This article presents a new data set on
electoral systems and outlines its potential uses in
research on the links between electoral systems and economic
outcomes. The data measure the extent to which politicians
can advance their careers by appealing to narrow geographic
constituencies on the one hand or party constituencies on
the other.
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: |
Wallack, Jessica Seddon,
Gaviria, Alejandro,
Panizza, Ugo,
Stein, Ernesto |
Format: | Journal Article
biblioteca
|
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
Washington, DC: World Bank
2003-01
|
Subjects: | ADVERTISING,
ARTICLE,
BASIC,
BICAMERAL SYSTEM,
CANDIDATES,
CITIZEN CONTROL,
CLASSIFICATION,
CLASSIFICATIONS,
CODES,
CODING,
COMPETITIVENESS,
CONSTITUENCIES,
CONSTITUENCY,
CONSTITUENT,
CONSTITUENTS,
DEMOCRACIES,
DEMOCRACY,
DEMOCRATIC REGIMES,
DESCRIPTION,
DESCRIPTIONS,
E-MAIL,
E-MAIL ADDRESS,
ECONOMIC OUTCOMES,
ECONOMIC RESEARCH,
ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES,
ELECTION,
ELECTORAL PROCESS,
ELECTORAL SYSTEM,
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS,
ENTRY,
INCOME GROUPS,
INVENTORY,
LAWS,
LEGISLATORS,
LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES,
LOWER HOUSES,
ORDERING,
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS,
POLITICAL ECONOMY,
POLITICAL RIGHTS,
POLITICAL SYSTEMS,
PROBABILITY,
RESEARCHERS,
RESULT,
SOCIAL SCIENCES,
SPREADSHEET,
SYSTEM DESIGN,
TRANSITION ECONOMIES,
UPPER HOUSE,
UPPER HOUSES,
USERS,
VOTERS, |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/01/17741949/particularism-around-world
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/17168
|
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