups of countries, tariff reductions by WTO
members--including own liberalization--will have a positive
effect on welfare. The results show both the importance of
focusing on tariffs as well as subsities, and the need for
complementary actions to allow a domestic supply response to
occur in developing countries if world prices rise |
topic_facet |
PROTECTIVE TARIFFS AGRICULTURAL TAXATION AGRICULTURAL PRICES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT TARIFFS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES ELASTICITY (ECONOMIC) SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SIMULATIONS MOST FAVOURED NATION CLAUSE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AGRICULTURAL GOODS AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES AGRICULTURE ARBITRAGE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFFS BENCHMARK BORDER PROTECTION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEMAND FUNCTIONS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DOMESTIC DEMAND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DOMESTIC SUPPORT ECONOMIC POLICY ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATE EXPORT PRICES EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTERS EXPORTS FIXED COSTS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GLOBAL TRADE HIGH TARIFFS IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PRICES IMPORTS INCOME INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES LDCS MARKET ACCESS MARKET SEGMENTING MARKET SEGMENTING EFFECT NET EXPORTERS NON-TARIFF BARRIERS OIL OVERVALUATION PATTERN OF TRADE PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY CHANGES POLICY MEASURES POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR COUNTRIES PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE SUPPORT PRICE VOLATILITY PRODUCERS PRODUCT MARKETS PROTECTION DATA PROTECTIONIST POLICIES QUOTAS REDUCTION IN TARIFFS RESTRICTIVE RULES OF ORIGIN ROUND AGREEMENT RULES OF ORIGIN SPECIALIZATION SUPPLY ELASTICITY SUPPLY FUNCTIONS TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF PREFERENCES TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATE QUOTAS TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF REVENUE TERMS OF TRADE TIME SERIES TRADE FLOWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY REFORM TRADING PARTNERS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPORT COSTS URUGUAY ROUND VOLATILITY WELFARE GAINS WELFARE LOSS WELFARE LOSSES WORLD MARKETS WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WTO WTO AGREEMENT WTO MEMBERS |
author |
Ng, Francis Hoekman, Bernard M. Olarreaga, Marcelo |
author_facet |
Ng, Francis Hoekman, Bernard M. Olarreaga, Marcelo |
author_sort |
Ng, Francis |
title |
Reducing Agricultural Tariffs versus Domestic Support : What's More Important for Developing Countries? |
title_short |
Reducing Agricultural Tariffs versus Domestic Support : What's More Important for Developing Countries? |
title_full |
Reducing Agricultural Tariffs versus Domestic Support : What's More Important for Developing Countries? |
title_fullStr |
Reducing Agricultural Tariffs versus Domestic Support : What's More Important for Developing Countries? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Reducing Agricultural Tariffs versus Domestic Support : What's More Important for Developing Countries? |
title_sort |
reducing agricultural tariffs versus domestic support : what's more important for developing countries? |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2003-03 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/03/2166843/reducing-agrcultural-tariffs-versus-domestic-support-whats-more-important-developing-countries https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19043 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT ngfrancis reducingagriculturaltariffsversusdomesticsupportwhatsmoreimportantfordevelopingcountries AT hoekmanbernardm reducingagriculturaltariffsversusdomesticsupportwhatsmoreimportantfordevelopingcountries AT olarreagamarcelo reducingagriculturaltariffsversusdomesticsupportwhatsmoreimportantfordevelopingcountries |
_version_ |
1807154292446986240 |
spelling |
dig-okr-10986190432024-08-08T17:48:42Z Reducing Agricultural Tariffs versus Domestic Support : What's More Important for Developing Countries? Ng, Francis Hoekman, Bernard M. Olarreaga, Marcelo PROTECTIVE TARIFFS AGRICULTURAL TAXATION AGRICULTURAL PRICES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT TARIFFS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES ELASTICITY (ECONOMIC) SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SIMULATIONS MOST FAVOURED NATION CLAUSE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AGRICULTURAL GOODS AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES AGRICULTURE ARBITRAGE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFFS BENCHMARK BORDER PROTECTION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEMAND FUNCTIONS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DOMESTIC DEMAND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DOMESTIC SUPPORT ECONOMIC POLICY ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATE EXPORT PRICES EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTERS EXPORTS FIXED COSTS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GLOBAL TRADE HIGH TARIFFS IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PRICES IMPORTS INCOME INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES LDCS MARKET ACCESS MARKET SEGMENTING MARKET SEGMENTING EFFECT NET EXPORTERS NON-TARIFF BARRIERS OIL OVERVALUATION PATTERN OF TRADE PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY CHANGES POLICY MEASURES POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR COUNTRIES PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE SUPPORT PRICE VOLATILITY PRODUCERS PRODUCT MARKETS PROTECTION DATA PROTECTIONIST POLICIES QUOTAS REDUCTION IN TARIFFS RESTRICTIVE RULES OF ORIGIN ROUND AGREEMENT RULES OF ORIGIN SPECIALIZATION SUPPLY ELASTICITY SUPPLY FUNCTIONS TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF PREFERENCES TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATE QUOTAS TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF REVENUE TERMS OF TRADE TIME SERIES TRADE FLOWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY REFORM TRADING PARTNERS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPORT COSTS URUGUAY ROUND VOLATILITY WELFARE GAINS WELFARE LOSS WELFARE LOSSES WORLD MARKETS WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WTO WTO AGREEMENT WTO MEMBERS High levels of protection and domestic support for farmers in industrial countries significantly affect many developing countries, both directly and through the price-depressing effect of agricultural support policies. High tariffs--in both rich and poor countries--and domestic support may also lower the world price of agricultural products, benefiting net importers. The authors assess the impact of reducing tariffs and domestic support in a sample of 119 countries. Least developed countries (LDCs) are disproportionately affected by agricultural support policies. More than 18 percent of LDC exports are subject to domestic support in at least one World Trade Organization (WTO) member, as compared to only 9 percent of their imports. For other developing countries the figures are around 4 percent for both their exports and imports. So, the prevailing pattern of trade suggests the world price-reducing effect of agricultural domestic support policies may induce a welfare loss in LDCs. The authors develop a simple partial equilibrium model of global trade in commodities that benefit from domestic support in at least one WTO member. The simulation results suggest there will be large differences between LDCs and other developing economies in terms of the impact of a 50 percent cut in tariffs as compared to a 50 percent cut in domestic support. Developing countries as a group would suffer a welfare loss from a cut in support, while LDCs would experience a small gain. For both groups of countries, tariff reductions by WTO members--including own liberalization--will have a positive effect on welfare. The results show both the importance of focusing on tariffs as well as subsities, and the need for complementary actions to allow a domestic supply response to occur in developing countries if world prices rise 2014-07-29T20:59:55Z 2014-07-29T20:59:55Z 2003-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/03/2166843/reducing-agrcultural-tariffs-versus-domestic-support-whats-more-important-developing-countries https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19043 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2918 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |