Pyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt
Using a large, original database of 385 politically connected firms under the Mubarak regime in Egypt, we document for the first time the negative impact of cronyism on economic growth. In the early 2000s, a policy shift in Egypt led to the expansion of crony activities into new, previously unconnected sectors. 4-digit sectors that experienced crony entry between 1996 and 2006 experienced lower aggregate employment growth during the period than those that did not. A wide array of supporting evidence indicates that this effect was causal, reflecting the mechanisms described in Aghion et al. (2001), and not due to selection. Crony entry skewed the distribution of employment toward smaller, less productive firms; crony firms did not enter into sectors that would have also grown more slowly even in the absence of crony entry; and they enjoyed multiple regulatory and fiscal privileges that reduced competition and investments by non-crony firms, including trade protection, energy subsidies, access to land, and favorable regulatory enforcement. Moreover, energy subsidies and trade protection account for the higher profits of politically connected firms.
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Subjects: | Firm Performance, Patronage, Productivity Growth, Industrial Productivity, Productivity Level, Economic Development, D24 - Production • Cost • Capital • Capital Total Factor and Multifactor Productivity • Capacity, D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior, O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth • Aggregate Productivity • Cross-Country Output Convergence, |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011766 https://publications.iadb.org/en/pyramid-capitalism-cronyism-regulation-and-firm-productivity-egypt |
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dig-bid-node-125532024-05-30T20:30:06ZPyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt 2016-10-05T00:00:00+0000 http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011766 https://publications.iadb.org/en/pyramid-capitalism-cronyism-regulation-and-firm-productivity-egypt Inter-American Development Bank Firm Performance Patronage Productivity Growth Industrial Productivity Productivity Level Economic Development D24 - Production • Cost • Capital • Capital Total Factor and Multifactor Productivity • Capacity D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth • Aggregate Productivity • Cross-Country Output Convergence Using a large, original database of 385 politically connected firms under the Mubarak regime in Egypt, we document for the first time the negative impact of cronyism on economic growth. In the early 2000s, a policy shift in Egypt led to the expansion of crony activities into new, previously unconnected sectors. 4-digit sectors that experienced crony entry between 1996 and 2006 experienced lower aggregate employment growth during the period than those that did not. A wide array of supporting evidence indicates that this effect was causal, reflecting the mechanisms described in Aghion et al. (2001), and not due to selection. Crony entry skewed the distribution of employment toward smaller, less productive firms; crony firms did not enter into sectors that would have also grown more slowly even in the absence of crony entry; and they enjoyed multiple regulatory and fiscal privileges that reduced competition and investments by non-crony firms, including trade protection, energy subsidies, access to land, and favorable regulatory enforcement. Moreover, energy subsidies and trade protection account for the higher profits of politically connected firms. Inter-American Development Bank Ishac Diwan Philip Keefer Marc Schiffbauer Working Papers application/pdf IDB Publications en |
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Firm Performance Patronage Productivity Growth Industrial Productivity Productivity Level Economic Development D24 - Production • Cost • Capital • Capital Total Factor and Multifactor Productivity • Capacity D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth • Aggregate Productivity • Cross-Country Output Convergence Firm Performance Patronage Productivity Growth Industrial Productivity Productivity Level Economic Development D24 - Production • Cost • Capital • Capital Total Factor and Multifactor Productivity • Capacity D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth • Aggregate Productivity • Cross-Country Output Convergence |
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Firm Performance Patronage Productivity Growth Industrial Productivity Productivity Level Economic Development D24 - Production • Cost • Capital • Capital Total Factor and Multifactor Productivity • Capacity D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth • Aggregate Productivity • Cross-Country Output Convergence Firm Performance Patronage Productivity Growth Industrial Productivity Productivity Level Economic Development D24 - Production • Cost • Capital • Capital Total Factor and Multifactor Productivity • Capacity D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth • Aggregate Productivity • Cross-Country Output Convergence Inter-American Development Bank Pyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |
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Using a large, original database of 385 politically connected firms under the Mubarak regime in Egypt, we document for the first time the negative impact of cronyism on economic growth. In the early 2000s, a policy shift in Egypt led to the expansion of crony activities into new, previously unconnected sectors. 4-digit sectors that experienced crony entry between 1996 and 2006 experienced lower aggregate employment growth during the period than those that did not. A wide array of supporting evidence indicates that this effect was causal, reflecting the mechanisms described in Aghion et al. (2001), and not due to selection. Crony entry skewed the distribution of employment toward smaller, less productive firms; crony firms did not enter into sectors that would have also grown more slowly even in the absence of crony entry; and they enjoyed multiple regulatory and fiscal privileges that reduced competition and investments by non-crony firms, including trade protection, energy subsidies, access to land, and favorable regulatory enforcement. Moreover, energy subsidies and trade protection account for the higher profits of politically connected firms. |
author2 |
Ishac Diwan |
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Ishac Diwan Inter-American Development Bank |
format |
Working Papers |
topic_facet |
Firm Performance Patronage Productivity Growth Industrial Productivity Productivity Level Economic Development D24 - Production • Cost • Capital • Capital Total Factor and Multifactor Productivity • Capacity D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth • Aggregate Productivity • Cross-Country Output Convergence |
author |
Inter-American Development Bank |
author_sort |
Inter-American Development Bank |
title |
Pyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |
title_short |
Pyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |
title_full |
Pyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |
title_fullStr |
Pyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |
title_full_unstemmed |
Pyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt |
title_sort |
pyramid capitalism: cronyism, regulation, and firm productivity in egypt |
publisher |
Inter-American Development Bank |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011766 https://publications.iadb.org/en/pyramid-capitalism-cronyism-regulation-and-firm-productivity-egypt |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT interamericandevelopmentbank pyramidcapitalismcronyismregulationandfirmproductivityinegypt |
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1809107346313445376 |