Chasing Informality: Evidence from Increasing Enforcement in Large Firms in Peru

Evasion of labor market regulations in middle income countries is systemic. This is generally known as informality. In Latin America, where less than 50% of workers are registered with social security, this is a permanent phenomenon and encompasses a variety of economic realities ranging from subsistence self-employment to evasion of certain regulations including social security contributions. In this study we analyze the role of enforcement in curbing informality in large formal firms in Peru, where informality levels are around 70%. Through the Peruvian National Labor Control Superintendence (SUNAFIL) we randomly sent 697 letters to formal Peruvian firms of more than 50 workers, indicating their obligation to enroll workers in social insurance systems (health and pensions). Two types of letters were sent, one with a deterrence message and one emphasizing the benefits of formalization. One year after the letters were sent, we found a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of workers enrolled in social security (9.8% on average). Only strict deterrence messages had a significant impact, and only in very large firms. This evidence suggests that there is room for improvement in compliance with labor regulations through more proactive monitoring and behavioral tools such as reminders, but effects could be concentrated in the largest firms.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Inter-American Development Bank
Other Authors: Mariano Bosch
Language:English
Published: Inter-American Development Bank
Subjects:Taxation, Social Security, Labor Legislation, Behavioral Economics, Labor Force, Informal Labor, Social Norm, Payroll, C93 - Field Experiments, O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements, D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving, H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions, J46 - Informal Labor Markets, Informality;Social security;randomized controlled trial;Audit;Letters;Labor formalization,
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003128
https://publications.iadb.org/en/chasing-informality-evidence-increasing-enforcement-large-firms-peru
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spelling dig-bid-node-299092021-03-24T16:47:53ZChasing Informality: Evidence from Increasing Enforcement in Large Firms in Peru 2021-03-23T00:00:00+0000 http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003128 https://publications.iadb.org/en/chasing-informality-evidence-increasing-enforcement-large-firms-peru Inter-American Development Bank Taxation Social Security Labor Legislation Behavioral Economics Labor Force Informal Labor Social Norm Payroll C93 - Field Experiments O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions J46 - Informal Labor Markets Informality;Social security;randomized controlled trial;Audit;Letters;Labor formalization Evasion of labor market regulations in middle income countries is systemic. This is generally known as informality. In Latin America, where less than 50% of workers are registered with social security, this is a permanent phenomenon and encompasses a variety of economic realities ranging from subsistence self-employment to evasion of certain regulations including social security contributions. In this study we analyze the role of enforcement in curbing informality in large formal firms in Peru, where informality levels are around 70%. Through the Peruvian National Labor Control Superintendence (SUNAFIL) we randomly sent 697 letters to formal Peruvian firms of more than 50 workers, indicating their obligation to enroll workers in social insurance systems (health and pensions). Two types of letters were sent, one with a deterrence message and one emphasizing the benefits of formalization. One year after the letters were sent, we found a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of workers enrolled in social security (9.8% on average). Only strict deterrence messages had a significant impact, and only in very large firms. This evidence suggests that there is room for improvement in compliance with labor regulations through more proactive monitoring and behavioral tools such as reminders, but effects could be concentrated in the largest firms. Inter-American Development Bank Mariano Bosch Stephanie González María Teresa Silva Porto application/pdf IDB Publications Peru en
institution BID
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-bid
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca Felipe Herrera del BID
language English
topic Taxation
Social Security
Labor Legislation
Behavioral Economics
Labor Force
Informal Labor
Social Norm
Payroll
C93 - Field Experiments
O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
J46 - Informal Labor Markets
Informality;Social security;randomized controlled trial;Audit;Letters;Labor formalization
Taxation
Social Security
Labor Legislation
Behavioral Economics
Labor Force
Informal Labor
Social Norm
Payroll
C93 - Field Experiments
O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
J46 - Informal Labor Markets
Informality;Social security;randomized controlled trial;Audit;Letters;Labor formalization
spellingShingle Taxation
Social Security
Labor Legislation
Behavioral Economics
Labor Force
Informal Labor
Social Norm
Payroll
C93 - Field Experiments
O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
J46 - Informal Labor Markets
Informality;Social security;randomized controlled trial;Audit;Letters;Labor formalization
Taxation
Social Security
Labor Legislation
Behavioral Economics
Labor Force
Informal Labor
Social Norm
Payroll
C93 - Field Experiments
O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
J46 - Informal Labor Markets
Informality;Social security;randomized controlled trial;Audit;Letters;Labor formalization
Inter-American Development Bank
Chasing Informality: Evidence from Increasing Enforcement in Large Firms in Peru
description Evasion of labor market regulations in middle income countries is systemic. This is generally known as informality. In Latin America, where less than 50% of workers are registered with social security, this is a permanent phenomenon and encompasses a variety of economic realities ranging from subsistence self-employment to evasion of certain regulations including social security contributions. In this study we analyze the role of enforcement in curbing informality in large formal firms in Peru, where informality levels are around 70%. Through the Peruvian National Labor Control Superintendence (SUNAFIL) we randomly sent 697 letters to formal Peruvian firms of more than 50 workers, indicating their obligation to enroll workers in social insurance systems (health and pensions). Two types of letters were sent, one with a deterrence message and one emphasizing the benefits of formalization. One year after the letters were sent, we found a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of workers enrolled in social security (9.8% on average). Only strict deterrence messages had a significant impact, and only in very large firms. This evidence suggests that there is room for improvement in compliance with labor regulations through more proactive monitoring and behavioral tools such as reminders, but effects could be concentrated in the largest firms.
author2 Mariano Bosch
author_facet Mariano Bosch
Inter-American Development Bank
topic_facet Taxation
Social Security
Labor Legislation
Behavioral Economics
Labor Force
Informal Labor
Social Norm
Payroll
C93 - Field Experiments
O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
J46 - Informal Labor Markets
Informality;Social security;randomized controlled trial;Audit;Letters;Labor formalization
author Inter-American Development Bank
author_sort Inter-American Development Bank
title Chasing Informality: Evidence from Increasing Enforcement in Large Firms in Peru
title_short Chasing Informality: Evidence from Increasing Enforcement in Large Firms in Peru
title_full Chasing Informality: Evidence from Increasing Enforcement in Large Firms in Peru
title_fullStr Chasing Informality: Evidence from Increasing Enforcement in Large Firms in Peru
title_full_unstemmed Chasing Informality: Evidence from Increasing Enforcement in Large Firms in Peru
title_sort chasing informality: evidence from increasing enforcement in large firms in peru
publisher Inter-American Development Bank
url http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003128
https://publications.iadb.org/en/chasing-informality-evidence-increasing-enforcement-large-firms-peru
work_keys_str_mv AT interamericandevelopmentbank chasinginformalityevidencefromincreasingenforcementinlargefirmsinperu
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