Punishment and Desert [electronic resource] /

Superficial acquaintance with the literature on punishment leaves a fairly definite impression. There are two approaches to punishment - retributive and utilitarian - and while some attempts may be made to reconcile them, it is the former rather than the latter which requires the reconciliation. Taken by itself the retributive approach is primitive and unenlightened, falling short of the rational civilized humanitarian values which we have now acquired. Certainly this is the dominant impression left by 'popular' discussions of the SUbject. And retributive vs. utilitarian seems to be the mould in which most philosophical dis­ cussions are cast. The issues are far more complex than this. Punishment may be con­ sidered in a great variety of contexts - legal, educational, parental, theological, informal, etc. - and in each of these contexts several im­ portant moral questions arise. Approaches which see only a simple choice between retributivism and utilitarianism tend to obscure this variety and plurality. But even more seriously, the distinction between retributivism and utilitarianism is far from clear. That it reflects the traditional distinction between deontological and teleological ap­ proaches to ethics serves to transfer rather than to resolve the un­ clarity. Usually it is said that retributive approaches seek to justify acts by reference to features which are intrinsic to them, whereas utilitarian approaches appeal to the consequences of such acts. This, however, makes assumptions about the individuation of acts which are difficult to justify.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kleinig, John. author., SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: Texto biblioteca
Language:eng
Published: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 1973
Subjects:Philosophy., Philosophy, general.,
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2027-5
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
id KOHA-OAI-TEST:228213
record_format koha
institution COLPOS
collection Koha
country México
countrycode MX
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
En linea
databasecode cat-colpos
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Departamento de documentación y biblioteca de COLPOS
language eng
topic Philosophy.
Philosophy.
Philosophy, general.
Philosophy.
Philosophy.
Philosophy, general.
spellingShingle Philosophy.
Philosophy.
Philosophy, general.
Philosophy.
Philosophy.
Philosophy, general.
Kleinig, John. author.
SpringerLink (Online service)
Punishment and Desert [electronic resource] /
description Superficial acquaintance with the literature on punishment leaves a fairly definite impression. There are two approaches to punishment - retributive and utilitarian - and while some attempts may be made to reconcile them, it is the former rather than the latter which requires the reconciliation. Taken by itself the retributive approach is primitive and unenlightened, falling short of the rational civilized humanitarian values which we have now acquired. Certainly this is the dominant impression left by 'popular' discussions of the SUbject. And retributive vs. utilitarian seems to be the mould in which most philosophical dis­ cussions are cast. The issues are far more complex than this. Punishment may be con­ sidered in a great variety of contexts - legal, educational, parental, theological, informal, etc. - and in each of these contexts several im­ portant moral questions arise. Approaches which see only a simple choice between retributivism and utilitarianism tend to obscure this variety and plurality. But even more seriously, the distinction between retributivism and utilitarianism is far from clear. That it reflects the traditional distinction between deontological and teleological ap­ proaches to ethics serves to transfer rather than to resolve the un­ clarity. Usually it is said that retributive approaches seek to justify acts by reference to features which are intrinsic to them, whereas utilitarian approaches appeal to the consequences of such acts. This, however, makes assumptions about the individuation of acts which are difficult to justify.
format Texto
topic_facet Philosophy.
Philosophy.
Philosophy, general.
author Kleinig, John. author.
SpringerLink (Online service)
author_facet Kleinig, John. author.
SpringerLink (Online service)
author_sort Kleinig, John. author.
title Punishment and Desert [electronic resource] /
title_short Punishment and Desert [electronic resource] /
title_full Punishment and Desert [electronic resource] /
title_fullStr Punishment and Desert [electronic resource] /
title_full_unstemmed Punishment and Desert [electronic resource] /
title_sort punishment and desert [electronic resource] /
publisher Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands,
publishDate 1973
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2027-5
work_keys_str_mv AT kleinigjohnauthor punishmentanddesertelectronicresource
AT springerlinkonlineservice punishmentanddesertelectronicresource
_version_ 1756271226254262272
spelling KOHA-OAI-TEST:2282132018-07-31T00:09:41ZPunishment and Desert [electronic resource] / Kleinig, John. author. SpringerLink (Online service) textDordrecht : Springer Netherlands,1973.engSuperficial acquaintance with the literature on punishment leaves a fairly definite impression. There are two approaches to punishment - retributive and utilitarian - and while some attempts may be made to reconcile them, it is the former rather than the latter which requires the reconciliation. Taken by itself the retributive approach is primitive and unenlightened, falling short of the rational civilized humanitarian values which we have now acquired. Certainly this is the dominant impression left by 'popular' discussions of the SUbject. And retributive vs. utilitarian seems to be the mould in which most philosophical dis­ cussions are cast. The issues are far more complex than this. Punishment may be con­ sidered in a great variety of contexts - legal, educational, parental, theological, informal, etc. - and in each of these contexts several im­ portant moral questions arise. Approaches which see only a simple choice between retributivism and utilitarianism tend to obscure this variety and plurality. But even more seriously, the distinction between retributivism and utilitarianism is far from clear. That it reflects the traditional distinction between deontological and teleological ap­ proaches to ethics serves to transfer rather than to resolve the un­ clarity. Usually it is said that retributive approaches seek to justify acts by reference to features which are intrinsic to them, whereas utilitarian approaches appeal to the consequences of such acts. This, however, makes assumptions about the individuation of acts which are difficult to justify.I. Moral Justification -- II. Definitions,Justification and Punishment -- a. ‘Punishment’ is an activity-word -- b. Punishment involves some imposition -- c. Punishment is meted out for moral wrongs -- d. Punishment is inflicted on offenders -- e. Must punishment be administered by an authority? -- f. Punishment as a moral notion -- III. The Concept of Desert -- a. The deserving -- b. The deserved -- c. The grounds of desert -- IV. Getting What One Deserves -- The authority to punish -- V. Desert, Punishment and Justice -- a. Justice vs. utility -- b. Justice and mercy -- c. Justice and forgiveness -- VI. Punishment and Responsibility -- a. Problems of determining responsibility -- b. Responsibility as alterability -- c. The elimination of responsibility -- d. Moral and legal responsibility -- VII. Getting as Much as One Deserves -- a. Scaling deserts -- b. Lex talionis -- c. An alternative -- d. Institutionalized penalties -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.Superficial acquaintance with the literature on punishment leaves a fairly definite impression. There are two approaches to punishment - retributive and utilitarian - and while some attempts may be made to reconcile them, it is the former rather than the latter which requires the reconciliation. Taken by itself the retributive approach is primitive and unenlightened, falling short of the rational civilized humanitarian values which we have now acquired. Certainly this is the dominant impression left by 'popular' discussions of the SUbject. And retributive vs. utilitarian seems to be the mould in which most philosophical dis­ cussions are cast. The issues are far more complex than this. Punishment may be con­ sidered in a great variety of contexts - legal, educational, parental, theological, informal, etc. - and in each of these contexts several im­ portant moral questions arise. Approaches which see only a simple choice between retributivism and utilitarianism tend to obscure this variety and plurality. But even more seriously, the distinction between retributivism and utilitarianism is far from clear. That it reflects the traditional distinction between deontological and teleological ap­ proaches to ethics serves to transfer rather than to resolve the un­ clarity. Usually it is said that retributive approaches seek to justify acts by reference to features which are intrinsic to them, whereas utilitarian approaches appeal to the consequences of such acts. This, however, makes assumptions about the individuation of acts which are difficult to justify.Philosophy.Philosophy.Philosophy, general.Springer eBookshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2027-5URN:ISBN:9789401020275