Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?
Veto player theory argues that a higher number of veto players lowers the likelihood of change; in turn, policies that do not change help to sustain commitments but may prevent adaptation to changing circumstances. This paper challenges that claim of veto player theory by arguing that policy stability does not necessarily mean lower policy adaptability. If policymaking takes place over time with actors interacting repeatedly, more cooperative polities might be able to achieve both objectives at once, and a higher number of veto players might even favor intertemporal cooperation. The paper presents a simple formalization of the argument and some supportive cross-national empirical evidence.
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| Format: | Working Papers biblioteca |
| Language: | English |
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Inter-American Development Bank
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| Subjects: | Public Administration, Democracy, democracy, political planning, comparative government, veto player theory, |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011288 https://publications.iadb.org/en/veto-players-intertemporal-interactions-and-policy-adaptability-how-do-political-institutions-work |
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dig-bid-node-107622024-05-30T20:25:17ZVeto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work? 2008-08-01T00:00:00+0000 http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011288 https://publications.iadb.org/en/veto-players-intertemporal-interactions-and-policy-adaptability-how-do-political-institutions-work Inter-American Development Bank Public Administration Democracy democracy, political planning, comparative government, veto player theory Veto player theory argues that a higher number of veto players lowers the likelihood of change; in turn, policies that do not change help to sustain commitments but may prevent adaptation to changing circumstances. This paper challenges that claim of veto player theory by arguing that policy stability does not necessarily mean lower policy adaptability. If policymaking takes place over time with actors interacting repeatedly, more cooperative polities might be able to achieve both objectives at once, and a higher number of veto players might even favor intertemporal cooperation. The paper presents a simple formalization of the argument and some supportive cross-national empirical evidence. Inter-American Development Bank Carlos Scartascini Ernesto H. Stein Mariano Tommasi Working Papers application/pdf IDB Publications The Caribbean Central America South America en |
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biblioteca |
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Biblioteca Felipe Herrera del BID |
| language |
English |
| topic |
Public Administration Democracy democracy, political planning, comparative government, veto player theory Public Administration Democracy democracy, political planning, comparative government, veto player theory |
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Public Administration Democracy democracy, political planning, comparative government, veto player theory Public Administration Democracy democracy, political planning, comparative government, veto player theory Inter-American Development Bank Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work? |
| description |
Veto player theory argues that a higher number of veto players lowers the likelihood of change; in turn, policies that do not change help to sustain commitments but may prevent adaptation to changing circumstances. This paper challenges that claim of veto player theory by arguing that policy stability does not necessarily mean lower policy adaptability. If policymaking takes place over time with actors interacting repeatedly, more cooperative polities might be able to achieve both objectives at once, and a higher number of veto players might even favor intertemporal cooperation. The paper presents a simple formalization of the argument and some supportive cross-national empirical evidence. |
| author2 |
Carlos Scartascini |
| author_facet |
Carlos Scartascini Inter-American Development Bank |
| format |
Working Papers |
| topic_facet |
Public Administration Democracy democracy, political planning, comparative government, veto player theory |
| author |
Inter-American Development Bank |
| author_sort |
Inter-American Development Bank |
| title |
Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work? |
| title_short |
Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work? |
| title_full |
Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work? |
| title_fullStr |
Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work? |
| title_sort |
veto players, intertemporal interactions and policy adaptability: how do political institutions work? |
| publisher |
Inter-American Development Bank |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011288 https://publications.iadb.org/en/veto-players-intertemporal-interactions-and-policy-adaptability-how-do-political-institutions-work |
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