Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies
As a symptom of fundamental institutional weaknesses, corruption needs to be viewed within a broader governance framework. It thrives where the state is unable to reign over its bureaucracy, to protect property and contractual rights, or to provide institutions that support the rule off law. Furthermore, governance failures at the national level cannot be isolated from the interface between the corporate and state sectors, in particular from the heretofore under-emphasized influence that firms may exert on the state. Under certain conditions, corporate strategies may exacerbate mis-governance at the national level. An in-depth empirical assessment of the links between corporate behavior and national governance can thus provide particular insights. The 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) - the transition economies component of the ongoing World Business Environment Survey - assesses in detail the various dimensions of governance from the perspective of about 3,000 firms in 20 countries. After introducing the survey framework and measurement approach, the authors present the survey results, focusing on governance, corruption, and state capture. By unbundling governance into its many dimensions, BEEPS permits an in-depth empirical assessment. The authors pay special attention to certain forms of grand corruption, notably state capture by parts of the corporate sector - that is, the propensity of firms to shape the underlying rules of the game by "purchasing" decrees, legislation, and influence at the central bank, which is found to be prevalent in a number of transition economies. The survey also measures other dimensions of grand corruption, including those associated with public procurement, and quantifies the more traditional ("prettier") forms of corruption. Cross-country surveys may suffer from bias if firms tend to systematically over- or underestimate the extent of problems within their country. The authors provide a new test of this potential bias, finding little evidence of country perception bias in BEEPS.
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dig-okr-1098618832 |
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Banco Mundial |
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Estados Unidos |
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US |
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Bibliográfico |
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America del Norte |
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Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
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English en_US |
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AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COMMUNIST COMPARISONS ACROSS COUNTRIES CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS CORPORATE BEHAVIOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE SECTOR CORPORATE STRATEGIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATORS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX COUNTRY COVERAGE CRIME DECREES DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE DISCRETIONARY POWER DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC POLICY EXCHANGE OF IDEAS EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CLIMATE JUDICIARY LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE MACROECONOMIC CRISIS MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT MEASURING GOVERNANCE MISGOVERNANCE NATIONAL GOVERNANCE NATIONAL LEVEL PARLIAMENT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY ADVICE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL INFLUENCE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATISATION PUBLIC AGENCIES PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC SERVICES QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE QUALITY OF PUBLIC RULE OF LAW STATE AGENCY STATE INSTITUTIONS STATE INTERVENTION STATE OWNERSHIP STATE SECTOR SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS SYSTEMATIC PATTERN TELEPHONE LINES TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COMMUNIST COMPARISONS ACROSS COUNTRIES CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS CORPORATE BEHAVIOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE SECTOR CORPORATE STRATEGIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATORS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX COUNTRY COVERAGE CRIME DECREES DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE DISCRETIONARY POWER DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC POLICY EXCHANGE OF IDEAS EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CLIMATE JUDICIARY LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE MACROECONOMIC CRISIS MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT MEASURING GOVERNANCE MISGOVERNANCE NATIONAL GOVERNANCE NATIONAL LEVEL PARLIAMENT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY ADVICE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL INFLUENCE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATISATION PUBLIC AGENCIES PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC SERVICES QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE QUALITY OF PUBLIC RULE OF LAW STATE AGENCY STATE INSTITUTIONS STATE INTERVENTION STATE OWNERSHIP STATE SECTOR SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS SYSTEMATIC PATTERN TELEPHONE LINES TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY |
spellingShingle |
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COMMUNIST COMPARISONS ACROSS COUNTRIES CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS CORPORATE BEHAVIOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE SECTOR CORPORATE STRATEGIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATORS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX COUNTRY COVERAGE CRIME DECREES DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE DISCRETIONARY POWER DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC POLICY EXCHANGE OF IDEAS EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CLIMATE JUDICIARY LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE MACROECONOMIC CRISIS MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT MEASURING GOVERNANCE MISGOVERNANCE NATIONAL GOVERNANCE NATIONAL LEVEL PARLIAMENT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY ADVICE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL INFLUENCE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATISATION PUBLIC AGENCIES PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC SERVICES QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE QUALITY OF PUBLIC RULE OF LAW STATE AGENCY STATE INSTITUTIONS STATE INTERVENTION STATE OWNERSHIP STATE SECTOR SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS SYSTEMATIC PATTERN TELEPHONE LINES TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COMMUNIST COMPARISONS ACROSS COUNTRIES CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS CORPORATE BEHAVIOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE SECTOR CORPORATE STRATEGIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATORS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX COUNTRY COVERAGE CRIME DECREES DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE DISCRETIONARY POWER DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC POLICY EXCHANGE OF IDEAS EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CLIMATE JUDICIARY LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE MACROECONOMIC CRISIS MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT MEASURING GOVERNANCE MISGOVERNANCE NATIONAL GOVERNANCE NATIONAL LEVEL PARLIAMENT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY ADVICE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL INFLUENCE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATISATION PUBLIC AGENCIES PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC SERVICES QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE QUALITY OF PUBLIC RULE OF LAW STATE AGENCY STATE INSTITUTIONS STATE INTERVENTION STATE OWNERSHIP STATE SECTOR SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS SYSTEMATIC PATTERN TELEPHONE LINES TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY Hellman, Joel S. Jones, Geraint Kaufmann, Daniel Schankerman, Mark Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies |
description |
As a symptom of fundamental
institutional weaknesses, corruption needs to be viewed
within a broader governance framework. It thrives where the
state is unable to reign over its bureaucracy, to protect
property and contractual rights, or to provide institutions
that support the rule off law. Furthermore, governance
failures at the national level cannot be isolated from the
interface between the corporate and state sectors, in
particular from the heretofore under-emphasized influence
that firms may exert on the state. Under certain conditions,
corporate strategies may exacerbate mis-governance at the
national level. An in-depth empirical assessment of the
links between corporate behavior and national governance can
thus provide particular insights. The 1999 Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) - the
transition economies component of the ongoing World Business
Environment Survey - assesses in detail the various
dimensions of governance from the perspective of about 3,000
firms in 20 countries. After introducing the survey
framework and measurement approach, the authors present the
survey results, focusing on governance, corruption, and
state capture. By unbundling governance into its many
dimensions, BEEPS permits an in-depth empirical assessment.
The authors pay special attention to certain forms of grand
corruption, notably state capture by parts of the corporate
sector - that is, the propensity of firms to shape the
underlying rules of the game by "purchasing"
decrees, legislation, and influence at the central bank,
which is found to be prevalent in a number of transition
economies. The survey also measures other dimensions of
grand corruption, including those associated with public
procurement, and quantifies the more traditional
("prettier") forms of corruption. Cross-country
surveys may suffer from bias if firms tend to systematically
over- or underestimate the extent of problems within their
country. The authors provide a new test of this potential
bias, finding little evidence of country perception bias in BEEPS. |
topic_facet |
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COMMUNIST COMPARISONS ACROSS COUNTRIES CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS CORPORATE BEHAVIOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE SECTOR CORPORATE STRATEGIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATORS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX COUNTRY COVERAGE CRIME DECREES DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE DISCRETIONARY POWER DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC POLICY EXCHANGE OF IDEAS EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CLIMATE JUDICIARY LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE MACROECONOMIC CRISIS MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT MEASURING GOVERNANCE MISGOVERNANCE NATIONAL GOVERNANCE NATIONAL LEVEL PARLIAMENT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY ADVICE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL INFLUENCE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATISATION PUBLIC AGENCIES PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC SERVICES QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE QUALITY OF PUBLIC RULE OF LAW STATE AGENCY STATE INSTITUTIONS STATE INTERVENTION STATE OWNERSHIP STATE SECTOR SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS SYSTEMATIC PATTERN TELEPHONE LINES TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY |
author |
Hellman, Joel S. Jones, Geraint Kaufmann, Daniel Schankerman, Mark |
author_facet |
Hellman, Joel S. Jones, Geraint Kaufmann, Daniel Schankerman, Mark |
author_sort |
Hellman, Joel S. |
title |
Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies |
title_short |
Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies |
title_full |
Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies |
title_fullStr |
Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies |
title_full_unstemmed |
Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies |
title_sort |
measuring governance, corruption, and state capture : how firms and bureaucrats shape the business environment in transition economies |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2000-04 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437919/measuring-governance-corruption-state-capture-firms-bureaucrats-shape-business-environment-transition-economies https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18832 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT hellmanjoels measuringgovernancecorruptionandstatecapturehowfirmsandbureaucratsshapethebusinessenvironmentintransitioneconomies AT jonesgeraint measuringgovernancecorruptionandstatecapturehowfirmsandbureaucratsshapethebusinessenvironmentintransitioneconomies AT kaufmanndaniel measuringgovernancecorruptionandstatecapturehowfirmsandbureaucratsshapethebusinessenvironmentintransitioneconomies AT schankermanmark measuringgovernancecorruptionandstatecapturehowfirmsandbureaucratsshapethebusinessenvironmentintransitioneconomies |
_version_ |
1807154901567930368 |
spelling |
dig-okr-10986188322024-08-08T18:10:38Z Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies Hellman, Joel S. Jones, Geraint Kaufmann, Daniel Schankerman, Mark AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COMMUNIST COMPARISONS ACROSS COUNTRIES CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS CORPORATE BEHAVIOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE SECTOR CORPORATE STRATEGIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATORS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX COUNTRY COVERAGE CRIME DECREES DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE DISCRETIONARY POWER DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC POLICY EXCHANGE OF IDEAS EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CLIMATE JUDICIARY LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE MACROECONOMIC CRISIS MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT MEASURING GOVERNANCE MISGOVERNANCE NATIONAL GOVERNANCE NATIONAL LEVEL PARLIAMENT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY ADVICE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL INFLUENCE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATISATION PUBLIC AGENCIES PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC SERVICES QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE QUALITY OF PUBLIC RULE OF LAW STATE AGENCY STATE INSTITUTIONS STATE INTERVENTION STATE OWNERSHIP STATE SECTOR SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS SYSTEMATIC PATTERN TELEPHONE LINES TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY As a symptom of fundamental institutional weaknesses, corruption needs to be viewed within a broader governance framework. It thrives where the state is unable to reign over its bureaucracy, to protect property and contractual rights, or to provide institutions that support the rule off law. Furthermore, governance failures at the national level cannot be isolated from the interface between the corporate and state sectors, in particular from the heretofore under-emphasized influence that firms may exert on the state. Under certain conditions, corporate strategies may exacerbate mis-governance at the national level. An in-depth empirical assessment of the links between corporate behavior and national governance can thus provide particular insights. The 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) - the transition economies component of the ongoing World Business Environment Survey - assesses in detail the various dimensions of governance from the perspective of about 3,000 firms in 20 countries. After introducing the survey framework and measurement approach, the authors present the survey results, focusing on governance, corruption, and state capture. By unbundling governance into its many dimensions, BEEPS permits an in-depth empirical assessment. The authors pay special attention to certain forms of grand corruption, notably state capture by parts of the corporate sector - that is, the propensity of firms to shape the underlying rules of the game by "purchasing" decrees, legislation, and influence at the central bank, which is found to be prevalent in a number of transition economies. The survey also measures other dimensions of grand corruption, including those associated with public procurement, and quantifies the more traditional ("prettier") forms of corruption. Cross-country surveys may suffer from bias if firms tend to systematically over- or underestimate the extent of problems within their country. The authors provide a new test of this potential bias, finding little evidence of country perception bias in BEEPS. 2014-06-30T17:21:33Z 2014-06-30T17:21:33Z 2000-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437919/measuring-governance-corruption-state-capture-firms-bureaucrats-shape-business-environment-transition-economies https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18832 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2312 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |