Electoral Accountability and Local Government Spending in Indonesia

This paper takes advantage of the exogenous phasing of direct elections in districts and applies the double-difference estimator to measure impacts on (i) human development outcomes and (ii) the pattern of public spending and revenue generation at the district level. The analysis reveals that four years after the switch to direct elections, there have been no significant effects on human development outcomes. However, the estimates of the impact of Pilkada on health expenditures at the district level suggest that directly elected district officials may have become more responsive to local needs at least in the area of health. The composition of district expenditures changes considerably during the year and sometimes the year before the elections, shifting toward expenditure categories that allow incumbent district heads running as candidates in the direct elections to "buy" voter support. Electoral reforms did not lead to higher revenue generation from own sources and had no effect on the budget surplus of districts with directly elected heads.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Dasgupta, Basab, Skoufias, Emmanuel, Narayan, Ambar, Kaiser, Kai
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014-02
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS, ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES, BANK POLICY, BLOCK GRANTS, BUDGET ALLOCATION, BUDGET DATA, BUDGET DEFICIT, BUDGET SURPLUS, BUSINESS CYCLE, BUSINESS CYCLES, CANDIDATES, CASH RESERVES, CASH TRANSFER, CATEGORIES OF EXPENDITURE, CENTRAL AUTHORITIES, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CENTRAL TRANSFERS, CHECKS, CITIZEN NEEDS, CIVIL SERVANTS, CIVIL SERVICE, COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, CONSTITUENCIES, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, DECENTRALIZATION, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRY, DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING, DISTRICT, DISTRICT BUDGET, DISTRICT GOVERNMENT, DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS, DISTRICT GOVERNOR, DISTRICT HEALTH, DISTRICT LEVEL, DISTRICT LEVELS, DISTRICT OFFICIALS, DISTRICT REVENUES, DISTRICT-LEVEL, DISTRICTS, E-MAIL, ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION, ECONOMIC POLICY, EFFICIENT ALLOCATION, EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES, ELECTION, ELECTION DATA, ELECTION TIME, ELECTIONS, ELECTORAL INFORMATION, ELECTORATE, EQUIPMENT, EXPENDITURE, EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES, EXPENDITURE DATA, EXPENDITURE PATTERNS, EXPENDITURES, EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA, FAIR ELECTIONS, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, FINANCIAL INFORMATION SYSTEM, FISCAL BALANCE, FISCAL CAPACITY, FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, FISCAL EXPENDITURE, FISCAL FEDERALISM, FISCAL OUTCOMES, FISCAL POLICY, FISCAL SYSTEM, FISCAL VARIABLES, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, GOVERNMENT FINANCING, GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES, GOVERNOR, GOVERNORS, HEALTH EXPENDITURES, HEALTH INSURANCE, HEALTH SPENDING, HOLDING, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, IMMUNIZATION, INTEREST PAYMENTS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL BANK, LAWS, LEGAL OBLIGATION, LEGISLATORS, LOCAL ELECTIONS, LOCAL EXPENDITURES, LOCAL FINANCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL TAXES, MAYOR, MAYORS, METROPOLITAN AREA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, MISTRUST, MUNICIPALITIES, MUNICIPALITY, NATIONAL INTERESTS, NATIONAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, NATIONAL STATISTICS, NATURAL DISASTERS, NATURAL RESOURCES, OBJECTIVE OF POVERTY REDUCTION, OIL PRICES, OUTCOME MEASURES, PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, PARLIAMENTS, PARTY DISCIPLINE, PATTERN OF PUBLIC SPENDING, POLICY CHANGES, POLICY CHOICES, POLICY OUTCOMES, POLICY REFORMS, POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICAL AUTONOMY, POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL PARTY, POLITICAL POWERS, POLITICAL REFORM, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, POLITICIANS, POVERTY RATE, POVERTY REDUCTION, PRICE INDEX, PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, PROGRAM OUTCOMES, PROGRAMS, PROVINCE, PROVINCES, PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC ECONOMICS, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW, PUBLIC FINANCE, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC HOUSING, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC REVENUE, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SERVICES, PUBLIC SPENDING, PUBLIC WORKS, QUALITY OF SERVICES, REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS, REPRESENTATIVES, REVENUE BASE, REVENUE MOBILIZATION, REVENUE PER CAPITA, REVENUE SHARING, SANITARY FACILITIES, SANITATION, SEPARATION OF POWERS, SERVICE DELIVERY, SERVICE PROVIDERS, SIZE OF GOVERNMENT, SOCIAL ASSISTANCE, SOCIAL PROTECTION, SUB-NATIONAL, SUB-NATIONAL EXPENDITURES, SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, TAX, TAX SHARING, TAXATION, TOTAL EXPENDITURES, VILLAGE, VILLAGES,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/02/19006608/electoral-accountability-local-government-spending-indonesia https://hdl.handle.net/10986/17326
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