Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law
The note looks at effective anticorruption legal instruments. However, law enforcement measures are not the first or necessarily the preferred method of defense. An informed citizenry, a government imbued with a service ethic, and other measures can be more effective in combating corruption. But tailoring the law to improve enforcement capacity generally encompasses a variety of statutes that prohibit bribery, nepotism, conflicts of interest, and favoritism in the award of contract or the provision of government benefits. And writing such laws containing "bright-line rules" in contrast to those containing standards open to interpretation by enforcement agencies may make it easier to monitor compliance and enforcement, but also rob the law of flexibility. Such laws often must be simplified to the point of arbitrariness-making them harder to accept than broadly-worded standards, which often conform to intuitive social understandings. The cost of bright-line rules are often more than offset by their deterrence value and their value in facilitating monitoring in countries with weak enforcement agencies. However, no statute can avoid some open-textured provisions. When a section in an anticorruption law must leave something open to question, one way to reduce enforcers' discretion is to establish a procedure for obtaining advance rulings. Finally, the author recommends laws that help bring corruption to light, such as a freedom of information law.
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dig-okr-10986113622024-08-08T17:51:53Z Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law Messick, Richard E. Kleinfeld, Rachel CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS CORRUPT PRACTICES BRIBERY CIVIL SOCIETY ETHICS ENFORCEMENT POWERS CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS CONFLICT OF INTERESTS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE LEGAL REFORM NEPOTISM CORRUPT PRACTICES SYSTEMIC REFORM ADVISORY ROLES FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACCESS TO INFORMATION INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACTIONS ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION LAWS ANTICORRUPTION LEGISLATION ANTICORRUPTION WORK AUTHORITY AWARD OF CONTRACTS BRIBERY BRIBES CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CRIME DEMOCRACY DISCRETION ETHICS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES JUSTICE LAWYER LEGAL ASPECTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL INSTITUTIONS LEGAL REFORM LEGAL REFORMS MEDIA NATIONAL INTEGRITY NATIONAL LEGISLATION NATIONS NEPOTISM PRESIDENCY PROSECUTION PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC LAWS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVANTS PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REPRESENTATIVES RULINGS SECRECY TRANSPARENCY The note looks at effective anticorruption legal instruments. However, law enforcement measures are not the first or necessarily the preferred method of defense. An informed citizenry, a government imbued with a service ethic, and other measures can be more effective in combating corruption. But tailoring the law to improve enforcement capacity generally encompasses a variety of statutes that prohibit bribery, nepotism, conflicts of interest, and favoritism in the award of contract or the provision of government benefits. And writing such laws containing "bright-line rules" in contrast to those containing standards open to interpretation by enforcement agencies may make it easier to monitor compliance and enforcement, but also rob the law of flexibility. Such laws often must be simplified to the point of arbitrariness-making them harder to accept than broadly-worded standards, which often conform to intuitive social understandings. The cost of bright-line rules are often more than offset by their deterrence value and their value in facilitating monitoring in countries with weak enforcement agencies. However, no statute can avoid some open-textured provisions. When a section in an anticorruption law must leave something open to question, one way to reduce enforcers' discretion is to establish a procedure for obtaining advance rulings. Finally, the author recommends laws that help bring corruption to light, such as a freedom of information law. 2012-08-13T14:51:43Z 2012-08-13T14:51:43Z 2001-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/10/2011704/writing-effective-anticorruption-law https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11362 English PREM Notes; No. 58 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
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Banco Mundial |
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Estados Unidos |
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biblioteca |
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America del Norte |
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Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
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English |
topic |
CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS CORRUPT PRACTICES BRIBERY CIVIL SOCIETY ETHICS ENFORCEMENT POWERS CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS CONFLICT OF INTERESTS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE LEGAL REFORM NEPOTISM CORRUPT PRACTICES SYSTEMIC REFORM ADVISORY ROLES FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACCESS TO INFORMATION INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACTIONS ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION LAWS ANTICORRUPTION LEGISLATION ANTICORRUPTION WORK AUTHORITY AWARD OF CONTRACTS BRIBERY BRIBES CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CRIME DEMOCRACY DISCRETION ETHICS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES JUSTICE LAWYER LEGAL ASPECTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL INSTITUTIONS LEGAL REFORM LEGAL REFORMS MEDIA NATIONAL INTEGRITY NATIONAL LEGISLATION NATIONS NEPOTISM PRESIDENCY PROSECUTION PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC LAWS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVANTS PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REPRESENTATIVES RULINGS SECRECY TRANSPARENCY CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS CORRUPT PRACTICES BRIBERY CIVIL SOCIETY ETHICS ENFORCEMENT POWERS CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS CONFLICT OF INTERESTS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE LEGAL REFORM NEPOTISM CORRUPT PRACTICES SYSTEMIC REFORM ADVISORY ROLES FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACCESS TO INFORMATION INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACTIONS ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION LAWS ANTICORRUPTION LEGISLATION ANTICORRUPTION WORK AUTHORITY AWARD OF CONTRACTS BRIBERY BRIBES CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CRIME DEMOCRACY DISCRETION ETHICS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES JUSTICE LAWYER LEGAL ASPECTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL INSTITUTIONS LEGAL REFORM LEGAL REFORMS MEDIA NATIONAL INTEGRITY NATIONAL LEGISLATION NATIONS NEPOTISM PRESIDENCY PROSECUTION PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC LAWS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVANTS PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REPRESENTATIVES RULINGS SECRECY TRANSPARENCY |
spellingShingle |
CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS CORRUPT PRACTICES BRIBERY CIVIL SOCIETY ETHICS ENFORCEMENT POWERS CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS CONFLICT OF INTERESTS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE LEGAL REFORM NEPOTISM CORRUPT PRACTICES SYSTEMIC REFORM ADVISORY ROLES FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACCESS TO INFORMATION INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACTIONS ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION LAWS ANTICORRUPTION LEGISLATION ANTICORRUPTION WORK AUTHORITY AWARD OF CONTRACTS BRIBERY BRIBES CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CRIME DEMOCRACY DISCRETION ETHICS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES JUSTICE LAWYER LEGAL ASPECTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL INSTITUTIONS LEGAL REFORM LEGAL REFORMS MEDIA NATIONAL INTEGRITY NATIONAL LEGISLATION NATIONS NEPOTISM PRESIDENCY PROSECUTION PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC LAWS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVANTS PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REPRESENTATIVES RULINGS SECRECY TRANSPARENCY CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS CORRUPT PRACTICES BRIBERY CIVIL SOCIETY ETHICS ENFORCEMENT POWERS CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS CONFLICT OF INTERESTS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE LEGAL REFORM NEPOTISM CORRUPT PRACTICES SYSTEMIC REFORM ADVISORY ROLES FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACCESS TO INFORMATION INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACTIONS ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION LAWS ANTICORRUPTION LEGISLATION ANTICORRUPTION WORK AUTHORITY AWARD OF CONTRACTS BRIBERY BRIBES CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CRIME DEMOCRACY DISCRETION ETHICS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES JUSTICE LAWYER LEGAL ASPECTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL INSTITUTIONS LEGAL REFORM LEGAL REFORMS MEDIA NATIONAL INTEGRITY NATIONAL LEGISLATION NATIONS NEPOTISM PRESIDENCY PROSECUTION PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC LAWS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVANTS PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REPRESENTATIVES RULINGS SECRECY TRANSPARENCY Messick, Richard E. Kleinfeld, Rachel Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law |
description |
The note looks at effective
anticorruption legal instruments. However, law enforcement
measures are not the first or necessarily the preferred
method of defense. An informed citizenry, a government
imbued with a service ethic, and other measures can be more
effective in combating corruption. But tailoring the law to
improve enforcement capacity generally encompasses a variety
of statutes that prohibit bribery, nepotism, conflicts of
interest, and favoritism in the award of contract or the
provision of government benefits. And writing such laws
containing "bright-line rules" in contrast to
those containing standards open to interpretation by
enforcement agencies may make it easier to monitor
compliance and enforcement, but also rob the law of
flexibility. Such laws often must be simplified to the point
of arbitrariness-making them harder to accept than
broadly-worded standards, which often conform to intuitive
social understandings. The cost of bright-line rules are
often more than offset by their deterrence value and their
value in facilitating monitoring in countries with weak
enforcement agencies. However, no statute can avoid some
open-textured provisions. When a section in an
anticorruption law must leave something open to question,
one way to reduce enforcers' discretion is to establish
a procedure for obtaining advance rulings. Finally, the
author recommends laws that help bring corruption to light,
such as a freedom of information law. |
topic_facet |
CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS CORRUPT PRACTICES BRIBERY CIVIL SOCIETY ETHICS ENFORCEMENT POWERS CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS CONFLICT OF INTERESTS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE LEGAL REFORM NEPOTISM CORRUPT PRACTICES SYSTEMIC REFORM ADVISORY ROLES FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACCESS TO INFORMATION INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACTIONS ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION LAWS ANTICORRUPTION LEGISLATION ANTICORRUPTION WORK AUTHORITY AWARD OF CONTRACTS BRIBERY BRIBES CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CRIME DEMOCRACY DISCRETION ETHICS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES JUSTICE LAWYER LEGAL ASPECTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL INSTITUTIONS LEGAL REFORM LEGAL REFORMS MEDIA NATIONAL INTEGRITY NATIONAL LEGISLATION NATIONS NEPOTISM PRESIDENCY PROSECUTION PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC LAWS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVANTS PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REPRESENTATIVES RULINGS SECRECY TRANSPARENCY |
author |
Messick, Richard E. Kleinfeld, Rachel |
author_facet |
Messick, Richard E. Kleinfeld, Rachel |
author_sort |
Messick, Richard E. |
title |
Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law |
title_short |
Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law |
title_full |
Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law |
title_fullStr |
Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law |
title_full_unstemmed |
Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law |
title_sort |
writing an effective anticorruption law |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2001-10 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/10/2011704/writing-effective-anticorruption-law https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11362 |
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