Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program
We analyze the effects on teacher retention and between school mobility of a program that rewards excellence in pedagogical practice in Chile. Teachers apply voluntarily for the award and those who succeed on a set of assessments receive a 6 percent annual wage increase for up to 10 years. We use a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of receiving the award. Using administrative data over several cohorts of applicants, our estimates indicate that locally the award does not alter transitions out of the school system. This suggests that around the threshold the skills rewarded by the program are not strongly correlated with the value of the teachers’ outside option. We observe, however, an increase in mobility within the school system among teachers that receive the award. These mobility patterns are consistent with the award providing a signal of teacher ability.
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Other Authors: | |
Format: | Working Papers biblioteca |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Inter-American Development Bank
|
Subjects: | Educational Institution, Teaching Effectiveness, Wage, Public School, Impact Evaluation, Regression Discontinuity Design, Wage Growth, I21 - Analysis of Education, J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets, J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs, M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects, Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers, |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0001159 https://publications.iadb.org/en/does-rewarding-pedagogical-excellence-keep-teachers-classroom-evidence-voluntary-award-program |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
id |
dig-bid-node-12989 |
---|---|
record_format |
koha |
spelling |
dig-bid-node-129892020-04-20T16:43:47ZDoes Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program 2018-06-13T00:00:00+0000 http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0001159 https://publications.iadb.org/en/does-rewarding-pedagogical-excellence-keep-teachers-classroom-evidence-voluntary-award-program Inter-American Development Bank Educational Institution Teaching Effectiveness Wage Public School Impact Evaluation Regression Discontinuity Design Wage Growth I21 - Analysis of Education J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers We analyze the effects on teacher retention and between school mobility of a program that rewards excellence in pedagogical practice in Chile. Teachers apply voluntarily for the award and those who succeed on a set of assessments receive a 6 percent annual wage increase for up to 10 years. We use a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of receiving the award. Using administrative data over several cohorts of applicants, our estimates indicate that locally the award does not alter transitions out of the school system. This suggests that around the threshold the skills rewarded by the program are not strongly correlated with the value of the teachers’ outside option. We observe, however, an increase in mobility within the school system among teachers that receive the award. These mobility patterns are consistent with the award providing a signal of teacher ability. Inter-American Development Bank Samuel Berlinski Working Papers application/pdf IDB Publications Chile en |
institution |
BID |
collection |
DSpace |
country |
Estados Unidos |
countrycode |
US |
component |
Bibliográfico |
access |
En linea |
databasecode |
dig-bid |
tag |
biblioteca |
region |
America del Norte |
libraryname |
Biblioteca Felipe Herrera del BID |
language |
English |
topic |
Educational Institution Teaching Effectiveness Wage Public School Impact Evaluation Regression Discontinuity Design Wage Growth I21 - Analysis of Education J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers Educational Institution Teaching Effectiveness Wage Public School Impact Evaluation Regression Discontinuity Design Wage Growth I21 - Analysis of Education J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers |
spellingShingle |
Educational Institution Teaching Effectiveness Wage Public School Impact Evaluation Regression Discontinuity Design Wage Growth I21 - Analysis of Education J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers Educational Institution Teaching Effectiveness Wage Public School Impact Evaluation Regression Discontinuity Design Wage Growth I21 - Analysis of Education J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers Inter-American Development Bank Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program |
description |
We analyze the effects on teacher retention and between school mobility of a program that rewards excellence in pedagogical practice in Chile. Teachers apply voluntarily for the award and those who succeed on a set of assessments receive a 6 percent annual wage increase for up to 10 years. We use a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of receiving the award. Using administrative data over several cohorts of applicants, our estimates indicate that locally the award does not alter transitions out of the school system. This suggests that around the threshold the skills rewarded by the program are not strongly correlated with the value of the teachers’ outside option. We observe, however, an increase in mobility within the school system among teachers that receive the award. These mobility patterns are consistent with the award providing a signal of teacher ability. |
author2 |
Samuel Berlinski |
author_facet |
Samuel Berlinski Inter-American Development Bank |
format |
Working Papers |
topic_facet |
Educational Institution Teaching Effectiveness Wage Public School Impact Evaluation Regression Discontinuity Design Wage Growth I21 - Analysis of Education J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers |
author |
Inter-American Development Bank |
author_sort |
Inter-American Development Bank |
title |
Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program |
title_short |
Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program |
title_full |
Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program |
title_fullStr |
Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program |
title_full_unstemmed |
Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program |
title_sort |
does rewarding pedagogical excellence keep teachers in the classroom?: evidence from a voluntary award program |
publisher |
Inter-American Development Bank |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0001159 https://publications.iadb.org/en/does-rewarding-pedagogical-excellence-keep-teachers-classroom-evidence-voluntary-award-program |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT interamericandevelopmentbank doesrewardingpedagogicalexcellencekeepteachersintheclassroomevidencefromavoluntaryawardprogram |
_version_ |
1809107463556825088 |