A Template for Power Reform
The author argues that since competition is more effective than regulation in promoting efficiency, separating the potentially competitive parts of the industry from the natural monopoly parts that must remain regulated is good public policy. If this "de-integration" is possible, he says, it should be done, or at least the option should be kept open through continued public ownership of the transmission system. And on the question of privatization, he cites recent experience with power sector reform that suggests that efficiency depends more on the form of regulation than on the form of ownership.
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
1995-09
|
| Subjects: | COAL, CONSTRUCTION, CONSUMERS, DEBT, DEREGULATION, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, ELECTRICITY, EXCESS DEMAND, FUELS, GAS, IMPORTS, INCOME, INFLATION, LABOR PRODUCTIVITY, LICENSES, LOW TARIFFS, MARGINAL COSTS, MARKET COMPETITION, MUNICIPALITIES, NATURAL MONOPOLIES, NATURAL MONOPOLY, OIL, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, POWER STATIONS, PRIVATE PROPERTY, PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS, PRIVATE SECTOR, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC DEBT, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP, TENDERS, UTILITIES DENATIONALIZATION, ELECTRIC UTILITIES, GOVERNMENT REGULATION, ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION, PRIVATE OWNERSHIP, TRANSITION ECONOMIES, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1995/09/441465/template-power-reform https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11652 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|