How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country

Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Cigno, Alessandro
Format: Journal Article biblioteca
Language:en_US
Published: World Bank 2012-01-18
Subjects:account, borrowing, Child Labor, Child Labour, Development Economics, economic analysis, economics, employment, employment opportunities, family members, general equilibrium, human capital, income, insurance, Labor Economics, labor market, moral hazard, Political Economy, school attendance, young children,
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15309
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spelling dig-okr-10986153092021-04-23T14:03:21Z How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country Cigno, Alessandro account borrowing Child Labor Child Labour Development Economics economic analysis economics employment employment opportunities family members general equilibrium human capital income insurance Labor Economics labor market moral hazard Political Economy school attendance young children Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure. 2013-08-22T21:27:53Z 2013-08-22T21:27:53Z 2012-01-18 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X doi:10.1093/wber/lhr038 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15309 en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank Journal Article Latin America
institution Banco Mundial
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language en_US
topic account
borrowing
Child Labor
Child Labour
Development Economics
economic analysis
economics
employment
employment opportunities
family members
general equilibrium
human capital
income
insurance
Labor Economics
labor market
moral hazard
Political Economy
school attendance
young children
account
borrowing
Child Labor
Child Labour
Development Economics
economic analysis
economics
employment
employment opportunities
family members
general equilibrium
human capital
income
insurance
Labor Economics
labor market
moral hazard
Political Economy
school attendance
young children
spellingShingle account
borrowing
Child Labor
Child Labour
Development Economics
economic analysis
economics
employment
employment opportunities
family members
general equilibrium
human capital
income
insurance
Labor Economics
labor market
moral hazard
Political Economy
school attendance
young children
account
borrowing
Child Labor
Child Labour
Development Economics
economic analysis
economics
employment
employment opportunities
family members
general equilibrium
human capital
income
insurance
Labor Economics
labor market
moral hazard
Political Economy
school attendance
young children
Cigno, Alessandro
How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
description Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.
format Journal Article
topic_facet account
borrowing
Child Labor
Child Labour
Development Economics
economic analysis
economics
employment
employment opportunities
family members
general equilibrium
human capital
income
insurance
Labor Economics
labor market
moral hazard
Political Economy
school attendance
young children
author Cigno, Alessandro
author_facet Cigno, Alessandro
author_sort Cigno, Alessandro
title How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
title_short How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
title_full How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
title_fullStr How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
title_full_unstemmed How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
title_sort how to deal with covert child labor and give children an effective education, in a poor developing country
publisher World Bank
publishDate 2012-01-18
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15309
work_keys_str_mv AT cignoalessandro howtodealwithcovertchildlaborandgivechildrenaneffectiveeducationinapoordevelopingcountry
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