Compliance and Accountability: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Argentina

Does compliance with low-cost civic duties increase demand for social accountability? We address this question by conducting a field experiment at train stations in Buenos Aires. We create exogenous variation in compliance with paying the public transportation fare by i) highlighting sanctions for non-compliance and ii) appealing to compliance norms whereby 90 percent of passengers pay the fare. We find that both sanctions and norms treatments raise compliance. However, only appeals to compliance norms make treated passengers more willing to sign a petition demanding quality public transportation serviceour measure of demand for social accountability. To probe the mechanisms explaining these patterns, we show that compliance invoked by adherence to norms makes subjects feel more entitled to demand accountability and trust the government to respect this right to a greater extent. Our findings suggest that raising compliance through appeals to social norms may thus have wider benefits for civic behaviors.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Inter-American Development Bank
Other Authors: Krzysztof Krakowski
Language:English
Published: Inter-American Development Bank
Subjects:Trust, Educational Institution, Public Transport, Taxation, Economy, Population Aging, Social Norm, Public Service, D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving, H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance, O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development, Compliance;accountability;Norms;Sanctions;Argentina,
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004967
https://publications.iadb.org/en/compliance-and-accountability-evidence-field-experiment-argentina
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
id dig-bid-node-33820
record_format koha
spelling dig-bid-node-338202023-06-28T21:18:01ZCompliance and Accountability: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Argentina 2023-06-22T00:06:00+0000 http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004967 https://publications.iadb.org/en/compliance-and-accountability-evidence-field-experiment-argentina Inter-American Development Bank Trust Educational Institution Public Transport Taxation Economy Population Aging Social Norm Public Service D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development Compliance;accountability;Norms;Sanctions;Argentina Does compliance with low-cost civic duties increase demand for social accountability? We address this question by conducting a field experiment at train stations in Buenos Aires. We create exogenous variation in compliance with paying the public transportation fare by i) highlighting sanctions for non-compliance and ii) appealing to compliance norms whereby 90 percent of passengers pay the fare. We find that both sanctions and norms treatments raise compliance. However, only appeals to compliance norms make treated passengers more willing to sign a petition demanding quality public transportation serviceour measure of demand for social accountability. To probe the mechanisms explaining these patterns, we show that compliance invoked by adherence to norms makes subjects feel more entitled to demand accountability and trust the government to respect this right to a greater extent. Our findings suggest that raising compliance through appeals to social norms may thus have wider benefits for civic behaviors. Inter-American Development Bank Krzysztof Krakowski Lucas Ronconi IDB Publications Argentina en
institution BID
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-bid
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca Felipe Herrera del BID
language English
topic Trust
Educational Institution
Public Transport
Taxation
Economy
Population Aging
Social Norm
Public Service
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Compliance;accountability;Norms;Sanctions;Argentina
Trust
Educational Institution
Public Transport
Taxation
Economy
Population Aging
Social Norm
Public Service
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Compliance;accountability;Norms;Sanctions;Argentina
spellingShingle Trust
Educational Institution
Public Transport
Taxation
Economy
Population Aging
Social Norm
Public Service
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Compliance;accountability;Norms;Sanctions;Argentina
Trust
Educational Institution
Public Transport
Taxation
Economy
Population Aging
Social Norm
Public Service
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Compliance;accountability;Norms;Sanctions;Argentina
Inter-American Development Bank
Compliance and Accountability: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Argentina
description Does compliance with low-cost civic duties increase demand for social accountability? We address this question by conducting a field experiment at train stations in Buenos Aires. We create exogenous variation in compliance with paying the public transportation fare by i) highlighting sanctions for non-compliance and ii) appealing to compliance norms whereby 90 percent of passengers pay the fare. We find that both sanctions and norms treatments raise compliance. However, only appeals to compliance norms make treated passengers more willing to sign a petition demanding quality public transportation serviceour measure of demand for social accountability. To probe the mechanisms explaining these patterns, we show that compliance invoked by adherence to norms makes subjects feel more entitled to demand accountability and trust the government to respect this right to a greater extent. Our findings suggest that raising compliance through appeals to social norms may thus have wider benefits for civic behaviors.
author2 Krzysztof Krakowski
author_facet Krzysztof Krakowski
Inter-American Development Bank
topic_facet Trust
Educational Institution
Public Transport
Taxation
Economy
Population Aging
Social Norm
Public Service
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Compliance;accountability;Norms;Sanctions;Argentina
author Inter-American Development Bank
author_sort Inter-American Development Bank
title Compliance and Accountability: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Argentina
title_short Compliance and Accountability: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Argentina
title_full Compliance and Accountability: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Argentina
title_fullStr Compliance and Accountability: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Argentina
title_full_unstemmed Compliance and Accountability: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Argentina
title_sort compliance and accountability: evidence from a field experiment in argentina
publisher Inter-American Development Bank
url http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004967
https://publications.iadb.org/en/compliance-and-accountability-evidence-field-experiment-argentina
work_keys_str_mv AT interamericandevelopmentbank complianceandaccountabilityevidencefromafieldexperimentinargentina
_version_ 1806237948647047168