Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India
What factors determine the nature of political opportunism in local government in South India? To answer this question, we study two types of policy decisions that have been delegated to local politicians—beneficiary selection for transfer programs and the allocation of within-village public goods. Our data on village councils in South India show that, relative to other citizens, elected councillors are more likely to be selected as beneficiaries of a large transfer program. The chief councillor's village also obtains more public goods, relative to other villages. These findings can be interpreted using a simple model of the logic of political incentives in the context that we study.
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Format: | Journal Article biblioteca |
Language: | en_US |
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Oxford University Press for the World Bank
2012-06-01
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Subjects: | beneficiaries, consultation, democracy, Democratization, Economic Policy, electoral process, figures, flexibility, Good Government, interviews, local government, Participatory Democracy, PRA, Reconstruction, Rural Development, self-interest, service delivery, village, village meetings, villages, |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16349 |
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dig-okr-10986163492021-04-23T14:03:28Z Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India Besley, Timothy Pande, Rohini Rao, Vijayendra beneficiaries consultation democracy Democratization Economic Policy electoral process figures flexibility Good Government interviews local government Participatory Democracy PRA Reconstruction Rural Development self-interest service delivery village village meetings villages What factors determine the nature of political opportunism in local government in South India? To answer this question, we study two types of policy decisions that have been delegated to local politicians—beneficiary selection for transfer programs and the allocation of within-village public goods. Our data on village councils in South India show that, relative to other citizens, elected councillors are more likely to be selected as beneficiaries of a large transfer program. The chief councillor's village also obtains more public goods, relative to other villages. These findings can be interpreted using a simple model of the logic of political incentives in the context that we study. 2013-12-04T17:04:36Z 2013-12-04T17:04:36Z 2012-06-01 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16349 en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Oxford University Press for the World Bank Journal Article South Asia India |
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beneficiaries consultation democracy Democratization Economic Policy electoral process figures flexibility Good Government interviews local government Participatory Democracy PRA Reconstruction Rural Development self-interest service delivery village village meetings villages beneficiaries consultation democracy Democratization Economic Policy electoral process figures flexibility Good Government interviews local government Participatory Democracy PRA Reconstruction Rural Development self-interest service delivery village village meetings villages |
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beneficiaries consultation democracy Democratization Economic Policy electoral process figures flexibility Good Government interviews local government Participatory Democracy PRA Reconstruction Rural Development self-interest service delivery village village meetings villages beneficiaries consultation democracy Democratization Economic Policy electoral process figures flexibility Good Government interviews local government Participatory Democracy PRA Reconstruction Rural Development self-interest service delivery village village meetings villages Besley, Timothy Pande, Rohini Rao, Vijayendra Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India |
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What factors determine the nature of political opportunism in local government in South India? To answer this question, we study two types of policy decisions that have been delegated to local politicians—beneficiary selection for transfer programs and the allocation of within-village public goods. Our data on village councils in South India show that, relative to other citizens, elected councillors are more likely to be selected as beneficiaries of a large transfer program. The chief councillor's village also obtains more public goods, relative to other villages. These findings can be interpreted using a simple model of the logic of political incentives in the context that we study. |
format |
Journal Article |
topic_facet |
beneficiaries consultation democracy Democratization Economic Policy electoral process figures flexibility Good Government interviews local government Participatory Democracy PRA Reconstruction Rural Development self-interest service delivery village village meetings villages |
author |
Besley, Timothy Pande, Rohini Rao, Vijayendra |
author_facet |
Besley, Timothy Pande, Rohini Rao, Vijayendra |
author_sort |
Besley, Timothy |
title |
Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India |
title_short |
Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India |
title_full |
Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India |
title_fullStr |
Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India |
title_full_unstemmed |
Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India |
title_sort |
just rewards? local politics and public resource allocation in south india |
publisher |
Oxford University Press for the World Bank |
publishDate |
2012-06-01 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16349 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT besleytimothy justrewardslocalpoliticsandpublicresourceallocationinsouthindia AT panderohini justrewardslocalpoliticsandpublicresourceallocationinsouthindia AT raovijayendra justrewardslocalpoliticsandpublicresourceallocationinsouthindia |
_version_ |
1756573162552688640 |