Post-electoral Promises and Trust in Government: A Survey Experiment on Signaling

Transparency initiatives are well-known tools introduced to foster trust and empower citizens. To explain why some governments introduce them but others do not, in a theoretical model we interpret these initiatives as a signal that complements the information already provided by visible government performance. To analyze how citizens react to these initiatives, we conducted a randomized survey experiment in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina, where the incumbent mayor made a set of post-electoral promises. Our results show that post-electoral promises matter in shaping citizens perceptions about the trustworthiness of the government. We find strong heterogeneity among three groups of citizens. A group unfamiliar with the policy was impervious to treatment: they seem to react to deeds, not words, and have low trust on average. The treatment effects are entirely through those vaguely familiar with the promises, closing the average gap in trust with those familiar with the promises. More generally, our study suggests that transparency initiatives may be an effective signal in a setting with some initial trust. Still their informational value may be more limited than visible public performance.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Inter-American Development Bank
Other Authors: Susana Otálvaro-Ramírez
Language:English
Published: Inter-American Development Bank
Subjects:Transparency and Anticorruption, Trust, Political Trust, Public Good, Knowledge, Political Economy, Learning, Economy, Population Aging, Rating, D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior, D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation, D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness,
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004811
https://publications.iadb.org/en/post-electoral-promises-and-trust-government-survey-experiment-signaling
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spelling dig-bid-node-334422023-03-31T17:42:16ZPost-electoral Promises and Trust in Government: A Survey Experiment on Signaling 2023-03-29T00:03:00+0000 http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004811 https://publications.iadb.org/en/post-electoral-promises-and-trust-government-survey-experiment-signaling Inter-American Development Bank Transparency and Anticorruption Trust Political Trust Public Good Knowledge Political Economy Learning Economy Population Aging Rating D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness Transparency initiatives are well-known tools introduced to foster trust and empower citizens. To explain why some governments introduce them but others do not, in a theoretical model we interpret these initiatives as a signal that complements the information already provided by visible government performance. To analyze how citizens react to these initiatives, we conducted a randomized survey experiment in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina, where the incumbent mayor made a set of post-electoral promises. Our results show that post-electoral promises matter in shaping citizens perceptions about the trustworthiness of the government. We find strong heterogeneity among three groups of citizens. A group unfamiliar with the policy was impervious to treatment: they seem to react to deeds, not words, and have low trust on average. The treatment effects are entirely through those vaguely familiar with the promises, closing the average gap in trust with those familiar with the promises. More generally, our study suggests that transparency initiatives may be an effective signal in a setting with some initial trust. Still their informational value may be more limited than visible public performance. Inter-American Development Bank Susana Otálvaro-Ramírez Carlos Scartascini Jorge M. Streb IDB Publications en
institution BID
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-bid
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca Felipe Herrera del BID
language English
topic Transparency and Anticorruption
Trust
Political Trust
Public Good
Knowledge
Political Economy
Learning
Economy
Population Aging
Rating
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
Transparency and Anticorruption
Trust
Political Trust
Public Good
Knowledge
Political Economy
Learning
Economy
Population Aging
Rating
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
spellingShingle Transparency and Anticorruption
Trust
Political Trust
Public Good
Knowledge
Political Economy
Learning
Economy
Population Aging
Rating
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
Transparency and Anticorruption
Trust
Political Trust
Public Good
Knowledge
Political Economy
Learning
Economy
Population Aging
Rating
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
Inter-American Development Bank
Post-electoral Promises and Trust in Government: A Survey Experiment on Signaling
description Transparency initiatives are well-known tools introduced to foster trust and empower citizens. To explain why some governments introduce them but others do not, in a theoretical model we interpret these initiatives as a signal that complements the information already provided by visible government performance. To analyze how citizens react to these initiatives, we conducted a randomized survey experiment in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina, where the incumbent mayor made a set of post-electoral promises. Our results show that post-electoral promises matter in shaping citizens perceptions about the trustworthiness of the government. We find strong heterogeneity among three groups of citizens. A group unfamiliar with the policy was impervious to treatment: they seem to react to deeds, not words, and have low trust on average. The treatment effects are entirely through those vaguely familiar with the promises, closing the average gap in trust with those familiar with the promises. More generally, our study suggests that transparency initiatives may be an effective signal in a setting with some initial trust. Still their informational value may be more limited than visible public performance.
author2 Susana Otálvaro-Ramírez
author_facet Susana Otálvaro-Ramírez
Inter-American Development Bank
topic_facet Transparency and Anticorruption
Trust
Political Trust
Public Good
Knowledge
Political Economy
Learning
Economy
Population Aging
Rating
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
author Inter-American Development Bank
author_sort Inter-American Development Bank
title Post-electoral Promises and Trust in Government: A Survey Experiment on Signaling
title_short Post-electoral Promises and Trust in Government: A Survey Experiment on Signaling
title_full Post-electoral Promises and Trust in Government: A Survey Experiment on Signaling
title_fullStr Post-electoral Promises and Trust in Government: A Survey Experiment on Signaling
title_full_unstemmed Post-electoral Promises and Trust in Government: A Survey Experiment on Signaling
title_sort post-electoral promises and trust in government: a survey experiment on signaling
publisher Inter-American Development Bank
url http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004811
https://publications.iadb.org/en/post-electoral-promises-and-trust-government-survey-experiment-signaling
work_keys_str_mv AT interamericandevelopmentbank postelectoralpromisesandtrustingovernmentasurveyexperimentonsignaling
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