Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design

Infrastructure concession contracts set out the performance obligations and rights of concessionaires and the incentives and risks under which they operate, including pricing arrangements. The clarity with which these terms can be defined determines whether there is likely to be renegotiations after contract award, which may undermine the significance of the initial auction. The design of incentives and risk allocation will affect first the intensity of competition and then the sustainability of the original contract. This Note examines these issues.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Klein, Michael
Format:	Viewpoint biblioteca
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 1998-11
Subjects:	CONCESSIONS, INFRASTRUCTURE, CONTRACT NEGOTIATION, RISKS, COST SHARING, BIDDING, RESTRICTIONS ARBITRATION, BOT, BREACH OF CONTRACT, COAL, CONCESSION, CONCESSION CONTRACTS, EMISSIONS, FUELS, INCENTIVE SYSTEMS, INFLATION, INSURANCE, LAWS, LEASE, LICENSES, MARKET POWER, MONOPOLY, MONOPOLY POWER, OIL, PENALTIES, POWER PLANTS, PRIVATE SECTOR, SERVICE DELIVERY, SPECIFICATIONS, TRANSACTION COSTS, UTILITY REGULATION,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441577/bidding-concessions-impact-contract-design http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11527
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