Conditional Cash Transfers and the Equity-Efficiency Debate
During the past decade, the use of conditional cash transfers to increase investment in human capital has generated considerable excitement in both research and policy forums. Such schemes are being increasingly adopted in a number of contexts and countries to improve outcomes in health, education, and child labor as they aim to balance the goals of current and future poverty reduction. In this paper, the authors define any scheme requiring a specified course of action in order to receive a benefit as a conditional cash transfer. This definition includes cash transfers based on human capital investments, but is sufficiently broad to encompass other schemes such as work-fare programs or consumption transfers. The authors examine the rationales behind, the problems with, and the tradeoffs inherent to conditional cash transfer programs. They discuss two main concerns: low participation and fungibility. Low participation refers to the problem of program uptake. If individuals do not participate in the program, whether it was designed to increase human capital investment or to target resources, the program will not be successful. The problem of fungibility, however, depends on the rationale for the particular conditional cash transfer program. When used to increase efficiency, even when program uptake is high, program effects may be less than envisioned due to behavioral responses of households that lead to changes in the consumption of close substitutes. While researchers have typically addressed these issues separately, the authors emphasize the need for policymakers to incorporate a number of different factors in a comprehensive framework to design optimal conditional cash transfer schemes.
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2004-04
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| Subjects: | CASH TRANSFERS, EQUITY, HUMAN CAPITAL, HEALTH, EDUCATION, CHILD LABOR, POVERTY MITIGATION, WORK GROUPS, CONSUMPTION ECONOMICS, FUNGIBILITY, PARTICIPATION, HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIORS CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/04/3573068/conditional-cash-transfers-equity-efficiency-debate https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14299 |
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dig-okr-10986142992024-08-08T17:35:52Z Conditional Cash Transfers and the Equity-Efficiency Debate Do, Quy-Toan Das, Jishnu Özler, Berk CASH TRANSFERS EQUITY HUMAN CAPITAL HEALTH EDUCATION CHILD LABOR POVERTY MITIGATION WORK GROUPS CONSUMPTION ECONOMICS FUNGIBILITY PARTICIPATION HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIORS CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS During the past decade, the use of conditional cash transfers to increase investment in human capital has generated considerable excitement in both research and policy forums. Such schemes are being increasingly adopted in a number of contexts and countries to improve outcomes in health, education, and child labor as they aim to balance the goals of current and future poverty reduction. In this paper, the authors define any scheme requiring a specified course of action in order to receive a benefit as a conditional cash transfer. This definition includes cash transfers based on human capital investments, but is sufficiently broad to encompass other schemes such as work-fare programs or consumption transfers. The authors examine the rationales behind, the problems with, and the tradeoffs inherent to conditional cash transfer programs. They discuss two main concerns: low participation and fungibility. Low participation refers to the problem of program uptake. If individuals do not participate in the program, whether it was designed to increase human capital investment or to target resources, the program will not be successful. The problem of fungibility, however, depends on the rationale for the particular conditional cash transfer program. When used to increase efficiency, even when program uptake is high, program effects may be less than envisioned due to behavioral responses of households that lead to changes in the consumption of close substitutes. While researchers have typically addressed these issues separately, the authors emphasize the need for policymakers to incorporate a number of different factors in a comprehensive framework to design optimal conditional cash transfer schemes. 2013-07-01T15:23:49Z 2013-07-01T15:23:49Z 2004-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/04/3573068/conditional-cash-transfers-equity-efficiency-debate https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14299 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3280 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
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| language |
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| topic |
CASH TRANSFERS EQUITY HUMAN CAPITAL HEALTH EDUCATION CHILD LABOR POVERTY MITIGATION WORK GROUPS CONSUMPTION ECONOMICS FUNGIBILITY PARTICIPATION HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIORS CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS CASH TRANSFERS EQUITY HUMAN CAPITAL HEALTH EDUCATION CHILD LABOR POVERTY MITIGATION WORK GROUPS CONSUMPTION ECONOMICS FUNGIBILITY PARTICIPATION HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIORS CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS |
| spellingShingle |
CASH TRANSFERS EQUITY HUMAN CAPITAL HEALTH EDUCATION CHILD LABOR POVERTY MITIGATION WORK GROUPS CONSUMPTION ECONOMICS FUNGIBILITY PARTICIPATION HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIORS CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS CASH TRANSFERS EQUITY HUMAN CAPITAL HEALTH EDUCATION CHILD LABOR POVERTY MITIGATION WORK GROUPS CONSUMPTION ECONOMICS FUNGIBILITY PARTICIPATION HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIORS CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS Do, Quy-Toan Das, Jishnu Özler, Berk Conditional Cash Transfers and the Equity-Efficiency Debate |
| description |
During the past decade, the use of
conditional cash transfers to increase investment in human
capital has generated considerable excitement in both
research and policy forums. Such schemes are being
increasingly adopted in a number of contexts and countries
to improve outcomes in health, education, and child labor as
they aim to balance the goals of current and future poverty
reduction. In this paper, the authors define any scheme
requiring a specified course of action in order to receive a
benefit as a conditional cash transfer. This definition
includes cash transfers based on human capital investments,
but is sufficiently broad to encompass other schemes such as
work-fare programs or consumption transfers. The authors
examine the rationales behind, the problems with, and the
tradeoffs inherent to conditional cash transfer programs.
They discuss two main concerns: low participation and
fungibility. Low participation refers to the problem of
program uptake. If individuals do not participate in the
program, whether it was designed to increase human capital
investment or to target resources, the program will not be
successful. The problem of fungibility, however, depends on
the rationale for the particular conditional cash transfer
program. When used to increase efficiency, even when program
uptake is high, program effects may be less than envisioned
due to behavioral responses of households that lead to
changes in the consumption of close substitutes. While
researchers have typically addressed these issues
separately, the authors emphasize the need for policymakers
to incorporate a number of different factors in a
comprehensive framework to design optimal conditional cash
transfer schemes. |
| topic_facet |
CASH TRANSFERS EQUITY HUMAN CAPITAL HEALTH EDUCATION CHILD LABOR POVERTY MITIGATION WORK GROUPS CONSUMPTION ECONOMICS FUNGIBILITY PARTICIPATION HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIORS CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS |
| author |
Do, Quy-Toan Das, Jishnu Özler, Berk |
| author_facet |
Do, Quy-Toan Das, Jishnu Özler, Berk |
| author_sort |
Do, Quy-Toan |
| title |
Conditional Cash Transfers and the Equity-Efficiency Debate |
| title_short |
Conditional Cash Transfers and the Equity-Efficiency Debate |
| title_full |
Conditional Cash Transfers and the Equity-Efficiency Debate |
| title_fullStr |
Conditional Cash Transfers and the Equity-Efficiency Debate |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Conditional Cash Transfers and the Equity-Efficiency Debate |
| title_sort |
conditional cash transfers and the equity-efficiency debate |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2004-04 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/04/3573068/conditional-cash-transfers-equity-efficiency-debate https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14299 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT doquytoan conditionalcashtransfersandtheequityefficiencydebate AT dasjishnu conditionalcashtransfersandtheequityefficiencydebate AT ozlerberk conditionalcashtransfersandtheequityefficiencydebate |
| _version_ |
1807159532210618368 |