Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design
Infrastructure concession contracts set out the performance obligations and rights of concessionaires and the incentives and risks under which they operate, including pricing arrangements. The clarity with which these terms can be defined determines whether there is likely to be renegotiations after contract award, which may undermine the significance of the initial auction. The design of incentives and risk allocation will affect first the intensity of competition and then the sustainability of the original contract. This Note examines these issues.
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Format: | Viewpoint biblioteca |
Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
1998-11
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Subjects: | CONCESSIONS, INFRASTRUCTURE, CONTRACT NEGOTIATION, RISKS, COST SHARING, BIDDING, RESTRICTIONS ARBITRATION, BOT, BREACH OF CONTRACT, COAL, CONCESSION, CONCESSION CONTRACTS, EMISSIONS, FUELS, INCENTIVE SYSTEMS, INFLATION, INSURANCE, LAWS, LEASE, LICENSES, MARKET POWER, MONOPOLY, MONOPOLY POWER, OIL, PENALTIES, POWER PLANTS, PRIVATE SECTOR, SERVICE DELIVERY, SPECIFICATIONS, TRANSACTION COSTS, UTILITY REGULATION, |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441577/bidding-concessions-impact-contract-design http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11527 |
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dig-okr-10986115272021-06-14T11:03:48Z Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design Klein, Michael CONCESSIONS INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACT NEGOTIATION RISKS COST SHARING BIDDING RESTRICTIONS ARBITRATION BOT BREACH OF CONTRACT COAL CONCESSION CONCESSION CONTRACTS EMISSIONS FUELS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INFLATION INSURANCE LAWS LEASE LICENSES MARKET POWER MONOPOLY MONOPOLY POWER OIL PENALTIES POWER PLANTS PRIVATE SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY SPECIFICATIONS TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITY REGULATION Infrastructure concession contracts set out the performance obligations and rights of concessionaires and the incentives and risks under which they operate, including pricing arrangements. The clarity with which these terms can be defined determines whether there is likely to be renegotiations after contract award, which may undermine the significance of the initial auction. The design of incentives and risk allocation will affect first the intensity of competition and then the sustainability of the original contract. This Note examines these issues. 2012-08-13T15:18:32Z 2012-08-13T15:18:32Z 1998-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441577/bidding-concessions-impact-contract-design Viewpoint. -- Note no. 158 (November 1998) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11527 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research |
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CONCESSIONS INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACT NEGOTIATION RISKS COST SHARING BIDDING RESTRICTIONS ARBITRATION BOT BREACH OF CONTRACT COAL CONCESSION CONCESSION CONTRACTS EMISSIONS FUELS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INFLATION INSURANCE LAWS LEASE LICENSES MARKET POWER MONOPOLY MONOPOLY POWER OIL PENALTIES POWER PLANTS PRIVATE SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY SPECIFICATIONS TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITY REGULATION CONCESSIONS INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACT NEGOTIATION RISKS COST SHARING BIDDING RESTRICTIONS ARBITRATION BOT BREACH OF CONTRACT COAL CONCESSION CONCESSION CONTRACTS EMISSIONS FUELS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INFLATION INSURANCE LAWS LEASE LICENSES MARKET POWER MONOPOLY MONOPOLY POWER OIL PENALTIES POWER PLANTS PRIVATE SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY SPECIFICATIONS TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITY REGULATION |
spellingShingle |
CONCESSIONS INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACT NEGOTIATION RISKS COST SHARING BIDDING RESTRICTIONS ARBITRATION BOT BREACH OF CONTRACT COAL CONCESSION CONCESSION CONTRACTS EMISSIONS FUELS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INFLATION INSURANCE LAWS LEASE LICENSES MARKET POWER MONOPOLY MONOPOLY POWER OIL PENALTIES POWER PLANTS PRIVATE SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY SPECIFICATIONS TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITY REGULATION CONCESSIONS INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACT NEGOTIATION RISKS COST SHARING BIDDING RESTRICTIONS ARBITRATION BOT BREACH OF CONTRACT COAL CONCESSION CONCESSION CONTRACTS EMISSIONS FUELS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INFLATION INSURANCE LAWS LEASE LICENSES MARKET POWER MONOPOLY MONOPOLY POWER OIL PENALTIES POWER PLANTS PRIVATE SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY SPECIFICATIONS TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITY REGULATION Klein, Michael Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design |
description |
Infrastructure concession contracts set
out the performance obligations and rights of
concessionaires and the incentives and risks under which
they operate, including pricing arrangements. The clarity
with which these terms can be defined determines whether
there is likely to be renegotiations after contract award,
which may undermine the significance of the initial auction.
The design of incentives and risk allocation will affect
first the intensity of competition and then the
sustainability of the original contract. This Note examines
these issues. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Viewpoint |
topic_facet |
CONCESSIONS INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACT NEGOTIATION RISKS COST SHARING BIDDING RESTRICTIONS ARBITRATION BOT BREACH OF CONTRACT COAL CONCESSION CONCESSION CONTRACTS EMISSIONS FUELS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INFLATION INSURANCE LAWS LEASE LICENSES MARKET POWER MONOPOLY MONOPOLY POWER OIL PENALTIES POWER PLANTS PRIVATE SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY SPECIFICATIONS TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITY REGULATION |
author |
Klein, Michael |
author_facet |
Klein, Michael |
author_sort |
Klein, Michael |
title |
Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design |
title_short |
Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design |
title_full |
Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design |
title_fullStr |
Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design |
title_full_unstemmed |
Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design |
title_sort |
bidding for concessions : the impact of contract design |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
1998-11 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441577/bidding-concessions-impact-contract-design http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11527 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT kleinmichael biddingforconcessionstheimpactofcontractdesign |
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