Evaluation of the Inter-American Development Bank's Governance

The evaluation's objective was to assess the extent to which the IDB's governance arrangements allow it to operate effectively and efficiently while providing sufficient accountability, transparency, and stakeholder voice in decision-making. The analysis covered the period from the IDB's establishment in 1959 to September 2020, with special attention paid to the last decade. The evaluation focused on the Bank's governing bodies (the Board of Governors, Board of Executive Directors, and Senior Management) and drew conclusions and recommendations on structural problems affecting the IDB's governance. The evaluation found that the Bank's governance arrangements, in general, have allowed the institution and its governing bodies to function adequately. Nonetheless, OVE identified certain factors that hinder the effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability of the Bank's governing bodies and exacerbate the natural information asymmetries stemming from the principal-agent relationship that exists between the governing bodies, giving rise to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. These factors include the lack of clear delineation of the roles and responsibilities of the governing bodies, leading to gaps, duplications, and tensions. Moreover, the selection process of the members of the Board of Executive Directors, under the authority of the different member countries, does not ensure that, as a group, this body has the skills and experience necessary to perform all of its fiduciary responsibilities. The high turnover rate of Executive Directors (among the highest for multilaterals) and their weak onboarding program create knowledge gaps and loss of institutional memory at the Board level that exacerbate this issue. At the same time, there are deficiencies in the agenda setting and meeting management of the various governance bodies, as well as problems in Board members' access to relevant information. The Secretary of the Bank's exclusive line of reporting to the Presidency contributes to these issues. Finally, OVE identified two additional elements that hinder accountability and exacerbate conflicts of interest. The first is the absence of a comprehensive accountability framework for Senior Management and of a self-evaluation mechanism for the Board of Executive Directors. The second is that the Bank's President is elected by the Board of Governors (not by the Board of Executive Directors) and serves as the chair of the Board of Executive Directors, complicating the Board of Executive Directors' ability to hold Senior Management accountable for its commitments, actions, and conduct. Based on the evaluation's findings, OVE made 12 recommendations aimed at addressing the identified structural issues that hinder the effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability of the Bank's governance. The Board of Executive Directors welcomed this important evaluation and endorsed all the recommendations.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Inter-American Development Bank
Other Authors: Jonathan Rose
Language:English
Published: Inter-American Development Bank
Subjects:Governance, Monitoring and Evaluation, Corporate Evaluation, H83 - Public Administration • Public Sector Accounting and Audits,
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004486
https://publications.iadb.org/en/evaluation-inter-american-development-banks-governance
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
id dig-bid-node-32704
record_format koha
spelling dig-bid-node-327042023-03-16T18:42:30ZEvaluation of the Inter-American Development Bank's Governance 2022-06-30T00:06:00+0000 http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004486 https://publications.iadb.org/en/evaluation-inter-american-development-banks-governance Inter-American Development Bank Governance Monitoring and Evaluation Corporate Evaluation H83 - Public Administration • Public Sector Accounting and Audits The evaluation's objective was to assess the extent to which the IDB's governance arrangements allow it to operate effectively and efficiently while providing sufficient accountability, transparency, and stakeholder voice in decision-making. The analysis covered the period from the IDB's establishment in 1959 to September 2020, with special attention paid to the last decade. The evaluation focused on the Bank's governing bodies (the Board of Governors, Board of Executive Directors, and Senior Management) and drew conclusions and recommendations on structural problems affecting the IDB's governance. The evaluation found that the Bank's governance arrangements, in general, have allowed the institution and its governing bodies to function adequately. Nonetheless, OVE identified certain factors that hinder the effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability of the Bank's governing bodies and exacerbate the natural information asymmetries stemming from the principal-agent relationship that exists between the governing bodies, giving rise to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. These factors include the lack of clear delineation of the roles and responsibilities of the governing bodies, leading to gaps, duplications, and tensions. Moreover, the selection process of the members of the Board of Executive Directors, under the authority of the different member countries, does not ensure that, as a group, this body has the skills and experience necessary to perform all of its fiduciary responsibilities. The high turnover rate of Executive Directors (among the highest for multilaterals) and their weak onboarding program create knowledge gaps and loss of institutional memory at the Board level that exacerbate this issue. At the same time, there are deficiencies in the agenda setting and meeting management of the various governance bodies, as well as problems in Board members' access to relevant information. The Secretary of the Bank's exclusive line of reporting to the Presidency contributes to these issues. Finally, OVE identified two additional elements that hinder accountability and exacerbate conflicts of interest. The first is the absence of a comprehensive accountability framework for Senior Management and of a self-evaluation mechanism for the Board of Executive Directors. The second is that the Bank's President is elected by the Board of Governors (not by the Board of Executive Directors) and serves as the chair of the Board of Executive Directors, complicating the Board of Executive Directors' ability to hold Senior Management accountable for its commitments, actions, and conduct. Based on the evaluation's findings, OVE made 12 recommendations aimed at addressing the identified structural issues that hinder the effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability of the Bank's governance. The Board of Executive Directors welcomed this important evaluation and endorsed all the recommendations. Inter-American Development Bank Jonathan Rose Josette Arévalo Thaís Soares Andreia Barcellos Ruben Lamdany Ernst & Young International Food Policy Research Institute Dennis Leech IDB Publications en
institution BID
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-bid
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca Felipe Herrera del BID
language English
topic Governance
Monitoring and Evaluation
Corporate Evaluation
H83 - Public Administration • Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Governance
Monitoring and Evaluation
Corporate Evaluation
H83 - Public Administration • Public Sector Accounting and Audits
spellingShingle Governance
Monitoring and Evaluation
Corporate Evaluation
H83 - Public Administration • Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Governance
Monitoring and Evaluation
Corporate Evaluation
H83 - Public Administration • Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Inter-American Development Bank
Evaluation of the Inter-American Development Bank's Governance
description The evaluation's objective was to assess the extent to which the IDB's governance arrangements allow it to operate effectively and efficiently while providing sufficient accountability, transparency, and stakeholder voice in decision-making. The analysis covered the period from the IDB's establishment in 1959 to September 2020, with special attention paid to the last decade. The evaluation focused on the Bank's governing bodies (the Board of Governors, Board of Executive Directors, and Senior Management) and drew conclusions and recommendations on structural problems affecting the IDB's governance. The evaluation found that the Bank's governance arrangements, in general, have allowed the institution and its governing bodies to function adequately. Nonetheless, OVE identified certain factors that hinder the effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability of the Bank's governing bodies and exacerbate the natural information asymmetries stemming from the principal-agent relationship that exists between the governing bodies, giving rise to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. These factors include the lack of clear delineation of the roles and responsibilities of the governing bodies, leading to gaps, duplications, and tensions. Moreover, the selection process of the members of the Board of Executive Directors, under the authority of the different member countries, does not ensure that, as a group, this body has the skills and experience necessary to perform all of its fiduciary responsibilities. The high turnover rate of Executive Directors (among the highest for multilaterals) and their weak onboarding program create knowledge gaps and loss of institutional memory at the Board level that exacerbate this issue. At the same time, there are deficiencies in the agenda setting and meeting management of the various governance bodies, as well as problems in Board members' access to relevant information. The Secretary of the Bank's exclusive line of reporting to the Presidency contributes to these issues. Finally, OVE identified two additional elements that hinder accountability and exacerbate conflicts of interest. The first is the absence of a comprehensive accountability framework for Senior Management and of a self-evaluation mechanism for the Board of Executive Directors. The second is that the Bank's President is elected by the Board of Governors (not by the Board of Executive Directors) and serves as the chair of the Board of Executive Directors, complicating the Board of Executive Directors' ability to hold Senior Management accountable for its commitments, actions, and conduct. Based on the evaluation's findings, OVE made 12 recommendations aimed at addressing the identified structural issues that hinder the effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability of the Bank's governance. The Board of Executive Directors welcomed this important evaluation and endorsed all the recommendations.
author2 Jonathan Rose
author_facet Jonathan Rose
Inter-American Development Bank
topic_facet Governance
Monitoring and Evaluation
Corporate Evaluation
H83 - Public Administration • Public Sector Accounting and Audits
author Inter-American Development Bank
author_sort Inter-American Development Bank
title Evaluation of the Inter-American Development Bank's Governance
title_short Evaluation of the Inter-American Development Bank's Governance
title_full Evaluation of the Inter-American Development Bank's Governance
title_fullStr Evaluation of the Inter-American Development Bank's Governance
title_full_unstemmed Evaluation of the Inter-American Development Bank's Governance
title_sort evaluation of the inter-american development bank's governance
publisher Inter-American Development Bank
url http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004486
https://publications.iadb.org/en/evaluation-inter-american-development-banks-governance
work_keys_str_mv AT interamericandevelopmentbank evaluationoftheinteramericandevelopmentbanksgovernance
_version_ 1806237876406452224