How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.
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| Format: | Journal Article biblioteca |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank
2012-01-18
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| Subjects: | account, borrowing, Child Labor, Child Labour, Development Economics, economic analysis, economics, employment, employment opportunities, family members, general equilibrium, human capital, income, insurance, Labor Economics, labor market, moral hazard, Political Economy, school attendance, young children, |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15309 |
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