Rebidding for Concessions
The longer a concession lasts, the less effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms of the concession over its full life. Much more influential will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which under standard concessions are hard to settle by competition. It has been suggested that competition could be brought to bear by periodically reauctioning a concession, which would limit the potential for exercise of market power by concessionaires. If contracts can be well written and rebidding is practical, periodic reauctioning offers an effective solution to the natural monoply problem. Price regulation may no longer be necessary, and rebidding may help with contract adjustment. This Note examines the case for rebidding.
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Format: | Viewpoint biblioteca |
Language: | English |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
1998-11
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Subjects: | ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE, ASSET VALUATION, ASSETS, AUCTION, BID, BIDDERS, BIDDING, COMPETITIVE MARKETS, CONSUMERS, DEBT, FREE ENTRY, HOSTILE TAKEOVER, MARKET ENTRY, MARKET POWER, MEDIAN VOTERS, NATURAL MONOPOLY, NET WORTH, PRICE SETTING, PRICE STRUCTURES, PRICING POLICY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, RETAIL, RISK PREMIUM, SHAREHOLDINGS, SUSTAINABILITY, TAKEOVER, VOTERS, WEALTH BIDDING, CONCESSIONS, AUCTIONS, ECONOMIC COMPETITION, |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441574/rebidding-concessions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11524 |
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dig-okr-10986115242021-06-14T11:03:17Z Rebidding for Concessions Klein, Michael ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE ASSET VALUATION ASSETS AUCTION BID BIDDERS BIDDING COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEBT FREE ENTRY HOSTILE TAKEOVER MARKET ENTRY MARKET POWER MEDIAN VOTERS NATURAL MONOPOLY NET WORTH PRICE SETTING PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING POLICY PROPERTY RIGHTS RETAIL RISK PREMIUM SHAREHOLDINGS SUSTAINABILITY TAKEOVER VOTERS WEALTH BIDDING CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS ECONOMIC COMPETITION The longer a concession lasts, the less effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms of the concession over its full life. Much more influential will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which under standard concessions are hard to settle by competition. It has been suggested that competition could be brought to bear by periodically reauctioning a concession, which would limit the potential for exercise of market power by concessionaires. If contracts can be well written and rebidding is practical, periodic reauctioning offers an effective solution to the natural monoply problem. Price regulation may no longer be necessary, and rebidding may help with contract adjustment. This Note examines the case for rebidding. 2012-08-13T15:18:02Z 2012-08-13T15:18:02Z 1998-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441574/rebidding-concessions Viewpoint. -- Note no. 161 (November 1998) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11524 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research |
institution |
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US |
component |
Bibliográfico |
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biblioteca |
region |
America del Norte |
libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
language |
English |
topic |
ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE ASSET VALUATION ASSETS AUCTION BID BIDDERS BIDDING COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEBT FREE ENTRY HOSTILE TAKEOVER MARKET ENTRY MARKET POWER MEDIAN VOTERS NATURAL MONOPOLY NET WORTH PRICE SETTING PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING POLICY PROPERTY RIGHTS RETAIL RISK PREMIUM SHAREHOLDINGS SUSTAINABILITY TAKEOVER VOTERS WEALTH BIDDING CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE ASSET VALUATION ASSETS AUCTION BID BIDDERS BIDDING COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEBT FREE ENTRY HOSTILE TAKEOVER MARKET ENTRY MARKET POWER MEDIAN VOTERS NATURAL MONOPOLY NET WORTH PRICE SETTING PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING POLICY PROPERTY RIGHTS RETAIL RISK PREMIUM SHAREHOLDINGS SUSTAINABILITY TAKEOVER VOTERS WEALTH BIDDING CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS ECONOMIC COMPETITION |
spellingShingle |
ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE ASSET VALUATION ASSETS AUCTION BID BIDDERS BIDDING COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEBT FREE ENTRY HOSTILE TAKEOVER MARKET ENTRY MARKET POWER MEDIAN VOTERS NATURAL MONOPOLY NET WORTH PRICE SETTING PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING POLICY PROPERTY RIGHTS RETAIL RISK PREMIUM SHAREHOLDINGS SUSTAINABILITY TAKEOVER VOTERS WEALTH BIDDING CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE ASSET VALUATION ASSETS AUCTION BID BIDDERS BIDDING COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEBT FREE ENTRY HOSTILE TAKEOVER MARKET ENTRY MARKET POWER MEDIAN VOTERS NATURAL MONOPOLY NET WORTH PRICE SETTING PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING POLICY PROPERTY RIGHTS RETAIL RISK PREMIUM SHAREHOLDINGS SUSTAINABILITY TAKEOVER VOTERS WEALTH BIDDING CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS ECONOMIC COMPETITION Klein, Michael Rebidding for Concessions |
description |
The longer a concession lasts, the less
effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms
of the concession over its full life. Much more influential
will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which
under standard concessions are hard to settle by
competition. It has been suggested that competition could be
brought to bear by periodically reauctioning a concession,
which would limit the potential for exercise of market power
by concessionaires. If contracts can be well written and
rebidding is practical, periodic reauctioning offers an
effective solution to the natural monoply problem. Price
regulation may no longer be necessary, and rebidding may
help with contract adjustment. This Note examines the case
for rebidding. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Viewpoint |
topic_facet |
ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE ASSET VALUATION ASSETS AUCTION BID BIDDERS BIDDING COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEBT FREE ENTRY HOSTILE TAKEOVER MARKET ENTRY MARKET POWER MEDIAN VOTERS NATURAL MONOPOLY NET WORTH PRICE SETTING PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING POLICY PROPERTY RIGHTS RETAIL RISK PREMIUM SHAREHOLDINGS SUSTAINABILITY TAKEOVER VOTERS WEALTH BIDDING CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS ECONOMIC COMPETITION |
author |
Klein, Michael |
author_facet |
Klein, Michael |
author_sort |
Klein, Michael |
title |
Rebidding for Concessions |
title_short |
Rebidding for Concessions |
title_full |
Rebidding for Concessions |
title_fullStr |
Rebidding for Concessions |
title_full_unstemmed |
Rebidding for Concessions |
title_sort |
rebidding for concessions |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
1998-11 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441574/rebidding-concessions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11524 |
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AT kleinmichael rebiddingforconcessions |
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