Job Security and the Age-Composition of Employment: Evidence from Chile
This paper develops a simple model to analyze the impact of tenure-based severance payments on firms' hiring and firing decisions. The findings are that under certain conditions, this feature leads to a Last-in First-out firing policy. Also, reforms that increase the slope of the severance-tenure profile tend to increase the probabilities of dismissal of low tenure workers.
Saved in:
Main Author: | Inter-American Development Bank |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Carmen Pagés |
Format: | Working Papers biblioteca |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Inter-American Development Bank
|
Subjects: | Productivity, E24 - Employment • Unemployment • Wages • Intergenerational Income Distribution • Aggregate Human Capital • Aggregate Labor Productivity, J23 - Labor Demand, J65 - Unemployment Insurance • Severance Pay • Plant Closings, WP-398, |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010721 https://publications.iadb.org/en/job-security-and-age-composition-employment-evidence-chile |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Similar Items
-
Who Benefits from Labor Market Regulations?: Chile 1960-1998
by: Inter-American Development Bank -
Unemployment Insurance and Search Effort in Chile
by: Inter-American Development Bank -
Who Suffers During Recessions in Brazil?
by: Inter-American Development Bank -
Healthier Firms for a Stronger Recovery: Policies to Support Business and Jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean
by: Inter-American Development Bank -
Productivity, Growth and Poverty in Mexico: What Follows Progress-Opportunities?
by: Inter-American Development Bank