Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984-2002
The authors examine the allocation of
foreign aid by 41 donor agencies, bilateral and
multilateral. Their policy selectivity index measures the
extent to which a donor's assistance is targeted to
countries with sound institutions and policies, controlling
for per capita income and population. The poverty
selectivity index analogously looks at how well a
donor's assistance is targeted to poor countries,
controlling for institutional and policy environment as
measured by a World Bank index. The authors' main
finding is that the same group of multilateral and bilateral
aid agencies that are very policy focused are also very
poverty focused. The donors that appear high up in both
rankings are the World Bank's International Development
Association, the International Monetary Fund's Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility, Denmark, the United Kingdom,
Norway, Ireland, and the Netherlands. As a robustness check
the authors alternatively use institutional quality measures
independent of the World Bank and find the same pattern of
selectivity. They also find that policy selectivity is a new
phenomenon: in the 1984-89 period, aid overall was allocated
indiscriminately without any consideration to the quality of
governance, whereas in the 1990s there was a clear
relationship between aid and governance (institutions and
policies). This increasing selectivity of aid is good news
for aid effectiveness. The bad news is that the aid agencies
that the authors survey vary greatly in size. Some donors
that are largest in absolute size, such as France and the
United States, are not particularly selective. Japan comes
in high on the policy selectivity index but far down on the
poverty selectivity index, reflecting its pattern of giving
large amounts of aid in Asia to countries that are well
governed but in many cases not poor.
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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: |
Dollar, David,
Levin, Victoria |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2004-05
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Subjects: | FOREIGN AID,
POLICY SELECTION,
PER CAPITA INCOME,
POPULATION & DEMOGRAPHY,
POLICY IMPACTS,
WORLD BANK,
MULTILATERAL AGENCIES,
BILATERAL AGENCIES,
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT,
GOVERNANCE,
POVERTY MITIGATION,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ABSOLUTE TERMS,
AID AGENCIES,
AID ALLOCATION,
AID DEPENDENCY,
AID EFFECTIVENESS,
AVERAGE GROWTH,
AVERAGE GROWTH RATE,
BILATERAL AID,
CAPITAL MARKETS,
CITIZEN,
CIVIL LIBERTIES,
COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT,
CONCESSIONAL LOANS,
DATA SET,
DEBT RELIEF,
DEMOCRACY,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
DEVELOPING COUNTRY,
DEVELOPMENT AID,
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE,
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION,
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS,
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES,
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS,
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES,
DONOR AGENCIES,
DONOR AID,
DONOR POLICY,
ECONOMIC COOPERATION,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
ECONOMIC GROWTH,
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE,
ECONOMIC POLICIES,
ECONOMIC REVIEW,
ECONOMIC SHOCKS,
ECONOMISTS,
EMPIRICAL GROWTH LITERATURE,
EMPIRICAL STUDIES,
FACTOR ENDOWMENTS,
GOOD GOVERNANCE,
GROWTH RATE,
GROWTH REGRESSION,
GROWTH REGRESSIONS,
INCOME COUNTRIES,
INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT,
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS,
INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES,
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY,
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
LAW INDEX,
LONG-TERM GROWTH,
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES,
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY,
MONETARY ECONOMICS,
MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS,
NATIONAL INCOME,
POLICY ENVIRONMENT,
POLICY FRAMEWORK,
POLICY PACKAGE,
POLICY RESEARCH,
POLICY SIDE,
POLITICAL FACTORS,
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS,
POLITICAL RIGHTS,
POOR COUNTRIES,
POPULOUS COUNTRIES,
POVERTY FOCUS,
POVERTY INDEX,
POVERTY REDUCTION,
PRIVATE SECTOR,
PROPERTY RIGHTS,
PUBLIC INVESTMENT,
RULE OF LAW,
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT,
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE,
STANDARD DEVIATION,
TARGETING,
TRADE OPENNESS,
TRADE REGIME,
TRANSPARENCY, |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/05/4268831/increasing-selectivity-foreign-aid-1984-2002
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14090
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