Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India

What factors determine the nature of political opportunism in local government in South India? To answer this question, we study two types of policy decisions that have been delegated to local politicians—beneficiary selection for transfer programs and the allocation of within-village public goods. Our data on village councils in South India show that, relative to other citizens, elected councillors are more likely to be selected as beneficiaries of a large transfer program. The chief councillor's village also obtains more public goods, relative to other villages. These findings can be interpreted using a simple model of the logic of political incentives in the context that we study.

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Main Authors: Besley, Timothy, Pande, Rohini, Rao, Vijayendra
Format: Journal Article biblioteca
Language:en_US
Published: Oxford University Press for the World Bank 2012-06-01
Subjects:beneficiaries, consultation, democracy, Democratization, Economic Policy, electoral process, figures, flexibility, Good Government, interviews, local government, Participatory Democracy, PRA, Reconstruction, Rural Development, self-interest, service delivery, village, village meetings, villages,
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16349
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spelling dig-okr-10986163492021-04-23T14:03:28Z Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India Besley, Timothy Pande, Rohini Rao, Vijayendra beneficiaries consultation democracy Democratization Economic Policy electoral process figures flexibility Good Government interviews local government Participatory Democracy PRA Reconstruction Rural Development self-interest service delivery village village meetings villages What factors determine the nature of political opportunism in local government in South India? To answer this question, we study two types of policy decisions that have been delegated to local politicians—beneficiary selection for transfer programs and the allocation of within-village public goods. Our data on village councils in South India show that, relative to other citizens, elected councillors are more likely to be selected as beneficiaries of a large transfer program. The chief councillor's village also obtains more public goods, relative to other villages. These findings can be interpreted using a simple model of the logic of political incentives in the context that we study. 2013-12-04T17:04:36Z 2013-12-04T17:04:36Z 2012-06-01 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16349 en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Oxford University Press for the World Bank Journal Article South Asia India
institution Banco Mundial
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language en_US
topic beneficiaries
consultation
democracy
Democratization
Economic Policy
electoral process
figures
flexibility
Good Government
interviews
local government
Participatory Democracy
PRA
Reconstruction
Rural Development
self-interest
service delivery
village
village meetings
villages
beneficiaries
consultation
democracy
Democratization
Economic Policy
electoral process
figures
flexibility
Good Government
interviews
local government
Participatory Democracy
PRA
Reconstruction
Rural Development
self-interest
service delivery
village
village meetings
villages
spellingShingle beneficiaries
consultation
democracy
Democratization
Economic Policy
electoral process
figures
flexibility
Good Government
interviews
local government
Participatory Democracy
PRA
Reconstruction
Rural Development
self-interest
service delivery
village
village meetings
villages
beneficiaries
consultation
democracy
Democratization
Economic Policy
electoral process
figures
flexibility
Good Government
interviews
local government
Participatory Democracy
PRA
Reconstruction
Rural Development
self-interest
service delivery
village
village meetings
villages
Besley, Timothy
Pande, Rohini
Rao, Vijayendra
Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India
description What factors determine the nature of political opportunism in local government in South India? To answer this question, we study two types of policy decisions that have been delegated to local politicians—beneficiary selection for transfer programs and the allocation of within-village public goods. Our data on village councils in South India show that, relative to other citizens, elected councillors are more likely to be selected as beneficiaries of a large transfer program. The chief councillor's village also obtains more public goods, relative to other villages. These findings can be interpreted using a simple model of the logic of political incentives in the context that we study.
format Journal Article
topic_facet beneficiaries
consultation
democracy
Democratization
Economic Policy
electoral process
figures
flexibility
Good Government
interviews
local government
Participatory Democracy
PRA
Reconstruction
Rural Development
self-interest
service delivery
village
village meetings
villages
author Besley, Timothy
Pande, Rohini
Rao, Vijayendra
author_facet Besley, Timothy
Pande, Rohini
Rao, Vijayendra
author_sort Besley, Timothy
title Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India
title_short Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India
title_full Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India
title_fullStr Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India
title_full_unstemmed Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India
title_sort just rewards? local politics and public resource allocation in south india
publisher Oxford University Press for the World Bank
publishDate 2012-06-01
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16349
work_keys_str_mv AT besleytimothy justrewardslocalpoliticsandpublicresourceallocationinsouthindia
AT panderohini justrewardslocalpoliticsandpublicresourceallocationinsouthindia
AT raovijayendra justrewardslocalpoliticsandpublicresourceallocationinsouthindia
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