A Playground for Tax Compliance?: Testing Fiscal Exchange in an RCT in Argentina

We present new evidence that a non-threatening behavioral intervention appealing to reciprocity significantly increases tax compliance in a setting (i.e., crisis-ridden Argentina) where one might least expect such an intervention to succeed. Prior research offers many examples of the efficacy of more threatening deterrence approaches. In contrast, field experimental evidence for non-deterrence nudges such as those appealing to taxpayers feelings of reciprocity (“fiscal exchange”) has been limited. This paper reports evidence from a randomized controlled trial with over 20,000 taxpayers in Argentina. A redesigned tax bill with fiscal exchange appeal increased payment rates of tax delinquents by about 20 percent, or almost 40 percent when the bills were delivered in person. With the fiscal exchange appeal, the new bill design elicited significantly more payments than without. The unfavorable economic crisis context in Argentina makes the impacts remarkable. We hypothesize that having children as beneficiaries, the visual form of the appeal, and the proximity between taxpayers and public services in the municipal setting have contributed to the positive compliance impacts.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Inter-American Development Bank
Other Authors: Huáscar Eguino
Language:English
Published: Inter-American Development Bank
Subjects:Fiscal Management, Randomized Controlled Trial, Public Finance, Tax Compliance, Taxpayer, Public Good, Public Service, Property Tax, C93 - Field Experiments, H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance, D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving, H71 - State and Local Taxation Subsidies and Revenue, D30 - Distribution: General, H31 - Household, Argentina;Field experiment;Tax compliance;fiscal exchange;nudge;randomizedcontrolled trial;local public finance,
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0002609
https://publications.iadb.org/en/a-playground-for-tax-compliance-testing-fiscal-exchange-in-an-rct-in-argentina
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spelling dig-bid-node-286962020-11-11T15:43:20ZA Playground for Tax Compliance?: Testing Fiscal Exchange in an RCT in Argentina 2020-08-26T00:00:00+0000 http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0002609 https://publications.iadb.org/en/a-playground-for-tax-compliance-testing-fiscal-exchange-in-an-rct-in-argentina Inter-American Development Bank Fiscal Management Randomized Controlled Trial Public Finance Tax Compliance Taxpayer Public Good Public Service Property Tax C93 - Field Experiments H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving H71 - State and Local Taxation Subsidies and Revenue D30 - Distribution: General H31 - Household Argentina;Field experiment;Tax compliance;fiscal exchange;nudge;randomizedcontrolled trial;local public finance We present new evidence that a non-threatening behavioral intervention appealing to reciprocity significantly increases tax compliance in a setting (i.e., crisis-ridden Argentina) where one might least expect such an intervention to succeed. Prior research offers many examples of the efficacy of more threatening deterrence approaches. In contrast, field experimental evidence for non-deterrence nudges such as those appealing to taxpayers feelings of reciprocity (“fiscal exchange”) has been limited. This paper reports evidence from a randomized controlled trial with over 20,000 taxpayers in Argentina. A redesigned tax bill with fiscal exchange appeal increased payment rates of tax delinquents by about 20 percent, or almost 40 percent when the bills were delivered in person. With the fiscal exchange appeal, the new bill design elicited significantly more payments than without. The unfavorable economic crisis context in Argentina makes the impacts remarkable. We hypothesize that having children as beneficiaries, the visual form of the appeal, and the proximity between taxpayers and public services in the municipal setting have contributed to the positive compliance impacts. Inter-American Development Bank Huáscar Eguino Simeon Schächtele application/pdf IDB Publications Argentina en
institution BID
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-bid
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca Felipe Herrera del BID
language English
topic Fiscal Management
Randomized Controlled Trial
Public Finance
Tax Compliance
Taxpayer
Public Good
Public Service
Property Tax
C93 - Field Experiments
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H71 - State and Local Taxation Subsidies and Revenue
D30 - Distribution: General
H31 - Household
Argentina;Field experiment;Tax compliance;fiscal exchange;nudge;randomizedcontrolled trial;local public finance
Fiscal Management
Randomized Controlled Trial
Public Finance
Tax Compliance
Taxpayer
Public Good
Public Service
Property Tax
C93 - Field Experiments
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H71 - State and Local Taxation Subsidies and Revenue
D30 - Distribution: General
H31 - Household
Argentina;Field experiment;Tax compliance;fiscal exchange;nudge;randomizedcontrolled trial;local public finance
spellingShingle Fiscal Management
Randomized Controlled Trial
Public Finance
Tax Compliance
Taxpayer
Public Good
Public Service
Property Tax
C93 - Field Experiments
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H71 - State and Local Taxation Subsidies and Revenue
D30 - Distribution: General
H31 - Household
Argentina;Field experiment;Tax compliance;fiscal exchange;nudge;randomizedcontrolled trial;local public finance
Fiscal Management
Randomized Controlled Trial
Public Finance
Tax Compliance
Taxpayer
Public Good
Public Service
Property Tax
C93 - Field Experiments
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H71 - State and Local Taxation Subsidies and Revenue
D30 - Distribution: General
H31 - Household
Argentina;Field experiment;Tax compliance;fiscal exchange;nudge;randomizedcontrolled trial;local public finance
Inter-American Development Bank
A Playground for Tax Compliance?: Testing Fiscal Exchange in an RCT in Argentina
description We present new evidence that a non-threatening behavioral intervention appealing to reciprocity significantly increases tax compliance in a setting (i.e., crisis-ridden Argentina) where one might least expect such an intervention to succeed. Prior research offers many examples of the efficacy of more threatening deterrence approaches. In contrast, field experimental evidence for non-deterrence nudges such as those appealing to taxpayers feelings of reciprocity (“fiscal exchange”) has been limited. This paper reports evidence from a randomized controlled trial with over 20,000 taxpayers in Argentina. A redesigned tax bill with fiscal exchange appeal increased payment rates of tax delinquents by about 20 percent, or almost 40 percent when the bills were delivered in person. With the fiscal exchange appeal, the new bill design elicited significantly more payments than without. The unfavorable economic crisis context in Argentina makes the impacts remarkable. We hypothesize that having children as beneficiaries, the visual form of the appeal, and the proximity between taxpayers and public services in the municipal setting have contributed to the positive compliance impacts.
author2 Huáscar Eguino
author_facet Huáscar Eguino
Inter-American Development Bank
topic_facet Fiscal Management
Randomized Controlled Trial
Public Finance
Tax Compliance
Taxpayer
Public Good
Public Service
Property Tax
C93 - Field Experiments
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
H71 - State and Local Taxation Subsidies and Revenue
D30 - Distribution: General
H31 - Household
Argentina;Field experiment;Tax compliance;fiscal exchange;nudge;randomizedcontrolled trial;local public finance
author Inter-American Development Bank
author_sort Inter-American Development Bank
title A Playground for Tax Compliance?: Testing Fiscal Exchange in an RCT in Argentina
title_short A Playground for Tax Compliance?: Testing Fiscal Exchange in an RCT in Argentina
title_full A Playground for Tax Compliance?: Testing Fiscal Exchange in an RCT in Argentina
title_fullStr A Playground for Tax Compliance?: Testing Fiscal Exchange in an RCT in Argentina
title_full_unstemmed A Playground for Tax Compliance?: Testing Fiscal Exchange in an RCT in Argentina
title_sort playground for tax compliance?: testing fiscal exchange in an rct in argentina
publisher Inter-American Development Bank
url http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0002609
https://publications.iadb.org/en/a-playground-for-tax-compliance-testing-fiscal-exchange-in-an-rct-in-argentina
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