Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service

Pay schemes in the public sector aim to attract motivated, high-ability applicants. A nascent literature has found positive effects of higher pay on ability and no or slightly positive effects on motivation. This paper revisits this issue with a novel subject pool, students destined for the private and public sectors in Indonesia. The analysis uses dictator games and real effort tasks to examine wage effects on a measure of motivation that exactly matches the mission of the public sector task. The model and experimental design allow for precisely measuring (1) the distribution of ability over the effort task; (2) the distribution of motivational preferences for public sector missions; and (3) outside options when choosing to work for public sector missions. Three novel conclusions emerge. First, more pro-social workers do, in fact, exert higher effort in a pro-social task. Second, in contrast to previous research, motivated individuals are more likely to join the public sector when public sector pay is low than when it is high. Third, real public sector workers exhibit greater pro-sociality than private sector workers, even for entrants into the Indonesian Ministry of Finance.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Banuri, Sheheryar, Keefer, Philip
Format: Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2013-12
Subjects:ACCOUNTING, ATTENTION, CAREERS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, EXCHANGE RATE, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, GENDER, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, INCOME, INCOME LEVELS, INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS, INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES, INTELLIGENCE, LEARNING, LOTTERY, MINISTRIES OF FINANCE, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, MOTIVATION, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, PERSONALITY, POLITICAL ECONOMY, PRIMING, PRIVATE SECTOR, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, PUBLIC ECONOMICS, PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING, PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE, PUBLIC SECTOR PAY, PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE, PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM, PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE, PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES, PUBLIC SECTORS, PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC, PUBLIC SERVICES, PUBLIC WORKS, RECOGNITION, SOCIAL ATTITUDES, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, SOCIAL CARE, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL WELFARE, SOCIALIZATION, TAXATION,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/12/18682614/intrinsic-motivation-effort-call-public-service
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16945
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spelling dig-okr-10986169452021-04-23T14:03:33Z Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service Banuri, Sheheryar Keefer, Philip ACCOUNTING ATTENTION CAREERS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES GENDER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INCOME INCOME LEVELS INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES INTELLIGENCE LEARNING LOTTERY MINISTRIES OF FINANCE MINISTRY OF FINANCE MOTIVATION NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PERSONALITY POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIMING PRIVATE SECTOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PSYCHOLOGY PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PAY PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES PUBLIC SECTORS PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC WORKS RECOGNITION SOCIAL ATTITUDES SOCIAL BEHAVIOR SOCIAL CARE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIALIZATION TAXATION Pay schemes in the public sector aim to attract motivated, high-ability applicants. A nascent literature has found positive effects of higher pay on ability and no or slightly positive effects on motivation. This paper revisits this issue with a novel subject pool, students destined for the private and public sectors in Indonesia. The analysis uses dictator games and real effort tasks to examine wage effects on a measure of motivation that exactly matches the mission of the public sector task. The model and experimental design allow for precisely measuring (1) the distribution of ability over the effort task; (2) the distribution of motivational preferences for public sector missions; and (3) outside options when choosing to work for public sector missions. Three novel conclusions emerge. First, more pro-social workers do, in fact, exert higher effort in a pro-social task. Second, in contrast to previous research, motivated individuals are more likely to join the public sector when public sector pay is low than when it is high. Third, real public sector workers exhibit greater pro-sociality than private sector workers, even for entrants into the Indonesian Ministry of Finance. 2014-02-05T20:23:38Z 2014-02-05T20:23:38Z 2013-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/12/18682614/intrinsic-motivation-effort-call-public-service http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16945 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6729 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Indonesia
institution Banco Mundial
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language English
en_US
topic ACCOUNTING
ATTENTION
CAREERS
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
EXCHANGE RATE
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
GENDER
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INCOME
INCOME LEVELS
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
INTELLIGENCE
LEARNING
LOTTERY
MINISTRIES OF FINANCE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
MOTIVATION
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
PERSONALITY
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PRIMING
PRIVATE SECTOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLIC
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
PUBLIC ECONOMICS
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC INTEREST
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING
PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR PAY
PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE
PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES
PUBLIC SECTORS
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUBLIC WORKS
RECOGNITION
SOCIAL ATTITUDES
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
SOCIAL CARE
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
SOCIAL WELFARE
SOCIALIZATION
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING
ATTENTION
CAREERS
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
EXCHANGE RATE
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
GENDER
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INCOME
INCOME LEVELS
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
INTELLIGENCE
LEARNING
LOTTERY
MINISTRIES OF FINANCE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
MOTIVATION
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
PERSONALITY
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PRIMING
PRIVATE SECTOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLIC
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
PUBLIC ECONOMICS
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC INTEREST
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING
PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR PAY
PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE
PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES
PUBLIC SECTORS
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUBLIC WORKS
RECOGNITION
SOCIAL ATTITUDES
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
SOCIAL CARE
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
SOCIAL WELFARE
SOCIALIZATION
TAXATION
spellingShingle ACCOUNTING
ATTENTION
CAREERS
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
EXCHANGE RATE
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
GENDER
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INCOME
INCOME LEVELS
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
INTELLIGENCE
LEARNING
LOTTERY
MINISTRIES OF FINANCE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
MOTIVATION
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
PERSONALITY
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PRIMING
PRIVATE SECTOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLIC
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
PUBLIC ECONOMICS
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC INTEREST
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING
PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR PAY
PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE
PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES
PUBLIC SECTORS
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUBLIC WORKS
RECOGNITION
SOCIAL ATTITUDES
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
SOCIAL CARE
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
SOCIAL WELFARE
SOCIALIZATION
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING
ATTENTION
CAREERS
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
EXCHANGE RATE
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
GENDER
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INCOME
INCOME LEVELS
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
INTELLIGENCE
LEARNING
LOTTERY
MINISTRIES OF FINANCE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
MOTIVATION
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
PERSONALITY
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PRIMING
PRIVATE SECTOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLIC
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
PUBLIC ECONOMICS
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC INTEREST
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING
PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR PAY
PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE
PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES
PUBLIC SECTORS
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUBLIC WORKS
RECOGNITION
SOCIAL ATTITUDES
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
SOCIAL CARE
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
SOCIAL WELFARE
SOCIALIZATION
TAXATION
Banuri, Sheheryar
Keefer, Philip
Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service
description Pay schemes in the public sector aim to attract motivated, high-ability applicants. A nascent literature has found positive effects of higher pay on ability and no or slightly positive effects on motivation. This paper revisits this issue with a novel subject pool, students destined for the private and public sectors in Indonesia. The analysis uses dictator games and real effort tasks to examine wage effects on a measure of motivation that exactly matches the mission of the public sector task. The model and experimental design allow for precisely measuring (1) the distribution of ability over the effort task; (2) the distribution of motivational preferences for public sector missions; and (3) outside options when choosing to work for public sector missions. Three novel conclusions emerge. First, more pro-social workers do, in fact, exert higher effort in a pro-social task. Second, in contrast to previous research, motivated individuals are more likely to join the public sector when public sector pay is low than when it is high. Third, real public sector workers exhibit greater pro-sociality than private sector workers, even for entrants into the Indonesian Ministry of Finance.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
topic_facet ACCOUNTING
ATTENTION
CAREERS
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
EXCHANGE RATE
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
GENDER
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INCOME
INCOME LEVELS
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
INTELLIGENCE
LEARNING
LOTTERY
MINISTRIES OF FINANCE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
MOTIVATION
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
PERSONALITY
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PRIMING
PRIVATE SECTOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLIC
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
PUBLIC ECONOMICS
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC INTEREST
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING
PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR PAY
PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE
PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES
PUBLIC SECTORS
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUBLIC WORKS
RECOGNITION
SOCIAL ATTITUDES
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
SOCIAL CARE
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
SOCIAL WELFARE
SOCIALIZATION
TAXATION
author Banuri, Sheheryar
Keefer, Philip
author_facet Banuri, Sheheryar
Keefer, Philip
author_sort Banuri, Sheheryar
title Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service
title_short Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service
title_full Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service
title_fullStr Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service
title_full_unstemmed Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service
title_sort intrinsic motivation, effort and the call to public service
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2013-12
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/12/18682614/intrinsic-motivation-effort-call-public-service
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16945
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AT keeferphilip intrinsicmotivationeffortandthecalltopublicservice
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