Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or imagerelated) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this “overjustification effect” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and more generally those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Format: | report biblioteca |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies
2006-04
|
Subjects: | Altruism, Rewards, Motivation, Esteem, Crowding Out, Overjustification Effect, Identity, Social Norms, Morals, Greed, Psychology, France, |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/55020 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
id |
dig-cornell-us-181355020 |
---|---|
record_format |
koha |
spelling |
dig-cornell-us-1813550202017-12-13T08:02:03Z Incentives and Prosocial Behavior Benabou, Roland Tirole, Jean Altruism Rewards Motivation Esteem Crowding Out Overjustification Effect Identity Social Norms Morals Greed Psychology France We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or imagerelated) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this “overjustification effect” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and more generally those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare. 2017-12-12T16:34:59Z 2017-12-12T16:34:59Z 2006-04 report https://hdl.handle.net/1813/55020 en_US application/pdf Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies |
institution |
CORNELL US |
collection |
DSpace |
country |
Estados Unidos |
countrycode |
US |
component |
Bibliográfico |
access |
En linea |
databasecode |
dig-cornell-us |
tag |
biblioteca |
region |
America del Norte |
libraryname |
Biblioteca de Cornell |
language |
en_US |
topic |
Altruism Rewards Motivation Esteem Crowding Out Overjustification Effect Identity Social Norms Morals Greed Psychology France Altruism Rewards Motivation Esteem Crowding Out Overjustification Effect Identity Social Norms Morals Greed Psychology France |
spellingShingle |
Altruism Rewards Motivation Esteem Crowding Out Overjustification Effect Identity Social Norms Morals Greed Psychology France Altruism Rewards Motivation Esteem Crowding Out Overjustification Effect Identity Social Norms Morals Greed Psychology France Benabou, Roland Tirole, Jean Incentives and Prosocial Behavior |
description |
We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or imagerelated) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this “overjustification effect” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and more generally those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare. |
format |
report |
topic_facet |
Altruism Rewards Motivation Esteem Crowding Out Overjustification Effect Identity Social Norms Morals Greed Psychology France |
author |
Benabou, Roland Tirole, Jean |
author_facet |
Benabou, Roland Tirole, Jean |
author_sort |
Benabou, Roland |
title |
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior |
title_short |
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior |
title_full |
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior |
title_fullStr |
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior |
title_full_unstemmed |
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior |
title_sort |
incentives and prosocial behavior |
publisher |
Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies |
publishDate |
2006-04 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/1813/55020 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT benabouroland incentivesandprosocialbehavior AT tirolejean incentivesandprosocialbehavior |
_version_ |
1762930949361762304 |