Trademark Protection or Protectionism?
This paper explores the extent to which discrimination against foreign applicants in the trademark registration process can be used as a "behind-the-border" barrier to imports. Prima-facie evidence shows that in some developing countries the ratio of trademark registration to applications is much higher for national than for foreign applicants, which is consistent with the notion of discrimination against foreign firms. The authors develop a simple model that suggests that incentives to discriminate are stronger when foreign firms produce products that are close in quality to the product produced by domestic firms. This hypothesis is then tested and empirically confirmed in three of the four countries in their sample, suggesting that discretion and discrimination in the trademark registration process can sometimes be used as a protectionist tool.
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2004-02
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| Subjects: | TRADEMARKS, TRADE REGULATION, EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS, FOREIGN EXCHANGE, IMPORTS, TRADE BARRIERS AGRICULTURE, BRANDS, CD, CONSUMER SURPLUS, CONSUMERS, DISCRIMINATION, DOMESTIC MARKET, DOMESTIC PRODUCTS, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, EXPORTS, FISH, FUTURE RESEARCH, HOME MARKET, IMPERFECT COMPETITION, INCOME, INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, LAWS, LEGISLATION, MARKET MECHANISM, MARKET SEGMENTATION, MARKET SHARE, MERCHANDISE, METALS, PERFECT INFORMATION, PRODUCERS, PRODUCT QUALITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PROTECTIONISM, QUALITY STANDARDS, QUOTAS, SALES, SURPLUSES, TRADE BARRIERS, TRANSACTION COSTS, WILLINGNESS TO PAY, WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/02/3909851/trademark-protection-or-protectionism https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14312 |
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