All in the Family : State Capture in Tunisia

This paper examines the relationship between regulation and the business interests of President Ben Ali and his family, using firm-level data from Tunisia for 1994-2010. Data on investment regulations are merged with balance sheet and firm-level census data in which 220 firms owned by the Ben Ali family are identified. These connected firms outperform their competitors in terms of employment, output, market share, profits, and growth and sectors in which they are active are disproportionately subject to authorization requirements and restriction on foreign direct investment. Consistent with theories of capture, performance differences between connected firms and their peers are significantly larger in highly regulated sectors. In addition, the introduction of new foreign direct investment restrictions and authorization requirements in narrowly defined five-digit sectors is correlated with the presence of connected firms and with their startup, suggesting that regulation is endogenous to state capture. The evidence implies that Tunisia's industrial policy was used as a vehicle for rent creation for the president and his family.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Rijkers, Bob, Freund, Caroline, Nucifora, Antonio
Format: Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014-03
Subjects:ACCOUNTING, AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS, AIR, AIR TRANSPORT, AIRLINE INDUSTRY, AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENT, AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENTS, AUTOMOBILE, AUTOMOBILES, BAILOUTS, BALANCE SHEET, BALANCE SHEET INFORMATION, BANK ACCOUNTS, BANK POLICY, BARRIERS TO ENTRY, BUSINESS COMMUNITY, BUSINESS REGULATIONS, CAPITAL CONTROLS, CAPITAL INTENSITY, CAPITAL STOCK, CAR, CARS, CHECKS, COMPANY, COMPETITORS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DIVIDEND, DRIVING, DUMMY VARIABLE, DUMMY VARIABLES, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, EMPLOYMENT, ENTREPRENEURS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, EQUIPMENT, FACE VALUE, FINANCIAL SERVICES, FIRM PERFORMANCE, FIRM SIZE, FIRMS, FOREIGN COMPETITION, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, FOREIGN EQUITY, FOREIGN FIRMS, FOREIGN FUNDS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, FOREIGN INVESTORS, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, GROWTH RATES, INCOME, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT, INVESTMENT CODE, INVESTMENT INCENTIVES, INVESTMENT POLICIES, INVESTMENT POLICY, INVESTMENT PROMOTION, INVESTMENT REGULATION, INVESTMENT REGULATIONS, INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS, IPO, LEVEL PLAYING FIELD, LICENSING, MARITIME TRANSPORT, MARKET ACCESS, MARKET CONCENTRATION, MARKET FAILURE, MARKET FAILURES, MARKET PLAYERS, MARKET SHARE, MARKET SHARES, MARKET STRUCTURE, MARKET VALUE, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, MONETARY FUND, MONEY LAUNDERING, MONOPOLY, OUTPUT, POLITICAL ECONOMY, PORTFOLIO, POSITIVE COEFFICIENT, PREFERENTIAL ACCESS, PRIVATE SCHOOL, PROFIT MARGINS, PROFITABILITY, RAILROAD, RAILWAY, RAPID GROWTH, REAL ESTATE, REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS, REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS, RENTS, RESTRICTIONS ON ENTRY, ROAD TRANSPORT, ROADS, RULE OF LAW, SME, SME DEVELOPMENT, STARTUP, STATE CAPTURE, STOCK MARKET, STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION, STOCK PORTFOLIOS, TAX, TAX BREAKS, TAX DEFERRALS, TAX RATES, TAX REGIME, TAXATION, TAXIS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP, TRANSPORTS, TRUE, TURNOVER, VEHICLE, WAREHOUSES, WEALTH,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/03/19291754/all-family-state-capture-tunisia
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17726
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