Leveling or Mining the Playing Field? Implementation Problems of Carbon-Motivated Border Adjustment Taxes
Climate change policies and trade policy are on a collision course. Border tax adjustments are at the center of the debate and are being considered in many Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, notably the United States and the European Union (EU). They will tax carbon emissions at the border with the aim of leveling the playing field between countries with different carbon emission limits. Border tax adjustments may be justified theoretically, but the challenges of implementation and its associated costs and incentives are a key determinant of the outcome. Implementation depends on complex administrative arrangements and controversial calculations of the embedded carbon in imported goods. Border tax adjustment schemes might mine rather than level the playing field. Implementation problems invite vested interests to influence the policy process and divert border adjustment taxes towards protectionist uses. Decision makers and academics alike have produced little evidence on implementation problems but appear to discuss the very complex border tax adjustment scheme with the implicit assumption that implementation problems can be solved if the need arises. The implementation problems are linked to the difficulties of calculating embedded carbon. This paper discusses a key question: how accurately can we measure embedded carbon and what will the inherent uncertainty do to trade policy when it triggers political economy forces?
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Language: | English |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2009-12
|
Subjects: | ALUMINUM, CALCULATION, CARBON, CARBON CONTENT, CARBON DIOXIDE, CARBON EMISSION, CARBON EMISSIONS, CARBON ENERGY, CARBON FOOTPRINT, CARBON LEAKAGE, CHEMICALS, CLIMATE, CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION, CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION, CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION PERSPECTIVE, CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS, CLIMATE POLICY, COPPER, ELECTRICITY, EMISSION, EMISSION LIMITS, EMISSIONS, ENERGY SOURCES, FEASIBILITY, FUEL, FUELS, GLOBAL EMISSIONS, GRAPHITE, GREENHOUSE, HEAVY INDUSTRY, IRON, LOW-CARBON, MANGANESE, NICKEL, NUCLEAR POWER, POLICY ADVICE, POLICY MAKERS, POTASSIUM, RAW MATERIALS, REFINERIES, SILICON, WIND, ZINC, |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/12/11684133/leveling-or-mining-playing-field-implementation-problems-carbon-motivated-border-adjustment-taxes https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11101 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Summary: | Climate change policies and trade policy
are on a collision course. Border tax adjustments are at the
center of the debate and are being considered in many
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries, notably the United States and the European
Union (EU). They will tax carbon emissions at the border
with the aim of leveling the playing field between countries
with different carbon emission limits. Border tax
adjustments may be justified theoretically, but the
challenges of implementation and its associated costs and
incentives are a key determinant of the outcome.
Implementation depends on complex administrative
arrangements and controversial calculations of the embedded
carbon in imported goods. Border tax adjustment schemes
might mine rather than level the playing field.
Implementation problems invite vested interests to influence
the policy process and divert border adjustment taxes
towards protectionist uses. Decision makers and academics
alike have produced little evidence on implementation
problems but appear to discuss the very complex border tax
adjustment scheme with the implicit assumption that
implementation problems can be solved if the need arises.
The implementation problems are linked to the difficulties
of calculating embedded carbon. This paper discusses a key
question: how accurately can we measure embedded carbon and
what will the inherent uncertainty do to trade policy when
it triggers political economy forces? |
---|