Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service
Pay schemes in the public sector aim to attract motivated, high-ability applicants. A nascent literature has found positive effects of higher pay on ability and no or slightly positive effects on motivation. This paper revisits this issue with a novel subject pool, students destined for the private and public sectors in Indonesia. The analysis uses dictator games and real effort tasks to examine wage effects on a measure of motivation that exactly matches the mission of the public sector task. The model and experimental design allow for precisely measuring (1) the distribution of ability over the effort task; (2) the distribution of motivational preferences for public sector missions; and (3) outside options when choosing to work for public sector missions. Three novel conclusions emerge. First, more pro-social workers do, in fact, exert higher effort in a pro-social task. Second, in contrast to previous research, motivated individuals are more likely to join the public sector when public sector pay is low than when it is high. Third, real public sector workers exhibit greater pro-sociality than private sector workers, even for entrants into the Indonesian Ministry of Finance.
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dig-okr-10986169452024-08-08T14:13:02Z Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service Banuri, Sheheryar Keefer, Philip ACCOUNTING ATTENTION CAREERS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES GENDER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INCOME INCOME LEVELS INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES INTELLIGENCE LEARNING LOTTERY MINISTRIES OF FINANCE MINISTRY OF FINANCE MOTIVATION NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PERSONALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIMING PRIVATE SECTOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PSYCHOLOGY PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PAY PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES PUBLIC SECTORS PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC WORKS RECOGNITION SOCIAL ATTITUDES SOCIAL BEHAVIOR SOCIAL CARE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIALIZATION TAXATION Pay schemes in the public sector aim to attract motivated, high-ability applicants. A nascent literature has found positive effects of higher pay on ability and no or slightly positive effects on motivation. This paper revisits this issue with a novel subject pool, students destined for the private and public sectors in Indonesia. The analysis uses dictator games and real effort tasks to examine wage effects on a measure of motivation that exactly matches the mission of the public sector task. The model and experimental design allow for precisely measuring (1) the distribution of ability over the effort task; (2) the distribution of motivational preferences for public sector missions; and (3) outside options when choosing to work for public sector missions. Three novel conclusions emerge. First, more pro-social workers do, in fact, exert higher effort in a pro-social task. Second, in contrast to previous research, motivated individuals are more likely to join the public sector when public sector pay is low than when it is high. Third, real public sector workers exhibit greater pro-sociality than private sector workers, even for entrants into the Indonesian Ministry of Finance. 2014-02-05T20:23:38Z 2014-02-05T20:23:38Z 2013-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/12/18682614/intrinsic-motivation-effort-call-public-service https://hdl.handle.net/10986/16945 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6729 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
institution |
Banco Mundial |
collection |
DSpace |
country |
Estados Unidos |
countrycode |
US |
component |
Bibliográfico |
access |
En linea |
databasecode |
dig-okr |
tag |
biblioteca |
region |
America del Norte |
libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ACCOUNTING ATTENTION CAREERS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES GENDER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INCOME INCOME LEVELS INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES INTELLIGENCE LEARNING LOTTERY MINISTRIES OF FINANCE MINISTRY OF FINANCE MOTIVATION NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PERSONALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIMING PRIVATE SECTOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PSYCHOLOGY PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PAY PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES PUBLIC SECTORS PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC WORKS RECOGNITION SOCIAL ATTITUDES SOCIAL BEHAVIOR SOCIAL CARE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIALIZATION TAXATION ACCOUNTING ATTENTION CAREERS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES GENDER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INCOME INCOME LEVELS INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES INTELLIGENCE LEARNING LOTTERY MINISTRIES OF FINANCE MINISTRY OF FINANCE MOTIVATION NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PERSONALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIMING PRIVATE SECTOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PSYCHOLOGY PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PAY PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES PUBLIC SECTORS PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC WORKS RECOGNITION SOCIAL ATTITUDES SOCIAL BEHAVIOR SOCIAL CARE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIALIZATION TAXATION |
spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING ATTENTION CAREERS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES GENDER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INCOME INCOME LEVELS INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES INTELLIGENCE LEARNING LOTTERY MINISTRIES OF FINANCE MINISTRY OF FINANCE MOTIVATION NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PERSONALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIMING PRIVATE SECTOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PSYCHOLOGY PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PAY PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES PUBLIC SECTORS PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC WORKS RECOGNITION SOCIAL ATTITUDES SOCIAL BEHAVIOR SOCIAL CARE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIALIZATION TAXATION ACCOUNTING ATTENTION CAREERS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES GENDER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INCOME INCOME LEVELS INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES INTELLIGENCE LEARNING LOTTERY MINISTRIES OF FINANCE MINISTRY OF FINANCE MOTIVATION NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PERSONALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIMING PRIVATE SECTOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PSYCHOLOGY PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PAY PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES PUBLIC SECTORS PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC WORKS RECOGNITION SOCIAL ATTITUDES SOCIAL BEHAVIOR SOCIAL CARE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIALIZATION TAXATION Banuri, Sheheryar Keefer, Philip Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service |
description |
Pay schemes in the public sector aim to
attract motivated, high-ability applicants. A nascent
literature has found positive effects of higher pay on
ability and no or slightly positive effects on motivation.
This paper revisits this issue with a novel subject pool,
students destined for the private and public sectors in
Indonesia. The analysis uses dictator games and real effort
tasks to examine wage effects on a measure of motivation
that exactly matches the mission of the public sector task.
The model and experimental design allow for precisely
measuring (1) the distribution of ability over the effort
task; (2) the distribution of motivational preferences for
public sector missions; and (3) outside options when
choosing to work for public sector missions. Three novel
conclusions emerge. First, more pro-social workers do, in
fact, exert higher effort in a pro-social task. Second, in
contrast to previous research, motivated individuals are
more likely to join the public sector when public sector pay
is low than when it is high. Third, real public sector
workers exhibit greater pro-sociality than private sector
workers, even for entrants into the Indonesian Ministry of Finance. |
topic_facet |
ACCOUNTING ATTENTION CAREERS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES GENDER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INCOME INCOME LEVELS INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES INTELLIGENCE LEARNING LOTTERY MINISTRIES OF FINANCE MINISTRY OF FINANCE MOTIVATION NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PERSONALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIMING PRIVATE SECTOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PSYCHOLOGY PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PAY PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES PUBLIC SECTORS PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC WORKS RECOGNITION SOCIAL ATTITUDES SOCIAL BEHAVIOR SOCIAL CARE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIALIZATION TAXATION |
author |
Banuri, Sheheryar Keefer, Philip |
author_facet |
Banuri, Sheheryar Keefer, Philip |
author_sort |
Banuri, Sheheryar |
title |
Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service |
title_short |
Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service |
title_full |
Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service |
title_fullStr |
Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service |
title_full_unstemmed |
Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service |
title_sort |
intrinsic motivation, effort and the call to public service |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2013-12 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/12/18682614/intrinsic-motivation-effort-call-public-service https://hdl.handle.net/10986/16945 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT banurisheheryar intrinsicmotivationeffortandthecalltopublicservice AT keeferphilip intrinsicmotivationeffortandthecalltopublicservice |
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1807154652774400000 |