Banking Systems Around the Globe : Do Regulation and Ownership Affect the Performance and Stability?

The authors report cross-country data on commercial bank regulation and ownership in more than 60 countries. They evaluate the links between different regulatory/ownership practices in those countries and both financial sector performance and banking system stability. They document substantial variation in response to these questions: Should it be public policy to limit the powers of commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities? Should the mixing of banking and commerce be restricted by regulating commercial bank's ownership of non-financial firms and non-financial firms' ownership of commercial banks? Should states own commercial banks, or should those banks be privatized? They find: 1) There is no reliable statistical relationship between restrictions on commercial banks' ability to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate transactions and how well-developed the banking sector, how well-developed securities markets and non-bank financial intermediaries are, or the degree of industrial competition. Based on the evidence, it is difficult to argue confidently that restricting commercial banking activities benefits-or harms-the development of financial and securities markets or industrial competition. 2) There are no positive effects from mixing banking and commerce. 3) Countries that more tightly restrict and regulate the securities activities of commercial banks are substantially more likely to suffer a major banking crisis. Countries whose national regulations inhibit banks' ability to engage in securities underwriting, brokering, and dealing--and all aspects of the mutual fund business--tend to have more fragile financial systems. 4) The mixing of banking and commerce is associated with less financial stability. The evidence does not support admonitions to restrict the mixing of banking and commerce because mixing them will increase financial fragility. 5) On average, greater state ownership of banks tends to be associated with more poorly developed banks, nonbanks, and stock markets and more poorly functioning financial systems.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Barth, James R., Caprio, Gerard, Jr., Levine, Ross
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2000-04
Subjects:BANK ASSETS, BANK PERFORMANCE, BANK REGULATION, BANK STRUCTURE, BANK SUPERVISION, BANKING CRISES, BANKING CRISIS, BANKING INDUSTRY, BANKING REFORM, BANKING SECTOR, BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, BANKING STABILITY, BANKING SUPERVISION, BANKING SYSTEM, BANKING SYSTEMS, BANKS, BONDS, CAPITALIZATION, CENTRAL BANK, COMMERCIAL BANKS, DEBT, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, EQUITY CAPITAL, FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES, FINANCIAL CRISES, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE, FINANCIAL SECTOR, FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL SERVICES, FINANCIAL STABILITY, FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, GDP, INFLATION, INSURANCE, INTEREST INCOME, INTEREST RATE, INTEREST RATES, INVESTMENT BANKING, LAWS, LIQUIDITY, MORAL HAZARD, MUTUAL FUND, MUTUAL FUNDS, NET INTEREST MARGIN, NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, NONBANKS, NONPERFORMING LOANS, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, POLICY ENVIRONMENT, POSITIVE EFFECTS, PRIVATE PROPERTY, PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION, PUBLIC POLICY, REGULATORY SYSTEMS, SAVINGS, SCARCE CAPITAL, SECURITIES, SECURITIES MARKETS, STATE BANKS, STATE OWNERSHIP, STOCK MARKETS, SUBSIDIARIES, SYSTEMIC, SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437748/banking-systems-around-globe-regulation-ownership-affect-performance-stability
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18839
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spelling dig-okr-10986188392024-08-08T18:10:43Z Banking Systems Around the Globe : Do Regulation and Ownership Affect the Performance and Stability? Barth, James R. Caprio, Gerard, Jr. Levine, Ross BANK ASSETS BANK PERFORMANCE BANK REGULATION BANK STRUCTURE BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING REFORM BANKING SECTOR BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT BANKING STABILITY BANKING SUPERVISION BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS BONDS CAPITALIZATION CENTRAL BANK COMMERCIAL BANKS DEBT DEPOSIT INSURANCE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUITY CAPITAL FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SERVICES FINANCIAL STABILITY FINANCIAL SYSTEMS GDP INFLATION INSURANCE INTEREST INCOME INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INVESTMENT BANKING LAWS LIQUIDITY MORAL HAZARD MUTUAL FUND MUTUAL FUNDS NET INTEREST MARGIN NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS NONBANKS NONPERFORMING LOANS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POLICY ENVIRONMENT POSITIVE EFFECTS PRIVATE PROPERTY PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION PUBLIC POLICY REGULATORY SYSTEMS SAVINGS SCARCE CAPITAL SECURITIES SECURITIES MARKETS STATE BANKS STATE OWNERSHIP STOCK MARKETS SUBSIDIARIES SYSTEMIC SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES The authors report cross-country data on commercial bank regulation and ownership in more than 60 countries. They evaluate the links between different regulatory/ownership practices in those countries and both financial sector performance and banking system stability. They document substantial variation in response to these questions: Should it be public policy to limit the powers of commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities? Should the mixing of banking and commerce be restricted by regulating commercial bank's ownership of non-financial firms and non-financial firms' ownership of commercial banks? Should states own commercial banks, or should those banks be privatized? They find: 1) There is no reliable statistical relationship between restrictions on commercial banks' ability to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate transactions and how well-developed the banking sector, how well-developed securities markets and non-bank financial intermediaries are, or the degree of industrial competition. Based on the evidence, it is difficult to argue confidently that restricting commercial banking activities benefits-or harms-the development of financial and securities markets or industrial competition. 2) There are no positive effects from mixing banking and commerce. 3) Countries that more tightly restrict and regulate the securities activities of commercial banks are substantially more likely to suffer a major banking crisis. Countries whose national regulations inhibit banks' ability to engage in securities underwriting, brokering, and dealing--and all aspects of the mutual fund business--tend to have more fragile financial systems. 4) The mixing of banking and commerce is associated with less financial stability. The evidence does not support admonitions to restrict the mixing of banking and commerce because mixing them will increase financial fragility. 5) On average, greater state ownership of banks tends to be associated with more poorly developed banks, nonbanks, and stock markets and more poorly functioning financial systems. 2014-06-30T18:33:59Z 2014-06-30T18:33:59Z 2000-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437748/banking-systems-around-globe-regulation-ownership-affect-performance-stability https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18839 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2325 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC
institution Banco Mundial
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language English
en_US
topic BANK ASSETS
BANK PERFORMANCE
BANK REGULATION
BANK STRUCTURE
BANK SUPERVISION
BANKING CRISES
BANKING CRISIS
BANKING INDUSTRY
BANKING REFORM
BANKING SECTOR
BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
BANKING STABILITY
BANKING SUPERVISION
BANKING SYSTEM
BANKING SYSTEMS
BANKS
BONDS
CAPITALIZATION
CENTRAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANKS
DEBT
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EQUITY CAPITAL
FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES
FINANCIAL CRISES
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
FINANCIAL SECTOR
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL SERVICES
FINANCIAL STABILITY
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
GDP
INFLATION
INSURANCE
INTEREST INCOME
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
INVESTMENT BANKING
LAWS
LIQUIDITY
MORAL HAZARD
MUTUAL FUND
MUTUAL FUNDS
NET INTEREST MARGIN
NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
NONBANKS
NONPERFORMING LOANS
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
POLICY ENVIRONMENT
POSITIVE EFFECTS
PRIVATE PROPERTY
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
PUBLIC POLICY
REGULATORY SYSTEMS
SAVINGS
SCARCE CAPITAL
SECURITIES
SECURITIES MARKETS
STATE BANKS
STATE OWNERSHIP
STOCK MARKETS
SUBSIDIARIES
SYSTEMIC
SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES
BANK ASSETS
BANK PERFORMANCE
BANK REGULATION
BANK STRUCTURE
BANK SUPERVISION
BANKING CRISES
BANKING CRISIS
BANKING INDUSTRY
BANKING REFORM
BANKING SECTOR
BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
BANKING STABILITY
BANKING SUPERVISION
BANKING SYSTEM
BANKING SYSTEMS
BANKS
BONDS
CAPITALIZATION
CENTRAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANKS
DEBT
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EQUITY CAPITAL
FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES
FINANCIAL CRISES
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
FINANCIAL SECTOR
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL SERVICES
FINANCIAL STABILITY
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
GDP
INFLATION
INSURANCE
INTEREST INCOME
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
INVESTMENT BANKING
LAWS
LIQUIDITY
MORAL HAZARD
MUTUAL FUND
MUTUAL FUNDS
NET INTEREST MARGIN
NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
NONBANKS
NONPERFORMING LOANS
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
POLICY ENVIRONMENT
POSITIVE EFFECTS
PRIVATE PROPERTY
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
PUBLIC POLICY
REGULATORY SYSTEMS
SAVINGS
SCARCE CAPITAL
SECURITIES
SECURITIES MARKETS
STATE BANKS
STATE OWNERSHIP
STOCK MARKETS
SUBSIDIARIES
SYSTEMIC
SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES
spellingShingle BANK ASSETS
BANK PERFORMANCE
BANK REGULATION
BANK STRUCTURE
BANK SUPERVISION
BANKING CRISES
BANKING CRISIS
BANKING INDUSTRY
BANKING REFORM
BANKING SECTOR
BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
BANKING STABILITY
BANKING SUPERVISION
BANKING SYSTEM
BANKING SYSTEMS
BANKS
BONDS
CAPITALIZATION
CENTRAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANKS
DEBT
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EQUITY CAPITAL
FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES
FINANCIAL CRISES
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
FINANCIAL SECTOR
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL SERVICES
FINANCIAL STABILITY
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
GDP
INFLATION
INSURANCE
INTEREST INCOME
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
INVESTMENT BANKING
LAWS
LIQUIDITY
MORAL HAZARD
MUTUAL FUND
MUTUAL FUNDS
NET INTEREST MARGIN
NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
NONBANKS
NONPERFORMING LOANS
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
POLICY ENVIRONMENT
POSITIVE EFFECTS
PRIVATE PROPERTY
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
PUBLIC POLICY
REGULATORY SYSTEMS
SAVINGS
SCARCE CAPITAL
SECURITIES
SECURITIES MARKETS
STATE BANKS
STATE OWNERSHIP
STOCK MARKETS
SUBSIDIARIES
SYSTEMIC
SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES
BANK ASSETS
BANK PERFORMANCE
BANK REGULATION
BANK STRUCTURE
BANK SUPERVISION
BANKING CRISES
BANKING CRISIS
BANKING INDUSTRY
BANKING REFORM
BANKING SECTOR
BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
BANKING STABILITY
BANKING SUPERVISION
BANKING SYSTEM
BANKING SYSTEMS
BANKS
BONDS
CAPITALIZATION
CENTRAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANKS
DEBT
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EQUITY CAPITAL
FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES
FINANCIAL CRISES
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
FINANCIAL SECTOR
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL SERVICES
FINANCIAL STABILITY
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
GDP
INFLATION
INSURANCE
INTEREST INCOME
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
INVESTMENT BANKING
LAWS
LIQUIDITY
MORAL HAZARD
MUTUAL FUND
MUTUAL FUNDS
NET INTEREST MARGIN
NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
NONBANKS
NONPERFORMING LOANS
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
POLICY ENVIRONMENT
POSITIVE EFFECTS
PRIVATE PROPERTY
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
PUBLIC POLICY
REGULATORY SYSTEMS
SAVINGS
SCARCE CAPITAL
SECURITIES
SECURITIES MARKETS
STATE BANKS
STATE OWNERSHIP
STOCK MARKETS
SUBSIDIARIES
SYSTEMIC
SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES
Barth, James R.
Caprio, Gerard, Jr.
Levine, Ross
Banking Systems Around the Globe : Do Regulation and Ownership Affect the Performance and Stability?
description The authors report cross-country data on commercial bank regulation and ownership in more than 60 countries. They evaluate the links between different regulatory/ownership practices in those countries and both financial sector performance and banking system stability. They document substantial variation in response to these questions: Should it be public policy to limit the powers of commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities? Should the mixing of banking and commerce be restricted by regulating commercial bank's ownership of non-financial firms and non-financial firms' ownership of commercial banks? Should states own commercial banks, or should those banks be privatized? They find: 1) There is no reliable statistical relationship between restrictions on commercial banks' ability to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate transactions and how well-developed the banking sector, how well-developed securities markets and non-bank financial intermediaries are, or the degree of industrial competition. Based on the evidence, it is difficult to argue confidently that restricting commercial banking activities benefits-or harms-the development of financial and securities markets or industrial competition. 2) There are no positive effects from mixing banking and commerce. 3) Countries that more tightly restrict and regulate the securities activities of commercial banks are substantially more likely to suffer a major banking crisis. Countries whose national regulations inhibit banks' ability to engage in securities underwriting, brokering, and dealing--and all aspects of the mutual fund business--tend to have more fragile financial systems. 4) The mixing of banking and commerce is associated with less financial stability. The evidence does not support admonitions to restrict the mixing of banking and commerce because mixing them will increase financial fragility. 5) On average, greater state ownership of banks tends to be associated with more poorly developed banks, nonbanks, and stock markets and more poorly functioning financial systems.
topic_facet BANK ASSETS
BANK PERFORMANCE
BANK REGULATION
BANK STRUCTURE
BANK SUPERVISION
BANKING CRISES
BANKING CRISIS
BANKING INDUSTRY
BANKING REFORM
BANKING SECTOR
BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
BANKING STABILITY
BANKING SUPERVISION
BANKING SYSTEM
BANKING SYSTEMS
BANKS
BONDS
CAPITALIZATION
CENTRAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANKS
DEBT
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EQUITY CAPITAL
FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES
FINANCIAL CRISES
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
FINANCIAL SECTOR
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL SERVICES
FINANCIAL STABILITY
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
GDP
INFLATION
INSURANCE
INTEREST INCOME
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
INVESTMENT BANKING
LAWS
LIQUIDITY
MORAL HAZARD
MUTUAL FUND
MUTUAL FUNDS
NET INTEREST MARGIN
NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
NONBANKS
NONPERFORMING LOANS
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
POLICY ENVIRONMENT
POSITIVE EFFECTS
PRIVATE PROPERTY
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
PUBLIC POLICY
REGULATORY SYSTEMS
SAVINGS
SCARCE CAPITAL
SECURITIES
SECURITIES MARKETS
STATE BANKS
STATE OWNERSHIP
STOCK MARKETS
SUBSIDIARIES
SYSTEMIC
SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES
author Barth, James R.
Caprio, Gerard, Jr.
Levine, Ross
author_facet Barth, James R.
Caprio, Gerard, Jr.
Levine, Ross
author_sort Barth, James R.
title Banking Systems Around the Globe : Do Regulation and Ownership Affect the Performance and Stability?
title_short Banking Systems Around the Globe : Do Regulation and Ownership Affect the Performance and Stability?
title_full Banking Systems Around the Globe : Do Regulation and Ownership Affect the Performance and Stability?
title_fullStr Banking Systems Around the Globe : Do Regulation and Ownership Affect the Performance and Stability?
title_full_unstemmed Banking Systems Around the Globe : Do Regulation and Ownership Affect the Performance and Stability?
title_sort banking systems around the globe : do regulation and ownership affect the performance and stability?
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2000-04
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437748/banking-systems-around-globe-regulation-ownership-affect-performance-stability
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18839
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AT capriogerardjr bankingsystemsaroundtheglobedoregulationandownershipaffecttheperformanceandstability
AT levineross bankingsystemsaroundtheglobedoregulationandownershipaffecttheperformanceandstability
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